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This research monograph examines presidential constitutional conventions and the role they play in the political systems of four Central European countries the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. As primarily unwritten rules of constitutional practice, constitutional conventions represent political arrangements and as such are political in origin. Not only this, constitutional conventions, in general, and presidential constitutional conventions, in particular, have signicant political implications. They shape both the everyday operation and character of regimes. Central Europe represents a particularly useful example on which this role of constitutional conventions can be studied and assessed. Milo Brunclk is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Czech Republic. Michal Kubt is Professor of Political Science at the Institute of International Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Czech Republic. Attila Vincze is Assistant Professor at the Judicial Studies Institute of the Faculty of Law, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. Milue Kindlov is Assistant Professor at the Department of Constitutional Law of the Faculty of Law, Charles University, Czech Republic. Marek Anto is Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at the Department of Constitutional Law of the Faculty of Law, Charles University, Czech Republic. Filip Hork is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the Department of Constitutional Law of the Faculty of Law, Charles University, Czech Republic. Luk Hjek is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Czech Republic.

This review article provides an overview of research on constitutional conventions in the Czech Republic against the backdrop of the Anglo-Saxon scholarship on this theme. The article identifies three important gaps directly related to the study of constitutional conventions in the Czech Republic. All of them are closely linked as they pertain to the very understanding of constitutional conventions. First, there are varying definitions, including different terms used to denote constitutional conventions. Second, scholars often disagree on how constitutional conventions are established. Moreover, often they are not concerned with this question at all. Third, there is a great gap in research on sanctions for the breaching of constitutional conventions and rules enforcement. The Anglo-Saxon scholarship is instrumental in showing possible ways to fill the gaps.

AbstractThis article compares three technocratic cabinets that were appointed in the Czech Republic. Its aim is to determine to what extent the cabinets can be understood as a failure of political parties. The article outlines the concept of party failure. It argues that patterns of party failure can be found in all cases. However, in the last case—the technocratic cabinet of Jiří Rusnok—party failure was only partial and indirect; its technocratic cabinet cannot be interpreted as resulting from an inability of the parties to form a partisan cabinet, but rather it resulted from the president's imposition of a technocratic cabinet. This imposition took place against the will of the parliamentary parties that sought to form a cabinet composed of party politicians immediately or following early elections.

Analytical tools are presently lacking to study the role played by the head of state in the government formation process (GFP). To remedy this absence, this paper provides a detailed analysis of that role. Two variables are of major concern: a) the formal powers of the head of state in the GFP, and b) the control over the GFP held by the parliament. These two variables are used to construct a scheme that shows the pronounced heterogeneity exhibited by GFP patterns. The GFP is seen as the result of an institutionally structured bargaining process in which institutional variations make for major differences in expected outcomes. The analysis reveals a large number of GFP patterns. Examples of the GFP taken from several European countries show the patterns should not be subsumed under broad categories, since overgeneralization may lead to confusion and cause the role played by the head of state and political regimes in European countries to be misunderstood.

Hloušek, Vít et al. 2013. Presidents above Parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, their Formal Competences and Informal Power. Brno: International Institure of Political Science of Masaryk University. 311 pages.

Knižní recenze

Kopeček, L. 2012. Fenomén Václav Klaus. Politická biografie. Brno: Barrister & Principal. 320 pages.

Kubát, M. 2013. Současná česká politika. Co s neefektivním státem? Brno: Barrister & Principal, 119 pages.

Miroslav Novák (2012): Úvod do studia politiky, Praha: Slon, 783 pages.

The article deals with the influence of presidents in the government formation process (GFP). The authors propose an original classification of roles of presidents, reflecting real constitutional practice, with five categories based on real presidential influence on the GFP, from the weakest to the strongest: observer, notary, regulator, co-designer, and creator. This classification is applied to Czechia, where the formal constitution gives the president great opportunities to intervene in the GFP. The results of the analysis of all cases of GFP show a significant variety of roles the Czech presidents have played: from notary to creator. Two factors are particularly important. Firstly, the timing of elections proved significant. When the GFP directly followed parliamentary elections, the presidents were weaker. In contrast, if the GFP followed a government break-up during the electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies, presidents were significantly stronger. Secondly, it depends on the real power of parties, that is, their ability to act together as a cohesive parliamentary majority. In most cases, the presidents showed their resolve to play a greater role than a notary, but they often faced a firm parliamentary majority that actually did not allow them to exert greater influence on the GFP. In contrast, the political proximity between the president and parliamentary parties appears difficult to assess, because there has been the public desire of non-partisan or "above-partisan" presidents in Czechia.

While reading academic papers and books on political regimes in Central Europe, one can become aware of an interesting and remarkable fact: these regimes (forms of government) are classified rather differently. Whereas some scholars tend to approach them as parliamentary regimes, others classify them as semi-presidential ones. The major dividing line between these two perspectives runs between a large group of English-writing scholars based outside Central Europe and those from Central Europe itself. Having reviewed a large number of relevant studies in this field, the authors of this article argue that the key reason for the different assessments of Central European regimes resides mainly in a different theoretical (but also methodological) approach, which has important implications when considering how these regimes are treated in various studies. Whereas the group of English-writing scholars tends to adopt a minimalist institutional definition suggested by Robert Elgie, most Central European scholars prefer an approach (inspired by Duverger or Sartori) that emphasizes presidential powers, which are irrelevant to Elgie's definition.

While reading academic papers and books on political regimes in Central Europe, one can become aware of an interesting and remarkable fact: these regimes (forms of government) are classified rather differently. Whereas some scholars tend to approach them as parliamentary regimes, others classify them as semi-presidential ones. The major dividing line between these two perspectives runs between a large group of English-writing scholars based outside Central Europe and those from Central Europe itself. Having reviewed a large number of relevant studies in this field, the authors of this article argue that the key reason for the different assessments of Central European regimes resides mainly in a different theoretical (but also methodological) approach, which has important implications when considering how these regimes are treated in various studies. Whereas the group of English-writing scholars tends to adopt a minimalist institutional definition suggested by Robert Elgie, most Central European scholars prefer an approach (inspired by Duverger or Sartori) that emphasizes presidential powers, which are irrelevant to Elgie's definition. ; While reading academic papers and books on political regimes in Central Europe, one can become aware of an interesting and remarkable fact: these regimes (forms of government) are classified rather differently. Whereas some scholars tend to approach them as parliamentary regimes, others classify them as semi-presidential ones. The major dividing line between these two perspectives runs between a large group of English-writing scholars based outside Central Europe and those from Central Europe itself. Having reviewed a large number of relevant studies in this field, the authors of this article argue that the key reason for the different assessments of Central European regimes resides mainly in a different theoretical (but also methodological) approach, which has important implications when considering how these regimes are treated in various studies. Whereas the group of ...