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Examines the usefulness of an equilibrium-based rational choice theory for analysis of the efficacy of informal & formal social institutions in combining beliefs & conduct in such a way as to constrain individual behavior. An equilibrium-based rational choice model of repeated cooperation in the two-player prisoner's dilemma game is constructed to ascertain the organizational effectiveness of various equilibria. Absent communication, equilibrium is achieved in a kind of tit-for-tat strategy of individual punishments. When the model is revised to allow communication, it is found that a true institution is achieved in which the whole group monitors & punishes deviant behavior, but this outcome is accomplished at significant costs. Such costs are partly ameliorated with the establishment of a central communication system directed by a single enforces. While the creation of a director reduces the costs of communication, it also raises the issue of who monitors the director. The notion of institutions as equilibria is defended as a useful approach for analyzing institutional stability & the effects of institutions in various areas of social life. 4 Tables. D. M. Smith

Sometimes an emotional irritant can be intellectually productive and provocative. For me, this was the case with Theodore Lowi's APSA presidential address, reprinted in the American Political Science Review (Lowi 1992). While disagreeing at many points with Lowi's account of the development of political science and with his critiques of the currently "hegemonic" subfields of "public opinion, public policy, and public choice," I am led ultimately to clarify my own understanding of the relationship between politics, ideology, and science. This response to Lowi's address is intended to sketch a different view of the relation between science, especially social science, and government; to argue with Lowi's assessment of the value of reductionist paradigms such as those employed by the three hegemonic subfields; and to say that many of the rest of us are passionate about politics too. In particular, it is intended to indicate how "public choice," my own favored member of that holy trinity, is in fact well suited to address issues critical to the matters of social value with which Lowi is concerned.

This article presents a method for analyzing the extent and strength of coattail voting in presidential elections. This method allows the authors to estimate the magnitude of coattail voting and then to decompose this estimate into more "basic" elements. Estimates are given for presidential elections beginning with 1956.The determination of the coattail vote and its decomposition depend on the theory of the voting decision that is assumed. In this article we present a model of vote determination that is similar in most respects to the traditional SRC model; the vote for congressional representation in a presidential election year is determined jointly by partisan affiliation, attitudes toward the presidential candidates, and local forces unique to the congressional race (such as may be captured by an incumbency variable). This model permits the separate estimation of the strength of short-term forces and of the efficiency of the presidential coattails.Application of the model to survey data since 1956 indicates that efficiency of presidential coattails has declined during this period. Furthermore, the 1980 election does not appear to be an exception to this trend. On the other hand there has not been any particular trend in the strength of short-term forces during this period; instead events peculiar to the context of a specific election generate short-term forces at the level of the presidential election, but the degree to which these forces are carried over to local races seems to have declined.