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AbstractIn the advancing understanding of the crime-terror nexus, organized crime and terrorist entities are increasingly seen as capable of pursuing multiple agendas simultaneously, with the potential to ultimately reach convergence. Applying Makarenko's theoretical work on crime-terror convergence, this article sets out to explain the persistence of organized crime in Iraq after the fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Caliphate, based on a literature study and three expert interviews. The vacuum caused by the Caliphate's fall led to fierce competition between remnants of ISIS and Iran-backed Shia factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and a rearrangement of control over ISIS' criminal enterprise. The Iraq-Syria border is used as a hub for the smuggling of weapons, drugs, oil, and people by both the ISIS remnants and the Shia PMF factions, while the border areas and roads leading to Baghdad are focal points for imposing illicit taxation. We argue that in post-Caliphate Iraq, ISIS remnants can be seen as hybrid criminal-political entities, while the Shia PMF factions cannot be defined as such in a definite manner. In their competition for power, both actors exploit local idiosyncrasies to garner support among the local population. By strengthening both their criminal and ideological-political components, these actors continue to destabilize the already fragile Iraqi state. Moreover, because Iran-backed Shia PMF factions obtained legitimacy and state backing as liberators from ISIS and became embedded in the Iraqi state apparatus, the state itself became a crucial contributor to the crime-terror nexus in post-Caliphate Iraq.

Abstract
The increasing use of social media and mobile devices by asylum seekers offers new vetting opportunities for immigration authorities, to verify the identity or to assess national-security or 1F-exclusion aspects. Based on interviews with practitioners in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, the first experiences with both of these new methods seem to be mixed, while formal evaluations of the results seem to be lacking. We argue that the increasing reliance on these methods, in combination with the further advancement of technology, raises important questions about possible infringements on the right to private life, as well as the risk of function creep and social sorting. It can be questioned to what extent the use of these new vetting tools and methods is proportional to the results they produce and to what extent fundamental human rights, including privacy, are sufficiently safeguarded.

The departure of substantial numbers of 'foreign fighters' and the occurrence of terrorist attacks on European soil have prompted renewed interest in citizenship deprivation as a policy measure. This article aims to contribute to the debate on its utility as a counterterrorism measure by examining recent developments in citizenship deprivation legislation and its use in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK; discussing the wide array of possible scenarios that may follow after an individual is deprived of citizenship; and analysing to what extent the various outcomes are instrumental in countering terrorism. It concludes that most of the outcomes are problematic from a human rights perspective, or counterproductive in the fight against terrorism as they may cause further marginalisation and radicalisation and can play into the hands of terrorist groups, may cause people to disappear from the radar, and may undermine crucial international cooperation.

AbstractAgainst the backdrop of countries increasingly being confronted with undesirable but unreturnable non-citizen terrorist suspects, this article describes the resettlement process of 150 cleared but unreturnable Guantanamo Bay detainees. Merely 13% of these detainees have been resettled in full democracies, compared to 52% in authoritarian regimes. Using Starkley et al.'s concept of 'zone agreement' the article explains how the U.S. particularly managed to incentivize pragmatically oriented – rather than idealistically motivated – governments to engage in third country resettlement [16]. From the perspective of the U.S. the resettlement scheme can be considered relatively successful, while the experiences of resettlement countries and the resettled detainees themselves have been very mixed.

Against the backdrop of countries increasingly being confronted with undesirable but unreturnable non-citizen terrorist suspects, this article describes the resettlement process of 150 cleared but unreturnable Guantanamo Bay detainees. Merely 13% of these detainees have been resettled in full democracies, compared to 52% in authoritarian regimes. Using Starkley et al.'s concept of 'zone agreement' the article explains how the U.S. particularly managed to incentivize pragmatically oriented – rather than idealistically motivated – governments to engage in third country resettlement [16]. From the perspective of the U.S. the resettlement scheme can be considered relatively successful, while the experiences of resettlement countries and the resettled detainees themselves have been very mixed.

Against the backdrop of countries increasingly being confronted with undesirable but unreturnable non-citizen terrorist suspects, this article describes the resettlement process of 150 cleared but unreturnable Guantanamo Bay detainees. Merely 13% of these detainees have been resettled in full democracies, compared to 52% in authoritarian regimes. Using Starkley et al.'s concept of 'zone agreement' the article explains how the U.S. particularly managed to incentivize pragmatically oriented – rather than idealistically motivated – governments to engage in third country resettlement [16]. From the perspective of the U.S. the resettlement scheme can be considered relatively successful, while the experiences of resettlement countries and the resettled detainees themselves have been very mixed.

States increasingly prosecute irregular migrants – asylum-seekers included – for their (alleged) involvement in human smuggling during their own migration journey. Based on a literature review and interviews with lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and migrants on Sicily, this article provides insight into the nature and scale of this phenomenon in Italy and discusses the effects of criminal prosecution on these migrants' asylum procedures. From 2015–2018, as a standard operating procedure, roughly 1,300 "captains" and navigators – scafisti (literally: smugglers by boat) – of small dinghies with migrants arriving in Italy have been arrested for suspicion of "aiding clandestine (or irregular) immigration". Most scafisti are migrants themselves and there are strong indications that they were forced to steer or navigate the boat. These prosecuted migrants face many difficulties in proving duress and are often inadequately advised about the consequences of a criminal conviction on their subsequent immigration procedures. After a conviction, as well as after an acquittal, they are often excluded from official reception centres and have difficulties accessing asylum procedures. When they manage to apply for asylum, they will be denied international protection if they have been convicted. When they cannot be expelled, they may end up in a legal limbo, having to rely on a temporary humanitarian status with strict limitations.