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The package to show Europe is in control of irregular arrivals is a triumph of performance over policy.

Most studies on illegal migration focus on particular national or local settings and most theoretical approaches are built upon research done in America and Western Europe. In consequence, there is little understanding about the legal construction of the 'illegal' and the meanings of migrants' illegality in different political contexts. Given these major shortcomings, this article compares the cases of Malaysia and Spain. By comparing how we can explain illegal immigration and what it means to be illegal in each country, the final aim of this article is to place the term 'illegal' back into its context, that is, to understand the 'illegal' not as an essentialised, generic and singular object but rather as a legal and political product of particular historical and national contexts.

The twenty-seven countries of the European Union have unlocked an agreement on the Pact on Migration and Asylum. The process of negotiation among the EU institutions will now begin and it remains to be seen, if it is approved, how this precarious balance might materialise in practice when the interests concerned do not only diverge but are also clearly inflamed by the politicisation of immigration in their respective national contexts. This article was previously published in the newspaperARA. Since 2015, Europe has been haunted by the possibility of a new migration crisis. Then, Angela Merkel uttered the famous words, "Yes we can", in response to the question of whether Europe could take in refugees. But immediately afterwards, Europe said, "Enough". Ever since, it has been obsessed with making sure this does not happen again. The Bulgarian political scientist, Ivan Krastev, calls it the European 9/11. Despite this fear, the EU has taken eight years to conclude a new migration pact. The aim is twofold: to seal European borders, and a more equitable distribution of responsibility among the Member States. But is there really agreement?Most of all, there is hurry. At the European level, there is no desire to be faced with the European elections in June 2024 without having shown unity and determination with regard to the question of migration. Not achieving this would give wings to Eurosceptic and far-right discourse about the inability of European governments to respond to the situation. Moreover, nobody wants in the rotating European Presidency countries like Hungary and Poland, which directly contest the need for an agreement. At the national level, in a situation of growing numbers of arrivals and requests for asylum, governments like those of Germany and Italy urgently need to calm internal tensions. In the case of Germany, the spectre of the far right looms again.There is a rush but there is also some agreement, especially on certain matters. The Vice-President of the European Commission, Margaritis Schinas, describes the Pact as being like a three-storey house where one floor is concerned with relations with third countries, a second with management of external borders, and a third with distributing responsibility among member states. Agreement exists mainly between the first two floors. The third continues to be home to hubbub. In the case of the first floor, there is agreement that third countries are essential for helping to contain illegal arrivals. No one doubts this. The problem lies with the consequences since depending on them leaves European countries in their hands, and there is no regime that willingly accepts the forced return of its citizens. In addition, agreements with governments like that of Tunisia still arouse certain suspicions and do not always end well.On the second floor, that of the border, the Pact allows delays in registration of asylum seekers, introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures, and expanded time of border detention. In short, it means lower standards, and legalising what, hitherto, was unequivocally illegal. The Crisis Regulation, the last that was left to be approved, only aggravates matters. The result is a creation of liminal and exceptional spaces, liminal because the question of whether a border has been crossed is in doubt, and exceptional because, in this no-man's land, certain laws (and hence, rights) no longer apply. This was one of the demands made by Meloni. Meanwhile, the delays and concentration of procedures at borders only consolidates the role of Greece, Italy, and Spain as the chief guardians of Europe's southern borders.Finally, the third floor still requires caution. To begin with, the Pact has forsaken its original intention of a fairer distribution of asylum seekers among the Member States. There will be no mandatory refugee relocation quotas. Solidarity has now become a matter of fines, the notorious 20,000 euros per asylum seeker for countries that refuse to take them in. Although this is a minimum agreement, Poland and Hungary have already said they consider it to be unacceptable. Then again, the Dublin Regulation—the one that Angela Merkel said in 2015 was not working—remains in force and even strengthened. For example, the period during which an asylum seeker who has entered through Spain can be returned from Germany has doubled from twelve to twenty-four months. Once again, the burden is on the countries of first entry. As long as the unequal distribution continues, the system will remain dysfunctional.Is there an agreement then? It depends on how the negotiations with the European Parliament will proceed and, if the Pact is approved, how this precarious balance might materialise in practice when the wishes concerned not only diverge but are also clearly inflamed by the politicisation of immigration in their respective national contexts. However, we could say that, yes, there is agreement, at least outwardly. This is how it has been presented by the Spanish government, which is proud that it has happened under its Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Nevertheless, once again, words and facts differ. The headlines show agreement, but the gestures point in a different direction. Granada was the setting. While Sunak and Meloni called a meeting of six (United Kingdom, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Albania, and the European Commission) to discuss "other" measures for stopping the illegal arrivals, Orbán arrived in the city declaring the Hungary and Poland had been "legally violated" by the Pact.Keywords: Pact on Migration and Asylum, EU, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Spanish presidency, border, arrivals, European Parliament, 2024 elections

