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Abstract The European Community (EC) operates a multi‐layered GSP scheme in which different groups of developing countries are granted varying degrees of market access. This paper analyzes the question of trade diversion among different categories of beneficiary countries ensuing from the selectivity of preferential market access. Evidence from a disaggregated panel data analysis reveals sizable intra‐developing country trade diversion. The losses for relatively disadvantaged countries in terms of forgone trade volume are estimated to range between about 2% to 20% of their total trade with the EC. The distortions are driven by highly substitutable, mostly labour‐intensive commodities.

We estimate the trade effect of removing uncertainty about future trading conditions in the context of the 2014 reform of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union (EU). EU GSP members receive non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs), but only as long as they are not too competitive; i.e. they will graduate in case their share of EU GSP imports in a sector exceeds a certain threshold. However, the 2014 reform removed the threat of these competitiveness-related graduations for members of the so-called "GSP+", a sub-scheme of the main programme. We find that the reform increased EU imports from GSP+ countries by about 45% on average whilst tariffs stayed the same. This trade impact is driven by the country-sector pairs most exposed to NRTPs uncertainty prior to the reform. The effect is robust to taking into account other aspects of the reform, such as the reduction in GSP membership and changes in tariff margins, respectively.

We estimate the trade effect of removing uncertainty about future trading conditions in the context of the 2014 reform of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union (EU). EU GSP members receive non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs), but only as long as they are not too competitive; i.e. they will graduate in case their share of EU GSP imports in a sector exceeds a certain threshold. However, the 2014 reform removed the threat of these competitiveness-related graduations for members of the GSP+, a sub-scheme of the main programme. We find that the reform increased EU imports from GSP+ countries by about 7% on average whilst tariffs stayed the same. This trade impact is driven by the country-sector pairs most exposed to NRTPs uncertainty pre-reform. The effect is robust to taking into account other aspects of the reform, such as the reduction in GSP membership and changes in tariff margins, respectively.

AbstractThis paper explores the role of policy and economic structure in determining international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in services sectors. The analysis is based on bilateral sectoral M&A flow data and detailed information on policy barriers from a new database. Restrictive investment policies are found to reduce the probability of M&A inflows, controlling for bilateral frictions such as geography. This negative effect, however, is mitigated in countries with relatively large shares of manufacturing and (to a lesser extent) services in GDP. The same result holds for the number of M&A deals concluded. Findings are robust to accounting for the potential endogeneity of policy restrictiveness. The evidence suggests that the impact of policy is state‐dependent and related to the composition of GDP in the target economy.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a 'carrot-and-stick' mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to 'reward good behavior' or 'punish bad behavior' on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market upon compliance by its trading partners with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. We systematically document the coverage of NTPOs in EU trade agreements and in its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). We then examine the extent to which trade agreements and GSP programs can be used to promote NTPOs. Preferential trade agreements are negotiated under multilateral rules, which require members to eliminate all tariffs reciprocally. As a result, once a trade agreement enters into force, the EU cannot easily restrict or extend access to its market so as to "punish bad behavior" or "reward good behavior" on NTPOs by its trading partners. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, so they can be limited or extended, depending on compliance with NTPOs. EU GSP programs can thus provide a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in partner countries.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market upon compliance by its trading partners with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. We systematically document the coverage of NTPOs in EU trade agreements and in its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). We then examine the extent to which trade agreements and GSP programs can be used to promote NTPOs. Preferential trade agreements are negotiated under multilateral rules, which require members to eliminate all tariffs reciprocally. As a result, once a trade agreement enters into force, the EU cannot easily restrict or extend access to its market so as to "punish bad behavior" or "reward good behavior" on NTPOs by its trading partners. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, so they can be limited or extended, depending on compliance with NTPOs. EU GSP programs can thus provide a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in partner countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published