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A study of the main changes in the British economy from 1951, focussing on nationalisation and privatisation; unemployment; funding of the NHS and education; deindustrialisation and Britain's changing industrial structure; taxation; inequality; environmental change and policy; and the UK's changing relationship with the EEC and the European Union.

This is a detailed archive-based study of the economic planning of the Attlee governments, in which the author seeks to analyse the interaction between the decisions of central planners and the micro-economic effects of these decisions. Throughout the book, Martin Chick pays particular attention to the level, pattern and quality of fixed capital investment. At the same time, there is a continuous concern with the struggle between politicians, economists and industrialists over the mix of pricing mechanisms and administrative orders which were to be used in this period. This struggle permeated all discussions over matters such as the organisation of nationalised industries, the monopoly structure of nationalised industries, the allocation of resources and the promotion of higher productivity. The author also asks what impact, if any, economic planning had on the productivity performance of the UK economy

Abstract
This article examines the change in the fundamental assumptions underpinning industrial policy from the mid-1970s in Britain. It necessarily contrasts the broadly supply-side concerns of industrial policy from the mid-1970s with the more demand-side concerns of the earlier 'Golden Age' period from 1945. Where in the earlier period the emphasis in industrial policy was on capital investment and the role of government in compensating for perceived market inefficiency, from the late 1970s this emphasis shifted to the need to improve the flexibility and quality of supply-side factors allied to a more optimistic view of the ability of the market to secure efficient outcomes.

SUMMARYFocusing on the shift from coal to oil in the French and British economies between 1945 and 1972, this article analyses the influence of economists and economic concepts on fuel‐policy making in each economy. The framing of French fuel policy around marginalist principles from 1958 is examined, and the unusually direct influence of economists on policy making is ascribed to a mix of national security, industrial modernization, and political considerations.