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Leading theories of grassroots lobbying assert that legislators should respond positively to the volume of grassroots lobbying messages because volume indicates the salience of an issue among constituents. This notion rests on the idea that the costs of producing a large volume of grassroots lobbying signals the value of the information to legislators. Advances in technology and strategy, however, have flattened the costs associated with producing such information—it costs much less to generate one additional e-mail message than before. In this environment, the volume of grassroots lobbying no longer signals the value of the information it contains. Instead, I believe trust becomes the critical factor in evaluating grassroots lobbying. I test this theory using a survey of state legislators. I find that lobbying message volume has no effect on legislator responses to higher salience issues, and a negative effect on lower salience issues.

Citizens' perceptions of the alt-right are not well explored in political science. We view the alt-right as a successor of the Tea Party movement. While the Tea Party described itself as organized around spending, the size of government, and the American Constitution, examinations of the movement found that the unifying concerns of people who identified with it or viewed it favorably were negative feelings about racial minorities and patriarchal views of gender roles. Using panel survey data, we show that whites with higher levels of hostile sexism, racial resentment, perceptions of discrimination against whites, and who were more favorable towards Donald Trump evaluated the alt-right movement more positively. We find no evidence that self-placed ideology informed these evaluations. On the whole, latent cultural conservatism appears to inform evaluations of the relatively unknown — at the time — alt-right movement.

Americans born before 1980, called Millennials, are repeatedly treated as a singular voting bloc, but much like the Baby Boomers, have been socialized across a series of very different elections. We develop a theory of millennial political socialization that argues that older Millennials are more tied to the Democratic party and more liberal than their younger counterparts. We use the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and an original survey of 1274 Americans conducted before the 2016 elections to test this theory. We find some support for our theory; in addition, we find that younger Millennials are socialized by issues of identity politics and culture – specifically on issues of immigration and the role of race in society. This implies a generation that largely favors Democrats, but whose Republicans are more culturally conservative than middle aged Republican voters.

ObjectivesDespite declining trust in government institutions, political scientists have observed increasing political participation across activities, including grassroots lobbying. We argue that higher levels of trust in the state political system as a whole—diffuse political trust—and in state legislatures—specific political trust—should increase the likelihood that citizens contact their state legislators about policy matters because higher levels of trust tend to correlate with believing that the policy‐making process produces equitable political outcomes.MethodsWe use observational data from a nationally representative survey sample taken in 2015.ResultsWe find mixed results: whereas diffuse political trust predicts participation in grassroots lobbying at the state level, specific political trust does not.ConclusionThis finding implies that more general feelings of political trust exert greater influence on grassroots lobbying behavior than do more institution‐specific indicators of trust.

AbstractTwo very different kinds of models—cross-sectional models based on the logic of island biogeography and time series models of density dependence—are used to understand interest system density. While they share much in common, it is not at all clear how results derived from cross-sectional models are to be understood in terms of the temporal focus of the time series approach. Thus, the first purpose of this article is to more thoroughly think through how these two modeling strategies and their empirical findings are related to each other. We empirically assess several theoretical conjectures about the relationship of the two modeling strategies by adding a temporal element to the typical cross-sectional analysis of state interest systems via modeling density dependence pooled across four cross-sections from 1980, 1990, 1997, and 2007. By doing so, we add to the literature on state interest system density by examining how it has changed since 1980. Finally, we discuss the nature of this change and what it implies for the temporal development of state interest communities, the second focus of this analysis.

We examine how economic change influences the supply of organized interests. Indeed, the economies of states have changed markedly since the turn of the century. State economies have grown, and the relative contributions of different economic sectors have changed. We use the Energy-Stability-Area model of interest system density to assess how these changes – along with changes in the productivity of different economic sectors in terms of generating organized interests – have influenced the size and composition of state interest communities from 1997 to 2007. We find that all three sources of economic change have uniquely contributed, and to a significant degree, to demographic change in state communities of organized interests.

ObjectiveTo determine how the alt‐right label informs how voters assess individuals and political candidates.MethodsWe use a survey experiment with a hypothetical candidate. Along with a control, we vary the ideological label the hypothetical candidate uses, including conservative and alt‐right.ResultsThe alt‐right label leads people to view candidates as holding more right‐leaning ideological and issue positions relative to no label and often—specifically on issues relating to race, gender, and norms—relative to a more explicit conservative label.ConclusionThese results shed light on how citizens come to understand and use new ideological labels and suggest that the alt‐right label conveys context‐specific information that differs from that connected to the conservative label.