Search results

Abstract
The provision of development aid has become a favored counterinsurgency strategy, with governments reasoning that the delivery of needed services will improve civilians' perceptions of the government, and consequently decrease civilian collaboration with insurgents. However, this reasoning relies on the critical assumption that civilians attribute projects to the government, and not to the very insurgents that the government seeks to defeat. In information poor environments like civil wars, it may be relatively easy for armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid by engaging in credit claiming. Drawing upon on a survey experiment in Afghanistan, I find that civilians who are told that the Taliban allowed a project in their village to occur are more likely to identify the Taliban as a facilitator of development projects, in spite of their own, real-life, experiences. While the effect size is modest, the finding points to the ability of armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid through purely rhetorical strategies, with implications for the viability of development aid as a counterinsurgency strategy.

Commitment problems make civil wars difficult to end. Research on overcoming commitment problems focuses on warring parties, however civilians' perceptions are central to successful transitions from war to peace. While civilians residing in areas previously controlled by armed groups may be highly distrustful that governments will implement peace agreements, I argue that some armed groups are both motivated and capable of improving trust in the state. Using survey data from civilians in the Bangsamoro, Philippines, I show that civilians that experienced rebel security provision or rebel justice provision from the MILF are more likely to trust that the Government of the Philippines will fully implement the peace agreement than civilians that did not experience rebel governance provision.

The provision of development aid has become a favored counterinsurgency strategy, with governments reasoning that the delivery of needed services will improve civilians' perceptions of the government, and consequently decrease civilian collaboration with insurgents. However, this reasoning relies on the critical assumption that civilians attribute projects to the government, and not to the very insurgents that the government seeks to defeat. In information poor environments like civil wars, it may be relatively easy for armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid by engaging in credit claiming. Drawing upon on a survey experiment in Afghanistan, I find that civilians who are told that the Taliban allowed a project in their village to occur are more likely to identify the Taliban as a facilitator of development projects, in spite of their own, real-life, experiences. While the effect size is modest, the finding points to the ability of armed groups to capture the reputational benefits of aid through purely rhetorical strategies, with implications for the viability of development aid as a counterinsurgency strategy.

Commitment problems make civil wars difficult to end. Research on overcoming commitment problems focuses on warring parties, however civilians' perceptions are central to successful transitions from war to peace. While civilians residing in areas previously controlled by armed groups may be highly distrustful that governments will implement peace agreements, I argue that some armed groups are both motivated and capable of improving trust in the state. Using survey data from civilians in the Bangsamoro, Philippines, I show that civilians that experienced rebel security provision or rebel justice provision from the MILF are more likely to trust that the Government of the Philippines will fully implement the peace agreement than civilians that did not experience rebel governance provision.

AbstractMost wars now take place within states instead of between them. In many cases, this requires humanitarians to contend with non-state armed groups in order to access civilians. While armed groups are widely perceived as a threat to the delivery of humanitarian aid, they vary in the extent to which they allow or hinder humanitarian access. Current understandings of this variation revolve around armed groups' motivations to comply with international humanitarian law (IHL). However, most humanitarians acknowledge that using IHL in negotiations for humanitarian access with armed groups is not a viable strategy. I argue that scholars should broaden their study of humanitarian access by investigating the viability of other strategies and, in particular, the strategy of community acceptance. Drawing upon interviews with humanitarian practitioners, this article discusses the shortcomings of IHL in access negotiations with armed groups, the promises of community acceptance, and the implications of these arguments.

In public health emergencies that take place in violent contexts, which non-state armed groups engage in public health interventions, and what do those interventions consist of? While a growing literature on rebel governance has increased our understanding of how these armed groups govern civilian populations day to day, less understood is how armed groups respond to emergencies, such as natural disasters or pandemics. In a world defined by an increasing number of unpredictable crises, it is important to understand the ways in which armed groups respond. The Covid-19 pandemic provides an unprecedented opportunity to examine how armed groups respond to crises across conflicts. Drawing upon new data from Geneva Call on armed groups' responses to Covid-19, the article offers a descriptive analysis of the types of actions armed groups take and the characteristics of armed groups taking action.

Abstract
In public health emergencies that take place in violent contexts, which non-state armed groups engage in public health interventions, and what do those interventions consist of? While a growing literature on rebel governance has increased our understanding of how these armed groups govern civilian populations day to day, less understood is how armed groups respond to emergencies, such as natural disasters or pandemics. In a world defined by an increasing number of unpredictable crises, it is important to understand the ways in which armed groups respond. The Covid-19 pandemic provides an unprecedented opportunity to examine how armed groups respond to crises across conflicts. Drawing upon new data from Geneva Call on armed groups' responses to Covid-19, the article offers a descriptive analysis of the types of actions armed groups take and the characteristics of armed groups taking action.

The extent of local order varies widely in rebel held areas, from total chaos to well-run governing institutions. When these institutions exist, why do some include civilian input in local affairs, while others exclude civilians from governance? I argue that rebels choose different governing strategies that maximize their utility of territorial control, based on certain characteristics of civilian inhabitants populating the territory. Rebels' constituency determines whether rebels seek to govern civilians or control them solely with coercive violence, and community cohesion (or lack thereof) then determines the type of institutions that rebels develop. I focus on three different outcomes for communities under rebel control—no institutions, exclusive institutions, and inclusive institutions. I test my argument using historical, statistical, and case evidence, leveraging original cross-national data on local order in rebel held territory as well as interviews with village heads, ex-combatants, and community members in Aceh, Indonesia.

The extent of local order varies widely in rebel held areas, from total chaos to well-run governing institutions. When these institutions exist, why do some include civilian input in local affairs, while others exclude civilians from governance? I argue that rebels choose different governing strategies that maximize their utility of territorial control, based on certain characteristics of civilian inhabitants populating the territory. Rebels' constituency determines whether rebels seek to govern civilians or control them solely with coercive violence, and community cohesion (or lack thereof) then determines the type of institutions that rebels develop. I focus on three different outcomes for communities under rebel control—no institutions, exclusive institutions, and inclusive institutions. I test my argument using historical, statistical, and case evidence, leveraging original cross-national data on local order in rebel held territory as well as interviews with village heads, ex-combatants, and community members in Aceh, Indonesia.

Abstract
Though civilians have traditionally been perceived as powerless at the hands of armed groups in civil war, recent research credits civilians with a greater degree of agency than previously perceived, revealing that effective institutions may be able to lessen the likelihood of violence in their locality through strategies such as resolving disputes between community members before they involve armed actors. However, systematic tests have been restricted in their scope and level of analysis due to the limited availability of data that captures the effectiveness of community-level institutions, so the applications of existing findings remain unclear. In this article, I replicate findings that effective local institutions lessen the likelihood of violence, even in a "hard" test of the hypothesis. Drawing upon survey data from Afghanistan, I demonstrate that more effective shuras and jirgas are associated with communities that perceive themselves and their families as safer, even in areas marred by armed group violence.