Introduction : revisiting securitization : the "constructivist turn" in security studies / Michael J. Butler and Zena Wolf -- Assessing securitization theory : theoretical discussions and empirical developments / Roxanna Sjöstedt -- Regional security complex theory : reflections and reformulations / Jaroslaw Jarzabek -- Counter-terrorism as a technology of securitization : approaching the Moroccan case / Blanca Camps-Febrer -- When advocacy securitizes : non-state actors and the circulation of narratives around sexualized violence in conflict / Natalie Florea Hudson and Alexandra Cosima Budabin -- Securitizing the environment : climate change as first-order threat / Mark A. Boyer and Neil Oculi -- Conflict management redux : de-securitizing intractable conflicts / Siniša Vukovic -- Beyond the speech act : contact, de-securitization, and peacebuilding in Cyprus / Katerina Antoniou -- The role of memory in the de-securitization of inter-societal conflicts / Valérie Rosoux -- Conclusion : securitization, revisited : revealed insights, future directions / Michael J. Butler.
Butler sheds light on how American political leaders sell the decision to intervene with military force to the public and how a just war frame is employed in US foreign policy. He provides three post-Cold War examples of foreign policy crises: the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001)
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Michael J. Butler uses Just War theory to analyze how the decision to go to war was framed for public consumption in three recent U.S. military interventions: the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. He shows how presenting operations as legitimate and virtuous has proven to be a highly salient, adaptable, and therefore effective mechanism for manufacturing societal support. This crucial component of foreign policy allows the President to sustain an effective monopoly over war decisions for the continued primacy of military force in U.S.
Abstract Nearly two decades after its formal endorsement by the international community, the Responsibility to Protect is stuck in a quagmire reminiscent of the contentious politics that both preceded and precipitated it. A once ambitious effort to transform notions of responsibility and practices of accountability regarding civilian protection and atrocity prevention, R2P has stagnated to such a degree that some have dismissed it as a dead letter. This research diagnoses the primary cause of that stagnation while also proposing a way forward for resuscitating R2P's normative aims, via a return to R2P's origins as an accountability mechanism for the provision of human rights and security.
Purpose Conventional wisdom tells us that mediation without ripeness is a fool's errand (Zartman and Touval, 1985). What, then, is Türkiye's motivation for mediating the war in Ukraine in lieu of ripeness – and what can its behavior as a mediator tell us about that motivation? In pursuit of this question, this paper inductively analyzes Turkish mediation in the Ukraine war to unpack the relationship between a contextual (ripeness) and actor-level (motivation) variable. Of particular interest is the decision-making and behavior of third parties (like Türkiye in Ukraine) who elect to mediate highly complex conflicts in which ripeness is indiscernible. The purpose of this research is not to propose or test a causal relationship between obscured ripeness and mediation, but rather to examine mediation behavior in situations where ripeness is obscured.
Design/methodology/approach The impact of weaponized information on ripeness and third-party mediation is evaluated through an original, systematic and inductive case study analysis of Turkish mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war. As an intense theater of operations for information warfare for well over a decade, the war in Ukraine serves as an especially apt choice for an analysis of "obscured ripeness." Likewise, Türkiye's anomalous position as the only substantive source of mediation in the conflict lends significance to an empirical examination of its motivation and behavior as a mediator.
Findings This research reveals that the pervasive use of weaponized information in the Russia–Ukraine war has distorted and disordered the information environment, thereby obscuring the ability of third parties to determine if the conflict is or could be ripe for mediation. However, the condition of obscured ripeness that prevails in the conflict has not proven a deterrent for mediation by Türkiye, which, as the only mediator in the conflict, has used a transactional approach to mediation motivated by self-regarding interests and animated by a manipulative mediation strategy. In sum, this inductive analysis of Turkish mediation in Ukraine reveals that the use of weaponized information in a conflict indirectly selects on transactional mediation (and mediators). The significance of this finding is magnified by the widespread use of weaponized information in contemporary conflicts as well as the declining frequency of third-party mediation.
