Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- ONE. Defining Globalization -- TWO. Theoretical Lenses for Viewing Globalization -- THREE. What People Fear-or Anticipate-about Globalization -- FOUR. Is Globalization Occurring? Assessing the Evidence -- FIVE. Globalization and Domestic Politics -- SIX. How Globalization's Impact Varies -- SEVEN. Globalization and the Politics of Identity -- EIGHT. Putting Globalization in Historical Perspective -- NINE. Future Scenarios: Political Backlash, or Global Governance? -- TEN. Grasping the Consequences of Globalization -- Index
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1. A neoclassical realist interpretation of grand strategy -- 2. U.S. grand strategy in the early phases of the Cold War -- 3. The hardening of alliances in the 1890s -- 4. Power, wealth, and time in the mercantilist period -- 5. Britain's naval scare of 1909 -- 6. Behind the Maginot Line : French grand strategy 1919-1939 -- 7. The consequences of mismanagement : Soviet grand strategy in the 1980s -- 8. Evaluating and refining the neoclassical realist approach.
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This book examines traditional balance of power theory from a political-economic perspective, using historical examples, to draw out distinctions between the liberal and realist approach and how this affects grand strategy.
AbstractIn the 1840s, Britain engaged in a series of trade liberalizations, with important consequences for itself and the international system. Many have tried to explain the central piece, Repeal of the Corn Laws, using liberal arguments from international political economy. Few find these arguments persuasive. Applying defensive neoclassical realism, I demonstrate how fluctuations in external threats to Britain—in particular posed by France—drove reassessments of trade policy. British leaders judged both the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts in terms of their contributions to security. Reassessments were also shaped by new information, such as the potato blight in Ireland. While defensive neoclassical realism highlights when a state may seek change to attain greater security, liberalism indicates how strongly constituents may defend existing policies. I use both to explain why tariffs remained popular, but Cabinets overrode protectionism's domestic supporters in this decade.
Economic globalization never proceeded in a smooth steady trajectory. The current international economy, organized around liberal principles, faces potential problems unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Two popular theoretical approaches offer varying reasons for the survivability of the contemporary order. One stresses the benefits associated with participating in liberal international orders, claiming such arrangements are essentially self-sustaining. The rival view emphasizes the uneven distribution of gains, emphasizing the role of leadership, especially for dampening crises. To examine the support for each argument, I examine the evolution of international monetary arrangements. International monetary orders lie at the heart of liberal international economies; no prior liberal monetary order has proven self-sustaining. Liberal international monetary sub-orders depend upon leadership as much as cooperation for their survival—leaders exert efforts to shape followers' actions so long as the leader draws sufficient benefits to make such efforts worthwhile. The economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic provides the latest illustration of this point, though these arguments also suggest experiences across issue-areas will vary.
AbstractRecent surveys revealed few producers in an export sector participate in trade. Economists explained this result by relaxing their assumption about firms' operations, to produce a novel observation: Trade liberalization disproportionately benefits the most efficient producers in the sector, while potentially harming the least efficient. Political scientists have begun exploring the consequences of this variation, especially in lobbying. This article explores whether the impact of this finer-grained description of interests can be observed in the later stages of our demand-driven models of the politics of trade. I focus on one case with characteristics favorable to observing intra-industry differences: the American steel industry in Taft's presidency. A trade-based cleavage inside the sector determined firms' interests. Demands shaped policy, as observed in three pieces of legislation: the Payne-Aldrich Act, reciprocity with Canada, and the 1912 tariff. The first liberalized trade in steel, intensifying competition in the industry. The second promised to do the same, with a similar impact. The third had no effect, however, because Taft vetoed the bill. This case illustrates intra-industry firm heterogeneity can provide additional accuracy, revealing a previously undiscovered cleavage. Nonetheless, preferences alone did not determine policy.
