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Embora um importante esforço venha sendo empreendido com o intuito de estabelecer a institucionalização de sistemas partidários como uma dimensão crítica, as implicações políticas concretas dessa institucionalização têm recebido relativamente pouca atenção da academia. Pouco se sabe, por exemplo, sobre as formas através das quais ela promove a consistência programática de governos. Este artigo contribui para este debate investigando um fenômeno característico da política latino-americana - mudanças programáticas empreendidas por presidentes de esquerda empossados em meio a ataques especulativos - e examinando de que forma níveis de institucionalização afetam a probabilidade de que essas mudanças ocorram. Os resultados mostram que, deparados com fortes pressões especulativas, presidentes de esquerda tendem a abandonar suas promessas de campanha em favor de uma agenda econômica conservadora. Ao contrário do esperado, no entanto, essas mudanças ocorrem mais frequentemente em sistemas partidários institucionalizados.

The persistence of policy switches-whereby presidents renege on campaign promises shortly after winning elections-30 years after Latin America's redemocratization defies established notions of democratic representation, and poses a puzzle to analysts and voters alike. In this article, I advance current explanations for switches, by arguing they can only be understood in the context of currency booms and crises, typical of Latin American economies after their reintegration into world finance in the 1970s. To test my propositions empirically, I examine elections held in the region between 1978 and 2006 and find evidence consistent with the claim that switches are more likely to occur in periods of dollar scarcity, when the need to attract financial capital to the economy pushes leftist presidents into adopting policies opposed to the programs they announced during campaign. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

The persistence of policy switches—whereby presidents renege on campaign promises shortly after winning elections—30 years after Latin America's redemocratization defies established notions of democratic representation, and poses a puzzle to analysts and voters alike. In this article, I advance current explanations for switches, by arguing they can only be understood in the context of currency booms and crises, typical of Latin American economies after their reintegration into world finance in the 1970s. To test my propositions empirically, I examine elections held in the region between 1978 and 2006 and find evidence consistent with the claim that switches are more likely to occur in periods of dollar scarcity, when the need to attract financial capital to the economy pushes leftist presidents into adopting policies opposed to the programs they announced during campaign.

This paper examines whether localized trade shocks from China influence Brazilians' views on integration with the country. We test the following hypotheses: (1) as trade shocks are localized, views on trade should form at the local, rather than at the individual level, and (2) as localized trade shocks affect both workers and companies in a same region, they should also influence legislators' views on China. Our analyses find support for both claims, but only among losers from Chinese trade. Residents and legislators from localities hurt by import shocks tend to hold negative views about economic ties with China, whereas neither residents nor legislators from localities benefitted by export shocks exhibit more positive views about the country. Our paper contributes to the literature on the politics of trade by incorporating meso-level theories of trade preference formation and by establishing the conditions under which the interests of constituencies should shape legislators' views on international trade.