Originality/value There have been few, if any, systematic assessments in Turkish mediation of the Russia–Ukraine war, and none specifically concerned with the effects of weaponized information. Additionally, the paper proposes a typology of mediator motivation that is used to structure that assessment, while also introducing a new concept ("obscured ripeness") and linking that concept both to the existing literature on ripeness and to the use of weaponized information in contemporary armed conflicts. As such, this manuscript represents an important contribution both to the empirical and theoretical landscape with respect to the study of mediation and international conflict management.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Volume 137, Issue 2, p. 440-442
Abstract In seeking a fuller understanding of the provision and effectiveness of negotiation and mediation, salient lessons can be gleaned from instances in which these processes seem unlikely to succeed or unlikely to be tried at all. Contributions to this special issue of International Negotiation purposefully avoid mining examples of success stories for correlates. The contributors have instead consciously identified and examined applications of negotiation and mediation in the hard(est) cases, with the objective of teasing out what shortcomings and even failures can tell us about the prospects of negotiation and mediation as practices of conflict management and resolution. Using the criteria discussed in this introductory article, this collection examines negotiation and mediation in international crises, intractable conflicts, civil wars, and other cases defined by complex contextual environments, actor configurations, and disputes – with the goal of revealing insights that can improve the effectiveness of negotiation and mediation in application.
Abstract By virtue of their defining criteria, international crises would seem unlikely candidates for conflict management and resolution. However, negotiations among crisis protagonists are not uncommon. Such behavior may reflect a desire to 'exit' the crisis dynamic. This article takes up the question of when and in what circumstances actors engaged in crisis situations turn to negotiation. Through an empirical analysis of over 1000 cases of foreign policy crises occurring between 1918 and 2015, this research examines a set of potential contextual, processual and structural correlates of crisis negotiation. The results of this analysis indicate that negotiation is less likely to occur in complex, high stakes, and especially violent crises, suggesting that negotiation is an unlikely and perhaps ill-suited response to more intense and severe crises.
Abstract The various contributions to this special issue reveal three overarching insights with respect to negotiation and mediation in the hard(est) cases: one, the discrepancy between securing negotiated or mediated agreements and actual solutions; two, the conditioning effects of structural and contextual considerations on the bargaining process; and three, the divergent ends to which negotiation and mediation can be (and are) directed. Ultimately, the preceding analyses suggest that, when it comes to the hard(est) cases, negotiation and mediation are best thought of as tools within a larger toolkit, which have a markedly better chance of succeeding when they are employed in an environment amenable to them. On their own, negotiation and mediation cannot be effective in cultivating ripeness in such cases. Rather, the challenge at hand is to employ other means to transform the context enveloping the bargaining environment in ways that are conducive to negotiated and mediated solutions.
AbstractThe dynamic quality of protracted intra‐state conflicts is a factor that complicates and sometimes confounds the efforts of peacemakers. Building on this insight, and given the prevalence of conflicts of this type in the contemporary international system, this paper takes up a central question: how can peacemakers adapt to changing dynamics along the parameters of a protracted intra‐state conflict in order to cultivate effective resolution of the conflict? Inspired by the theme of this special issue on new diplomacy in new conflicts, this paper draws on and modifies the concepts of 'adaptive peacemaking' and 'adaptive peacebuilding' (de Coning, 2018; Okulski, 2017) in order to provide a heuristic device for evaluating peacemaking efforts within protracted intra‐state conflicts. In that vein, this paper examines third‐party mediation within the setting of the second Sudanese civil war through the lens of a modified adaptive peacemaking approach. The resulting analysis allows for a conceptual and empirical assessment of the prospects as well as the perils of 'adaptive peacemaking' within the context of protracted civil wars.
When and in what circumstances do states turn to conflict management to manage a crisis? This article identifies a set of contextual, processual, and structural variables, examining the presence and strength of their associations with the likelihood of states employing conflict management in a foreign policy crisis. I conduct an empirical analysis of more than one thousand foreign policy crises between 1918 and 2013, using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB)-2 dataset, and with the data seek to craft a comprehensive model with the capacity to reliably predict when states will turn to conflict management in a foreign policy crisis based on the context and dynamics of a crisis as well as the attributes of crisis actors. My analysis suggests that states are more likely to employ negotiation, mediation, adjudication, and arbitration in foreign policy crises where the appeal, utility, and experience of violence is diminished; in crises involving weak, nascent, and/or transitional political entities; in crises involving fewer actors and/or crises not embedded within protracted conflicts; and in crises in which International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) are significantly involved.
A decade after achieving independence, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (DRTL) continues to rely upon the United Nations (UN) directly and indirectly to carry out functions typically ascribed to the state. This dependency raises the specter of what scholars concerned with the breadth and extent of recent and ongoing UN operations in places such as Timor-Leste have dubbed "neo-trusteeship." This research advances an empirical accounting of, and explanation for, the emergence and persistence of neo-trusteeship in Timor-Leste. Careful scrutiny of the UN involvement in Timor-Leste betrays the origins and sources of the neo-trusteeship arrangement and suggests that neo-trusteeship is better understood as a by-product of the disjuncture between mandate overreach and organizational incapacity playing out within complex post-conflict environments rather than any intentional manifestation of "post-modern imperialism.". Adapted from the source document.
