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AbstractUsing South African examples, this article explores how legitimacy is constituted amongst state and non-state actors in a highly pluralized context of limited statehood and the implications that this has for policing reform. In particular, it explores the means by which the legitimacy of the state and non-state is relational, co-produced, and co-dependent by focusing on two components of legitimacy: effectiveness and accountability. Given the contextual realities of policing legitimation in pluralized contexts, the article provides a critical appraisal of the challenges for policing reform.

This thesis examines how power is constituted in hybrid polycentric systems of security governance. In particular, the thesis explores how legitimacy - as one form of power - is configured in Improvement Districts in South Africa, with a specific focus on three ways by which it is gained: through promoting public participation in decision-making; through transparent and accountable policing nodes; and through the delivery of effective security for the public good. Polycentric systems of security governance are usually composed of a number of policing or security nodes that are independent of each other, but take account of each other in relationships of co-operation or conflict and where no single node dominates all the rest. In other words, some or all of these nodes, may co-ordinate around specific security problems or events in a sustained manner. The functioning of polycentric security governance was explored in Improvement Districts in Cape Town and Johannesburg, as they are an exemplar of polycentricity in the way that they operate. Qualitative field research was employed using a nodal analytical framework and a collective case study approach. In-depth interviewing, participant and direct observation as well as documentary analysis were the primary research methods employed. The findings of the research reveal that polycentricity impacts on legitimacy in a number of ways. Legitimacy may originate from multiple sources and state and non-state policing nodes within polycentric security governance systems may undermine, enhance and/or co-produce democratic participation, accountability and security for the public interest. There are a number of factors or conditions that shape whether polycentric systems of governance are legitimate and how they derive this legitimacy. The main finding of the thesis is that for a polycentric system to be aligned to the public interest, it needs to be motivated by public, peer and political expectations, amongst other things. The findings of the thesis both challenge the normative tendency to associate democratic legitimacy with the state and contribute to the pressing question of how to theoretically account for the empirical reality of polycentric security governance systems.

The pre- and post- apartheid governments have been engaging with the private security industry through the creation and enforcement of legislation to regulate the industry. The new government, in particular, has been actively implementing legislation to further tighten restrictions and update older legislation. Considering these developments it is perhaps necessary to review all the legislative parameters, both old and new, directed at the private security industry. The future role of private security in South Africa may depend on the success of the legislative attempts of the government and could be a preparation for a formal partnership with the public police.

Among scholars of law and crime and practitioners of public safety, there is a pervasive view that only the public police can or should protect the public interest. Further, the prevailing perception is that the public police predominantly governs through crime—that is, acts on harms as detrimental to the public good. We argue that governing harm through crime is not always the most effective way of producing public safety and security and that the production of public safety is not limited to public police forces. An approach of governing-through-harm that uses a variety of noncrime strategies and private security agents as participants in public safety is often more effective—and more legitimate—than the predominant governing-through-crime approach. We reflect on case studies of noncrime intervention strategies from the Global South to bolster the case for decoupling the link between the public police and public goods. A new theoretical framing needs to be pursued.

With the legislative review of police oversight currently taking place in South Africa, now is a good time to reflect on the regulation of the private security industry. This article does so by focusing on three challenges to the current private security regulatory systems: the increased pluralisation of policing within public spaces; the operation of hidden sectors within the industry; and the nature of criminal abuses perpetuated by the industry. We do this to demonstrate the need for a re-imagining of what regulation, especially state regulation, of this industry should entail. The aim of the article is not to review the current legislation or to identify gaps and propose means of filling those gaps, but rather to reflect on the underlying premises informing the legislation and propose a shift in thinking. We do this by briefly identifying two phases of state regulation in South Africa, implemented before and after the change to a new democratic dispensation, and suggest that we are now entering a third phase of regulation. We conclude with suggestions as to what this third phase may entail.