Booster Draft Mechanism for Multi-Object Assignment
In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 20-074
2 results
Sort by:
In: ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 20-074
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of mechanism and institution design: JMID, Volume 8, Issue 1, p. 75-96
ISSN: 2399-8458
We study multi-category housing allocation problems: A finite set of objects, which is sorted into categories of equal size, has to be allocated to a finite set of individuals, such that everyone obtains exactly one object from each category. We show that, in the large class of category-wise neutral and non-bossy mechanisms, any strategy-proof mechanism can be constructed by simply letting individuals choose an object from each category one after another following some priority order. We refer to these mechanisms as multi-category serial dictatorships and advocate for selecting priority orders across categories as fairly as possible.