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Abstract
Why did America's twenty-year war in Afghanistan fail to establish a self-sustaining non-Taliban government? Analysts have cited cultural obstacles in Afghanistan, bureaucratic inertia in Washington, and a lack of strategic commitment, in part because Iraq dominated national security policy. Such claims tend to draw evidence from Germany, Japan, and Iraq, places where the U.S. military achieved some measure of success establishing pro-American governments. The present article broadens the comparison to consider Afghanistan alongside Germany, Japan, Iraq, and two examples of post-Cold War regime-change success: Panama (1989–1990) and Haiti (1994–1995). The cases indicate that U.S. influence in the postwar environment has depended on the prospects for integrating old regime elites into the new government and on the strength of indigenous opposition forces. Both variables were unfavorable in Afghanistan, and they shaped the boundaries of political order—no matter how hard U.S. forces fought or how long they stayed.

Scholars of public opinion on military intervention agree that survey respondents make judgments from limited information. Yet researchers still question whether ordinary Americans reflect elite attitudes or instead reach their own "pretty prudent" conclusions from the stated principal policy objective (PPO). This article adjudicates the debate while incorporating lessons from the study of bounded rationality. Evidence comes from an original data set of aggregate US public opinion, covering 1,080 nationally representative survey items about launching operations, across thirty-five countries, during 1981 to 2016. Tests show that PPO matters: pursuing "internal policy change" is less popular than restraining international aggression. However, language reflecting White House cues and one prominent cognitive shortcut (the "availability heuristic") statistically and substantively outperforms PPO at predicting intervention support. The results indicate that when ordinary Americans are polled about using force against salient foes (Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), elements of bounded rationality can overtake the prudence expressed toward less vivid problems.

Scholars of public opinion on military intervention agree that survey respondents make judgments from limited information. Yet researchers still question whether ordinary Americans reflect elite attitudes or instead reach their own "pretty prudent" conclusions from the stated principal policy objective (PPO). This article adjudicates the debate while incorporating lessons from the study of bounded rationality. Evidence comes from an original data set of aggregate US public opinion, covering 1,080 nationally representative survey items about launching operations, across thirty-five countries, during 1981 to 2016. Tests show that PPO matters: pursuing "internal policy change" is less popular than restraining international aggression. However, language reflecting White House cues and one prominent cognitive shortcut (the "availability heuristic") statistically and substantively outperforms PPO at predicting intervention support. The results indicate that when ordinary Americans are polled about using force against salient foes (Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), elements of bounded rationality can overtake the prudence expressed toward less vivid problems.

The White House has not repealed the doctrines that in the Middle East prioritize the stability of allied autocracies over democratization.