Search results

In Europe, there is increasing concern with how the operation of the Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament is creating a democratic deficit. One institution that is generally considered central to the effective functioning of a democratic system, but tends to be neglected in these discussions, is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). After all, it is at least ostensibly the job of the legal system to ensure that no one is above the law, not even governments. This study applies a theory of judicial politics to identify under what conditions the ECJ can act as an effective democratic check in the European Union and how enlargement may affect that role.

Why does European integration proceed? This article tests among three theories of representation. (1) The "permissive consensus" theory argues that political elites have been able to pursue their own policy interests because of public disinterest. (2) Stimson's (1991) "policy mood" theory argues that public disinterest is a sign that political elites are hewing close enough to public preferences. (3) The "cue-taking" theory argues that a disinterested public's preferences will be correlated with political elite policy positions not because elites are responding to public preferences, but because political elites shape weakly held preferences through their policy positions. A two-stage least squares regression model is used to test among the theories. The results provide support for the policy mood theory. 3 Tables, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

Develops a model relating financial assistance from wealthier to poorer member nations to a desire to facilitate market integration, strengthen domestic economies, and thereby protect the political party in power; 1977-90.

Scholars have long been fascinated by the role of international courts in the enforcement of international rule of law. They start with a foundational question: Can international courts affect how international law is implemented? In this review, we lay out four of the most common theoretical arguments for why international courts matter. We then interrogate these accounts. In particular, we examine their views on how much influence courts have and what the likely welfare consequences are for the signatories of an agreement. In so doing, we identify critical conditions that must obtain for court influence under each of the arguments. We then bring more recent scholarship to bear on the plausibility of these conditions. In particular, we examine what research on the structure of law, the preferences of judges, and institutional design implies about the efficacy of international courts based on the four foundational arguments. We conclude with suggestions for future research.

Wissenschaftler sind sich einig, dass das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren des Europäischen Gerichtshofes (EuGH) von großer Bedeutung ist für die europäische Integration. Allerdings besteht keine Einigkeit darüber, warum dieses Verfahren eingesetzt wird. Obwohl eine große Menge Erklärungen existiert, konnte doch keine durch einen Vergleichstest als entscheidend erkannt werden. Der Artikel stellt einen solchen Test auf. Es werden Hinweise gefunden, dass transnationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, öffentliche Unterstützung der europäischen Integration, politische Traditionen, gerichtliches Einspruchswesen und politische Bildung Einflussfaktoren für diese Vorabentscheidungsverfahren sind