Search results

It was not long after the attacks of September 11th that government officials began discussing other avenues that terrorists might use to attack American citizens, particularly in the maritime domain. In a speech delivered in January 2002, President George W. Bush noted, "The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- sance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries."

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword: Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy (Robert Jervis) -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness (Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz) -- Part One: Challenges to Effective Intelligence in Modern Democracies -- One: Executive Privilege: Intelligence Oversight in the United States (Steven C. Boraz) -- Two: Rethinking Judicial Oversight of Intelligence (Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Bryan Pate) -- Three: U.S. Intelligence Prior to 9/11 and Obstacles to Reform (William J. Lahneman) -- Four: Keeping ''Earthly Awkwardness'': Failures of Intelligence in the United Kingdom (Peter Gill) -- Five: Cultural Legacies of French Intelligence (Douglas Porch) -- Part Two: Democratic Control of Intelligence in New Democracies -- Six: Structural Change and Democratic Control of Intelligence in Brazil (Marco Cepik) -- Seven: Taiwan's Intelligence Reform in an Age of Democratization (Steven E. Phillips) -- Eight: Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina (Priscila Carlos Brandão Antunes) -- Nine: Romania's Transition To Democracy and the Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform (Cristiana Matei) -- Ten: Transforming Intelligence in South Africa (Kenneth R. Dombroski) -- Eleven: Terrorism's Threat To New Democracies: The Case of Russia (Mikhail Tsypkin) -- Twelve: Ethical and Moral Issues in Intelligence Reform: The Philippines (Douglas J. Macdonald) -- Conclusion: Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness (Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau) -- Selected Bibliography -- About the Contributors -- Index.

Abstract: Reforming national intelligence communities is a critical, if often overlooked, task facing democratizing countries. Democracy requires openness in the flow of information and discussion, while intelligence work often demands secrecy. Maintaining agencies to do such work in the midst of a generally open political culture is a challenge for any democracy. Democratizing or newly democratic countries, however, must deal with the even more arduous task of transforming intelligence bureaucracies that once served undemocratic regimes. Happily, intelligence agencies brought under civilian, democratic control may also become better at their core job of protecting free nations from deadly threats.

Military Review, November - December 2006 ; Violence in Central America has grown so much in the last half decade that Colombia is no longer the homicide capital of the region. In fact, it now ranks fourth in that ignominious distinction behind El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.1 The violence is mostly due to the phenomenon of street gangs, also called pandillas or gangas, but most often maras. They have grown in number, sophistication, and stature and have largely overwhelmed the security forces of Central America's fledgling democracies. Altogether, these maras represent a significant threat to the security of the countries in the region. Numerous national, binational, multinational, regional, and hemispheric conferences have sought to address the problem.

One of the most difficult and least explored challenges confronting new democracies is that of reforming their intelligence services. Even for long-established democracies, the need for civilian agencies dedicated to protecting national security through the gathering and analysis of intelligence (as well as occasional covert action on the basis of such intelligence) poses serious problems. Democracy requires openness in the flow of information and discussion, while intelligence work often demands secrecy. Maintaining agencies to do such work in the midst of a generally open political culture is a challenge for any democracy. Democratizing or newly democratic countries, however, must deal with the even more arduous task of transforming intelligence bureaucracies that once served undemocratic regimes.

Boraz, Steven C. ; Bruneau, Thomas C.: Democracy and effectiveness. - S. 28-42 Dombrowski, Kenneth R.: South Africa after apartheid. - S. 43-57 Philips, Steven E.: Identity and security in Taiwan. - S. 58-71 Tsypkin, Mikhail: Russia's failure. - S. 72-85

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword. Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction. Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness -- Part One: Challenges to Effective Intelligence in Modern Democracies -- 1. Executive Privilege: Intelligence Oversight in the United States -- 2. Rethinking Judicial Oversight of Intelligence -- 3. U.S. Intelligence Prior to 9/11 and Obstacles to Reform -- 4. Keeping ''Earthly Awkwardness'': Failures of Intelligence in the United Kingdom -- 5. Cultural Legacies of French Intelligence -- Part Two: Democratic Control of Intelligence in New Democracies -- 6. Structural Change and Democratic Control of Intelligence in Brazil -- 7. Taiwan's Intelligence Reform in an Age of Democratization -- 8. Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina -- 9. Romania's Transition to Democracy and the Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform -- 10. Transforming Intelligence in South Africa -- 11. Terrorism's Threat to New Democracies: The Case of Russia -- 12. Ethical and Moral Issues in Intelligence Reform: The Philippines -- Conclusion. Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness -- Selected Bibliography -- About the Contributors -- Index