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In political games, a good reputation is an invaluable asset. Hence, this research intends to expand the current understanding of the determinants of success imperative for the reputation of local political leaders. This article reviews the literature on reputation management, as well as empirical cases, to elucidate the reputational success factors of political leaders. Empirically, this study targets tenured mayors in Norway to distinguish key sources of their political reputation, which can be practically beneficial for political leadership. The theories delineated in the literature regarding political leadership were used to construct a typology containing three constructs to analyse political reputations. The findings in this article reveal that the key elements from behavioural, symbolic, and ethical constructs are important and should act in concert to build a good reputation. Within a system with limited formal political powers, efforts are needed to build soft power networks that provide the capacity to act. Politicians can learn ways to secure their support and enhance their power base from the identified reputational success factors.

In political games, a good reputation is an invaluable asset. Hence, this research intends to expand the current understanding of the determinants of success imperative for the reputation of local political leaders. This article reviews the literature on reputation management, as well as empirical cases, to elucidate the reputational success factors of political leaders. Empirically, this study targets tenured mayors in Norway to distinguish key sources of their political reputation, which can be practically beneficial for political leadership. The theories delineated in the literature regarding political leadership were used to construct a typology containing three constructs to analyse political reputations. The findings in this article reveal that the key elements from behavioural, symbolic, and ethical constructs are important and should act in concert to build a good reputation. Within a system with limited formal political powers, efforts are needed to build soft power networks that provide the capacity to act. Politicians can learn ways to secure their support and enhance their power base from the identified reputational success factors.

This article explores how council leaderships act as agents in promoting reputational policies. It introduces a public policy perspective to research on public sector reputation. It asks how the political leader and the administrative leader are agents in reputational policies and to what extent different interests and coalitions can influence thought patterns and behaviour in the municipal organisation. What has been found is that the political leader and the administrative leader may have different interests and strategies and that they are likely to be engaged in networks that might be narrow or broad in focus, scope and membership. These reputational agents and coalitions have an impact on reputational policies. They have an impact on the understanding of 'proper roles' and routines in municipalities and this again may lead to changes in the workings of the municipal organisation.

Published version. Source at http://ojs.ub.gu.se/ojs/index.php/sjpa/article/view/3320 ; This article explores how council leaderships act as agents in promoting reputational policies. It introduces a public policy perspective to research on public sector reputation. It asks how the political leader and the administrative leader are agents in reputational policies and to what extent different interests and coalitions can influence thought patterns and behaviour in the municipal organisation. What has been found is that the political leader and the administrative leader may have different interests and strategies and that they are likely to be engaged in networks that might be narrow or broad in focus, scope and membership. These reputational agents and coalitions have an impact on reputational policies. They have an impact on the understanding of 'proper roles' and routines in municipalities and this again may lead to changes in the workings of the municipal organisation.

This article explores how council leaderships act as agents in promoting reputational policies. It introduces a public policy perspective to research on public sector reputation. It asks how the political leader and the administrative leader are agents in reputational policies and to what extent different interests and coalitions can influence thought patterns and behaviour in the municipal organisation. What has been found is that the political leader and the administrative leader may have different interests and strategies and that they are likely to be engaged in networks that might be narrow or broad in focus, scope and membership. These reputational agents and coalitions have an impact on reputational policies. They have an impact on the understanding of 'proper roles' and routines in municipalities and this again may lead to changes in the workings of the municipal organisation.

The article is based on a study of a local council in Australia where women representatives hold a majority of the seats. How do these representatives understand their role in this context? What is their preferred style of doing politics, and what can explain their political aims and behaviour? What we find is that these women representatives are oriented toward green politics and prefer deliberative decision-making. This case study of a local council in Queensland suggests that the political objectives and style of women representatives largely reflect the specific local context, the electoral system and the political composition of the council, and not just the fact that women hold more than 70% of the seats. However, women representatives do feel that "numbers matter" for their ability to be acting out "who they are" in politics.

While steps are taken to increase women's representation in politics, it can often prove difficult to change patterns of recruitment and nomination to political positions. This article argues that not only formal regulation, but also informal institutions, like local norms, beliefs and values, history and traditional codes of conduct matter and should be taken into account in plans to achieve balanced gender representation. The article compares recruitment policies in rural municipalities in Norway. Case studies were conducted to identify factors affecting women's willingness to stand as candidates, the factors local political parties take into account when nominating candidates, and voting behaviour. The study suggests that local issues, such as religious traditions, distributional conflicts and desire for community representation, affect women representation. Representation policies in local governments are, in other words, not only affected by rules and values "from above", they must also be understood in a "bottom up" perspective, as the aggregated consequences of the rational behaviour of voters.

Keywords: women representation • representation policies • informal and formal institutions • local democracy

The article is based on a study of a local council in Australia where women representatives hold a majority of the seats. How do these representatives understand their role in this context? What is their preferred style of doing politics, and what can explain their political aims and behaviour? What we find is that these women representatives are oriented toward green politics and prefer deliberative decision-making. This case study of a local council in Queensland suggests that the political objectives and style of women representatives largely reflect the specific local context, the electoral system and the political composition of the council, and not just the fact that women hold more than 70% of the seats. However, women representatives do feel that "numbers matter" for their ability to be acting out "who they are" in politics.

