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AbstractWhy do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.

Abstract
The idea of using nuclear weapons to kill noncombatants is said to evoke strong moral opprobrium among millions of individuals across the globe, such that national leaders should be constrained from using the weapons even when such a decision would be strategically sensible. Classical area scholarship and recent survey evidence suggest that this "nuclear taboo" is strong among the Chinese public, buttressed by culturally grounded preferences for moderation in warfare. Drawing on findings in cultural sociology and political behavior, we argue that previous studies mislead on the extent to which ordinary Chinese citizens might oppose the use of nuclear weapons in a real military clash, primarily due to a failure to distinguish baseline preferences for nuclear nonuse from the willingness to approve of governmental decisions to use these weapons. Results from an original survey experiment fielded in mainland China show that many individuals who personally dislike the idea of using nuclear weapons are nonetheless willing to support their leaders' decision to do so. Our study contributes new and systematic knowledge about Chinese nuclear attitudes and highlights the value of harnessing interdisciplinary insights to inform the research agenda on the nuclear taboo.

The idea of using nuclear weapons to kill noncombatants is said to evoke strong moral opprobrium among millions of individuals across the globe, such that national leaders should be constrained from using the weapons even when such a decision would be strategically sensible. Classical area scholarship and recent survey evidence suggest that this "nuclear taboo" is strong among the Chinese public, buttressed by culturally grounded preferences for moderation in warfare. Drawing on findings in cultural sociology and political behavior, we argue that previous studies mislead on the extent to which ordinary Chinese citizens might oppose the use of nuclear weapons in a real military clash, primarily due to a failure to distinguish baseline preferences for nuclear nonuse from the willingness to approve of governmental decisions to use these weapons. Results from an original survey experiment fielded in mainland China show that many individuals who personally dislike the idea of using nuclear weapons are nonetheless willing to support their leaders' decision to do so. Our study contributes new and systematic knowledge about Chinese nuclear attitudes and highlights the value of harnessing interdisciplinary insights to inform the research agenda on the nuclear taboo.

Abstract
How does leader age affect international politics? Challenging the existing literature's focus on chronological age, we argue that leaders do not age the same in the eyes of their beholders. Combining insights from gerontology on age-related stereotypes and studies of face-to-face diplomacy, we show that judgments about age informed by high-level personal encounters have profound consequences for how elderly leaders are appraised and treated by their counterparts. A leader who betrays indicators of "senility" during face-to-face encounters will elicit harsh judgments by activating negative stereotypes about aging. Older leaders can also surprise their interlocutors: those long thought to be senile may show themselves as mentally and physically fit. Perceptions of age, in turn, shape how observers understand a leader's agency and shape decisions to "engage" or "bypass" the leader in the context of interstate cooperation. We draw on declassified primary documents to compare American views of three elderly leaders in Cold War Asia—Syngman Rhee, Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai—and how such views informed Washington's approach to these leaders, finding powerful support for our arguments. Our findings suggest new insights for the IR research program on leaders as well as lessons for statecraft in an era of aging decision makers.

Conventional wisdom treats politicization in the international human rights regime as invariant: for any given violation, states condemn adversaries while coddling friends. However, we find that politicization patterns vary markedly across human rights issues. Some norms are more politicized than others, and states are more likely to punish geopolitical partners on certain violations. We offer a novel theory of politicized enforcement wherein states punish human rights violations discriminatively based on their perceived "sensitivity" for the target state. Using data from the UN Universal Periodic Review, an elaborate human rights mechanism, we show that states tend to criticize their adversaries on sensitive issues that undermine the target regime's power and legitimacy while addressing safer topics with friends. By uncovering a strategic logic of human rights enforcement, this research contributes new theoretical insights on the relationship between norms and power politics in global governance.

How does leader age affect international politics? Challenging the existing literature's focus on chronological age, we argue that leaders do not age the same in the eyes of their beholders. Combining insights from gerontology on age-related stereotypes and studies of face-to-face diplomacy, we show that judgments about age informed by high-level personal encounters have profound consequences for how elderly leaders are appraised and treated by their counterparts. A leader who betrays indicators of "senility" during face-to-face encounters will elicit harsh judgments by activating negative stereotypes about aging. Older leaders can also surprise their interlocutors: those long thought to be senile may show themselves as mentally and physically fit. Perceptions of age, in turn, shape how observers understand a leader's agency and shape decisions to "engage" or "bypass" the leader in the context of interstate cooperation. We draw on declassified primary documents to compare American views of three elderly leaders in Cold War Asia—Syngman Rhee, Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai—and how such views informed Washington's approach to these leaders, finding powerful support for our arguments. Our findings suggest new insights for the IR research program on leaders as well as lessons for statecraft in an era of aging decision makers.