Search results

Artiklen giver først en kort oversigt over covid-19-håndteringens forløb fra krisens udbrud i 2020 til 2022, hvor der er en forventning om covid-19's forvandling fra en alvorlig og svært kontrollabel sygdom til en endemisk viruslidelse. Næste afsnit gennemgår krisens politiske og administrative beslutningsprocesser, dels under selve krisen i strikt forstand, dels i den lange fase hvor det har handlet om administrativt og politisk at håndtere et samfundsproblem, som ikke ville gå væk. Det sidste afsnit tager krisehåndteringens ret alvorlige kvalitative aspekter op. Det drejer sig om de demokratiske problemer, som krisehåndteringen snarere end krisen aktualiserede, det faglige beslutningsgrundlag (sundhedsfagligt, juridisk, økonomisk og adfærdsvidenskabeligt) og endelig spørgsmålet om, hvordan man kvalitetssikrer krisehåndteringen. ; The paper presents an overview of Danish Covid-19-crisis management as it developed from its outbreak to its status as an endemic virus. This is followed by an analysis of political and administrative decision making during the crisis and during the protracted series of events where the handling of problems that would not go away attracted all political attention. Finally, the paper discusses the important qualitative issues that were raised both by the crisis and by its political handling. These issues were democratic, legal, and professional (health professional, economic, and behavioral).

Decentralization of authority from central government to sub‐national governments is an important part of modern public sector reforms and has been the primary contribution to public sector reform in Denmark and the other Nordic countries. On the assumption that political and administrative actors are authority maximizers, the paper analyses how national and sub‐national actors react to these decentralization goals, and the extent to which they are implemented. The analysis points to the importance of both institutional and power variables. It concludes that dynamic change can take place in a public sector which is characterized by strong corporatist and multi‐level institutions, such as in Denmark.

Danish democracy has strong corporatist characteristics. The implication is that interest organizations are integrated in both policy‐making and policy implementation. This article deals with policy implementation. A distinction between different administrative regimes is developed. The proposition advanced here is that variations with respect to the involvement of interest organizations in administrative execution of public policy have consequences for administrative behavior. A number of scandals revealed during recent years concerning the management of public funds provide the basis of the empirical analysis. The conclusion is that with increased involvement of interest organizations in the administrative implementation of policy, legal norms are superseded by political norms, while the traditional institutions of administrative accountability are weakened.

Comparison of public service reform and contractual civil service, and differences in strategic approaches.

State sector reform was an integral component of the radical economic and social policy changes enacted by New Zealand governments between 1984 and 1991. This reform replaced the traditional tenured public service with a contractual regime. Through a comparison with Denmark, it is shown that New Zealand's reforms were not unique. Similar reforms were enacted in Denmark. But contrary to what occurred in New Zealand, the Danish reforms had already begun in the 1960s, and have since been gradually expanded. The parallel contractual regimes introduced in the two countries are accounted for by an increasing demand among politicians to secure a civil service that is responsive to political executive demands. However, because of institutional differences and diverging regulatory regimes, the strategic approaches in the two countries have been different. Whereas the New Zealand approach was dominated by an appeal to a coherent and sophisticated body of theoretical knowledge, combined with strict formalization, the Danish strategy has been based on political bargaining with the civil service unions. In both cases the reforms rest on critical assumptions regarding their positive and negative implications.

AbstractThe outbreak of COVID-19 unleashed a severe crisis in society. The suddenness and speed with which the disease spread into a global pandemic makes it an outstanding case for showing how bureaucracy acts in response to a crisis marked by uncertainty and urgency. This article focuses on the role played by the central government bureaucracy in preparing and enacting the Danish government's response to the COVID-19 crisis. It is based on full access to internal government files related to crisis management during the winter and spring of 2020. These files include memos, e-mails, decision notes, and draft decisions from key civil servants. The article demonstrates the strength of the theory of bounded rationality when it comes to analyzing the interaction between top civil servants and political executives. Moreover, it shows how administrative and political executives can mold a governmental organization to overcome the inertia inherent in bureaucratic organization and procedures.

ABSTRACTIn the early 1990s the Danish Ministry of Finance initiated an experiment where a few ministerial departments negotiated performance agreements with their agencies. Since then internal contracting has spread and is now nearly universally used in central government. However, a close study demonstrates that in this process contract content has changed dramatically. The early contracts were quid-pro-quo agreements. Agencies committed themselves to improve efficiency but contracts at the same time admitted them increased managerial discretion. The mature contracts are quite different. Departmental ministries have exploited their considerable autonomy to set demands that are related to policy and service levels rather than internal management. Here ministries have adapted to the characteristics of their policy tasks and to the presumed concerns of the target groups dominating their political environment. Building on an analysis of all contracts in force in 1995, 2000, and 2005 the paper sees this change as a transformation of an ideal type NPM-instrument into a managerial tool adapted to a system where highly autonomous ministers act as unquestioned political executives.

Performance contracts entered between ministerial departments and their agencies are used throughout the Danish central government. The article analyzes the use of performance contracting in 2005. The analysis draws on transaction cost theory and actor‐centered institutionalism, stressing the bargaining aspect of hierarchy and the importance of economic and political transaction costs. The analysis shows considerable variation in the content of performance demands. Ministries with different organizational designs use contracts in markedly different ways and agencies with a strong interface to individual citizens and businesses are more likely to meet demands regulating policy delivery and service levels. Further, contracts contain substantive clauses, the terms of which are largely assessable. It also shows that performance contracts only rarely specify demands related to cost efficiency within agencies. Many of these results are statistically significant, even though a general point is the wide variation in the implementation of performance contracts between individual ministries.