The article is based on a study of a local council in Australia where women representatives hold a majority of the seats. How do these representatives understand their role in this context? What is their preferred style of doing politics, and what can explain their political aims and behaviour? What we find is that these women representatives are oriented toward green politics and prefer deliberative decision-making. This case study of a local council in Queensland suggests that the political objectives and style of women representatives largely reflect the specific local context, the electoral system and the political composition of the council, and not just the fact that women hold more than 70% of the seats. However, women representatives do feel that "numbers matter" for their ability to be acting out "who they are" in politics.

This article discusses the consequences of changing views on accountability in democratic decision-making. Trends in Norway indicate that Norwegians are evaluating local democracy increasingly in terms of service performance and output, rather than in terms of political input from citizens. While traditional process evaluation is associated with governmental hierarchies and how voters can make elected representatives accountable for their policies, performance evaluation has connections with the logic of the market. It represents a shift from collective political control to individual consumer satisfaction, and consequently, from public to private accountability. Some highly prized democratic values, such as vertical political accountability, informed discussions of the totality of interests, and traditional democratic will-formation, could be lost on the way.

Facilitative leadership has long been a catchword in studies of mayoral leadership. Emphasizing cooperation, consensus-building and the empowerment of others, the facilitative model is said to be typical of council-manager systems of local government. Drawing on a study of long-serving mayors in Norway, the paper assesses the accuracy of the facilitative approach in a typical council-manager system. What does it entail as an ideal type and to what extent does it catch the essence of mayoral leadership as practiced in Norwegian local government? We argue that there are conspicuous and interesting examples of Norwegian mayors exercising strong, strategic, and visionary leadership within a 'facilitative frame', and that the facilitative model does not preclude a broader and more 'expansive' and 'entrepreneurial' approach to mayoral leadership.

The NPM portfolio offers several solutions to improve organisational performance and efficiency. One of the most crucial of them is to split up integrated organisations into more autonomous operational units. The idea of arm's length government is gaining ground in Norwegian local government and has materialised itself through the proliferation of agencies, especially in the shape of different forms of local government bodies and enterprises. Agencies are regarded as useful organisational designs for promoting transparency and, in consequence, better fiscal and political control. They are supposed to provide a more output oriented type of democracy. But does this form of government actually improve transparency and are Norwegian municipalities attuned to and prepared for this type of democracy? This article builds on case studies of local government enterprises in two municipalities. Here we ask: how transparent are the activities and outputs of these agencies; do they have specified contracts; do they have easy-to-follow structures and are the owners in control? Our findings make us question local governments' ability to accommodate the form of transparency associated with agencies and output oriented democracy. In our cases, arm's length government has not led to the intended increase in transparency and political control, mainly because of weak contractualisation between local government and agencies, complex ownership structures, lack of interest among average local politicians, side-lined municipal administrations and even mayors striving to get the information and the influence they deem necessary and legitimate.

The NPM portfolio offers several solutions to improve organisational performance and . One of the most crucial of them is to split up integrated organisations into more autonomous operational units. The idea of arm's length government is gaining ground in Norwegian local government and has materialised itself through the proliferation of agencies, especially in the shape of different forms of local government bodies and enterprises. Agencies are regarded as useful organisational designs for promoting transparency and, in consequence, better fiscal and political control. They are supposed to provide a more output oriented type of democracy. But does this form of government actually improve transparency and are Norwegian municipalities attuned to and prepared for this type of democracy? This article builds on case studies of local government enterprises in two municipalities. Here we ask: how transparent are the activities and outputs of these agencies; do they have specified contracts; do they have easy-to-follow structures and are the owners in control? Our findings make us question local governments' ability to accommodate the form of transparency associated with agencies and output oriented democracy. In our cases, arm's length government has not led to the intended increase in transparency and political control, mainly because of weak contractualisation between local government and agencies, complex ownership structures, lack of interest among average local politicians, side-lined municipal administrations and even mayors striving to get the information and the influence they deem necessary and legitimate.

The NPM portfolio offers several solutions to improve organisational performance and . One of the most crucial of them is to split up integrated organisations into more autonomous operational units. The idea of arm's length government is gaining ground in Norwegian local government and has materialised itself through the proliferation of agencies, especially in the shape of different forms of local government bodies and enterprises. Agencies are regarded as useful organisational designs for promoting transparency and, in consequence, better fiscal and political control. They are supposed to provide a more output oriented type of democracy. But does this form of government actually improve transparency and are Norwegian municipalities attuned to and prepared for this type of democracy? This article builds on case studies of local government enterprises in two municipalities. Here we ask: how transparent are the activities and outputs of these agencies; do they have specified contracts; do they have easy-to-follow structures and are the owners in control? Our findings make us question local governments' ability to accommodate the form of transparency associated with agencies and output oriented democracy. In our cases, arm's length government has not led to the intended increase in transparency and political control, mainly because of weak contractualisation between local government and agencies, complex ownership structures, lack of interest among average local politicians, side-lined municipal administrations and even mayors striving to get the information and the influence they deem necessary and legitimate.