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The WTO is in a state of crisis. Yet its problems did not start with the Trump Administration. And although this has been the focus of much criticism from the United States, the Appellate Body should not be the priority in reforming the WTO. More differentiation amongst its members and its rules is needed, to reflect varying levels of development. In addition, more room for plurilaterals ought to be created. China's atypical economic model ought to be reconciled with the WTO's market-orientation. This can be done through an update of its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, or perhaps through a newly conceived plurilateral agreement. Such a bridging mechanism would reflect a renewed engagement of China with the WTO, and could help to recommit the United States to a rules-based system. The EU should take initiatives to make this happen.
Appellate Body, China, Developing countries, Dispute settlement, EU trade policy, Made in 2025, Non-market economy, Plurilaterals, Protocol of Accession to the WTO, Special and Differential Treatment, State capitalism, State-owned enterprises, US trade policy, WTO-crisis

This article inquires how the EC courts deal with judgments of other international courts and tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights, WTO tribunals, and panels set up by the EC's proliferating number of bilateral agreements. Having reviewed the case law to date, the essay focuses on one question in particular: should the EC courts consider themselves bound by rulings of other international tribunals? Although the ECJ recognized in the early 1990s that it might be so bound, to date it has never accepted this in actual case. The article submits that, in the absence of a specific instruction in a particular international agreement, there are strong reasons for the EC courts not to bind themselves a priori to rulings of other international tribunals. The EC Courts should normally follow the rulings of the international tribunal, but should keep the power to deviate from another international ruling in narrowly defined circumstances. Reference is made to the practice of national courts. Allowing the EC courts to perform such limited checks and balances should not weaken the Community's credibility as a reliable negotiating partner. It will also facilitate the domestic reception of international law in the EC legal order.