State regulation of labour migration is confronted with a double paradox. First, while markets require a policy of open borders to fulfill demands for migrant workers, the boundaries of citizenship impose some degree of closure to the outside. Second, while the exclusivity of citizenship requires closed membership, civil and human rights undermine the state's capacity to exclude foreigners once they are in the country. By considering how Malaysia and Spain have responded to the demand for foreign labour, this book analyses what may be identified as the trilemma between markets, citizenship and rights.

State regulation of labour migration is confronted with a double paradox. First, while markets require a policy of open borders to fulfill demands for migrant workers, the boundaries of citizenship impose some degree of closure to the outside. Second, while the exclusivity of citizenship requires closed membership, civil and human rights undermine the state's capacity to exclude foreigners once they are in the country. By considering how Malaysia and Spain have responded to the demand for foreign labour, this book analyses what may be identified as the trilemma between markets, citizenship and rights. For though their markets are similar, the two countries have different approaches to citizenship and rights. We must thus ask: how do such divergences affect state responses to market demands and how, in turn, do state regulations impact labour migration flows? And what does this mean for contemporary migration overall? - De overheid wordt in de regulering van arbeidsmigratie geconfronteerd met een dubbele paradox. Ten eerste: terwijl markten een op en grenzenbeleid vereisen om aan de behoefte van arbeidsmigranten en de marktvraag tegemoet te komen, leggen de grenzen die inherent zijn aan burgerschap een zekere afsluiting van de buitenwereld op. Ten tweede: terwijl de exclusiviteit die burgerschap met zich meebrengt een gesloten lidmaatschap vergt, ondermijnen burgerschap- en mensenrechten de mogelijkheid van de staat om buitenlanders uit te sluiten zodra zij zich in het land bevinden.

En los últimos años, a pesar de un mayor control migratorio, la inmigración irregular ha crecido tanto en España como en Malasia y Estados Unidos. Este incremento de la inmigración irregular ha sido explicado principalmente en relación a factores socioeconómicos. Sin embargo, si bien estos factores explican la presencia de flujos migratorios hacia estos países, no logran explicar por qué parte de estos flujos se da de forma irregular. Para ello tenemos que tomar en consideración el Estado y sus políticas de inmigración. Partiendo de esta premisa, esta investigación analiza hasta qué punto, cómo y por qué las políticas de inmigración en España, Malasia y Estados Unidos producen "ilegales". Esto significa analizar no sólo cómo y por qué las políticas de inmigración contribuyen a incrementar el número de inmigrantes irregulares, sino también cómo y por qué, negando sus derechos y a menudo su existencia, crean la figura del "ilegal". Como se demuestra en esta nota de investigación para el caso de Malasia, la inmigración irregular no es a pesar de las políticas de inmigración, sino como consecuencia de ellas

Migration; Statistics for Social Science, Behavorial Science, Education, Public Policy, and Law

Despite their rhetorical emphasis on enforcement, contemporary governments have overseen a process of formal semi-inclusion of irregular migrants. This chapter calls for a clearer conceptual distinction between sovereignty and governmentality to argue that simultaneous exclusion and inclusion does not primarily result from a gap between law in the books and law in practice, nor from external constraints imposed on the state, but rather follows from contradictory public rationalities in the realm of migration management. Those contradictions result in a messy, multidimensional, and continuous citizenship regime that cannot not be fully grasped through reified dichotomies such as formal vs informal, structure vs agency, or legal exclusion vs performative acts of inclusion, as the latter ironically rely on an overly homogenous and self-consistent picture of the modern state. We hypothesize that the structural imperatives of governmentality, which require embracing the population as it is, may account for the relative stability of forms of incorporation over time while moral and legal justifications for it come and go in a more fluctuating way. These structural concerns— public health, public education, public safety, economic and urban planning — could turn out to be of deeper long-term relevance to contemporary states than more superficial or "ideological" considerations such as human rights compliance or humanitarian compassion.