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ABSTRACTManuscript Type:EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue:We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family‐owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family‐owned companies.Research Findings/Insights:At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family‐owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family‐owned companies equates to board independence of 38 per cent, separation of the chairman and CEO positions, and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring.Theoretical/Academic Implications:This study shows that the effect of additional monitoring on agency costs and firm performance differs across firms with different ownership structures.Practitioner/Policy Implications:For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family‐owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels.

Purpose
Despite the benefits of international diversification, the home equity bias phenomenon is well documented in the portfolio choice literature. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the same investment behavior applies to domestic socially responsible investments (SRIs) where ethical screenings should be the selection criteria.


Design/methodology/approach
The authors apply the model by Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) to uncover the effect of distance relative to screenings on SRI domestic portfolio choice. For the first time, the authors test the robustness of distance effect by using time bias, which is the travel time between the fund manager and the company's headquarter.


Findings
The authors find that SRIs exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms. After controlling for screening activity and other fund characteristics, the authors still find a strong distance bias in SRI fund portfolio decision-making. The authors find that this bias is mostly observed in SRI fund with social screening and that fund holding characteristics determine the propensity of fund managers to invest locally. The results suggest that the local bias puzzle exists in SRI.


Research limitations/implications
This study provides avenue for future research to examine whether the same local bias is found in SRI investment in other countries where they have different characteristics and behavior. Also, the evidence that local bias exists in SRI investment may need further analysis as to whether this is conflicting with the objectives of SRI, which focus more on ethical beliefs.


Practical implications
The results suggest that many local firms in the same city currently held by an SRI fund will not be held by this fund if it is in another city. The implications of the findings are that geographic proximity, along with ethical screenings, is an important dimension to how SRI fund invests.


Originality/value
This study is the first that examines local bias in SRI funds by using portfolio holding data.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueFamily control in family firms can extend beyond the direct involvement of family members, but identifying these mechanisms is difficult in most markets. We utilize unique disclosures made by Taiwanese firms to examine the role played by family representatives in listed family firms. Family representatives are non‐family members that represent the controlling family's indirect shareholdings in the firm. We examine whether family representatives are used in the same manner as family members and whether they provide net benefits or costs to shareholders.Research Findings/InsightsIn our sample of listed family firms, we find that omitting family representatives understates the influence of controlling families by 46 percent. We show that family representatives are associated with net costs to shareholders, but to a lesser extent than family members. We also find that controlling families use family members and family representatives differently. Family members are more involved in older family firms and in firms founded by the family. Family representatives are more involved in acquired and second generation family firms and in larger firms with more fixed assets.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe apply agency theory to the use of family representatives and show that family representatives are being used by controlling families to extend their influence within their firms, increasing agency costs to minority shareholders.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsFor policymakers, our analysis shows that disclosure of family member and representative relationships within firms is important and value‐relevant to investors. Furthermore, our results suggest that firm performance could be improved by limiting the involvement of family members and family representatives in family firms.