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In April and June 2014, Afghanistan conducted its first democratic transition of power. This commentary provides a first-hand account and appraisal of the conduct of the elections, and begins by capturing first the atmospherics of polling day, and then reviews some lasting impressions of the same. After identifying some of the common themes and strands that characterised the polling—including, polling procedures, individual and/or team performances of election officials, logistical shortcomings, and the security measures put in place, etc.—the commentary concludes by advocating for the continued improvement (best practices) of the electoral enterprise.

In April and June 2014, Afghanistan conducted its first democratic transition of power. This commentary provides a first-hand account and appraisal of the conduct of the elections, and begins by capturing first the atmospherics of polling day, and then reviews some lasting impressions of the same. After identifying some of the common themes and strands that characterised the polling—including, polling procedures, individual and/or team performances of election officials, logistical shortcomings, and the security measures put in place, etc.—the commentary concludes by advocating for the continued improvement (best practices) of the electoral enterprise. ; Copyright Information: The Author(s). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License from http://www.ieeca.org/journal/index.php/JEECAR/article/view/80.

In April and June 2014, Afghanistan conducted its first democratic transition of power. This commentary provides a first-hand account and appraisal of the conduct of the elections, and begins by capturing first the atmospherics of polling day, and then reviews some lasting impressions of the same. After identifying some of the common themes and strands that characterised the polling—including, polling procedures, individual and/or team performances of election officials, logistical shortcomings, and the security measures put in place, etc.—the commentary concludes by advocating for the continued improvement (best practices) of the electoral enterprise.

In April and June 2014, Afghanistan conducted its first democratic transition of power. This commentary provides a first-hand account and appraisal of the conduct of the elections, and begins by capturing first the atmospherics of polling day, and then reviews some lasting impressions of the same. After identifying some of the common themes and strands that characterised the polling—including, polling procedures, individual and/or team performances of election officials, logistical shortcomings, and the security measures put in place, etc.—the commentary concludes by advocating for the continued improvement (best practices) of the electoral enterprise.

AbstractDominant orthodoxies within the study of terrorism have developed and promoted a strategic understanding of terrorism which has, in effect, reinforced the very conflict it seeks to explain. In response, this article develops the challenge of critical terrorism studies to propose a new strategic approach to terrorism. It posits that, while unable to achieve a Clausewitzian victory over the state per se, terrorism is able to politically paralyse the state's overwhelming power by shifting the moral horizons of that state's constituency. We explore two mutually reinforcing mechanisms by which terrorism achieves this objective and explore a number of strategic policy implications of each. This new approach is needed as current approaches misrepresent the challenge the global community currently faces, creating a self‐perpetuating loop of conflict and grievance which promises no end to terrorist violence.

The responsibility to rebuild needs to be re-elevated to prominence as an integral component of r2p: conceptually, normatively and operationally; and its institutional homes in the un system and the Secretary-General's role clarified. The 2009 three pillar formulation of r2p works well in most contexts, but is problematic in that it buries and loses sight of the critical importance of the original iciss third 'responsibility to rebuild' and reconstruct war-raved societies to the point of being viable and self-sustaining once again. We derive some key lessons from the major international interventions of the twenty-first century and recall the context in which r2p was originally formulated in order to highlight the distinctive features of its contribution to international policy. We then describe three dimensions of the responsibility to rebuild – recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation – and the strategies and steps needed for the rebuilding agenda. Recalling that Security Council authorisation of r2p coercive operations is a nonnegotiable prerequisite, we suggest that the responsibility to rebuild can be reintroduced and implemented through the administrative and political leadership roles of the Secretary-General.

The ongoing international military withdrawal from Afghanistan has set the stage for energising the activities of Afghanistan's external stakeholders to re-evaluate their activities. The possible return of the Taliban in some form could compel Afghanistan's current external partners—Iran, India and Russia—to turn into limited spoilers. The absence of an international guarantor in Afghanistan from December 2014 is likely to encourage Pakistan—a greedy spoiler—to intensify its meddling as a means to reposition the Taliban—a total spoiler—at the helm of Afghan affairs. The combination of limited, greedy and total spoilers threatens to undermine security and state-building processes.

The ongoing international military withdrawal from Afghanistan has set the stage for energising the activities of Afghanistan's external stakeholders to re-evaluate their activities. The possible return of the Taliban in some form could compel Afghanistan's current external partners—Iran, India and Russia—to turn into limited spoilers. The absence of an international guarantor in Afghanistan from December 2014 is likely to encourage Pakistan—a greedy spoiler—to intensify its meddling as a means to reposition the Taliban—a total spoiler—at the helm of Afghan affairs. The combination of limited, greedy and total spoilers threatens to undermine security and state-building processes.