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The Canadian province of British Columbia has been widely recognized as the North American leader in employing Design, Build, Finance Operate public–private partnerships to create new public infrastructure. Canada is one of the most decentralized federations in the world. Provinces exercise considerable autonomy and have powerful revenue raising power at their disposal. Although Canadian local governments are generally seen as substantially inferior to the two senior levels of government, those in British Columbia have in fact managed to achieve quite a bit of autonomy due to non-constitutional factors. Large infrastructure projects, for which municipalities and other local government agencies must look to the province for financial support are among the most controversial of issues within the provincial–local government relationship. The introduction of public–private partnerships represents a classic example of a political entrepreneur changing the rules of the game to favour their desired outcomes. In this case, a government leader determined to pursue an infrastructure program that the province lacked the capital to support and the re-structuring of the state along New Public Management lines. However, even though the rule change favoured the Premier's immediate goals, and allowed him to over-ride much local objection, it can be argued that in the long run neither local governments nor the province have necessarily gained in power by changing the rules of the game. In keeping with the general tenants of the New Public Management, the introduction of public–private partnerships has given precedence to technocratic forms of knowledge, especially those involved with finance and accounting, with the aim of pursuing public goals in the most "economically efficient" manner possible. The flip side is that democratic input is strictly limited to the initial question as to whether or not a project is desirable, not how it can be best achieved or whether, once underway, it still represents a wise move. As a result, if there are any real winners in terms of autonomy, it has been senior public managers at both the provincial and local level and their financial and accounting advisors. These actors have had the range of issues for which they are accountable markedly simplified when it comes to major infrastructure projects, even as the complexity of such projects are increased by the use of public–private partnerships. Evidence is drawn from government documents, news accounts and interviews conducted by the author with senior managers, politicians and appointed board members of local government organizations (a quasi-governmental agency and a regional municipality's transit authority) as well as a provincial ministry, which acts as a control case. By employing three cases within the same province and the same time-frame, many of the contextual factors that can confound a study of this sort have been held constant for the purpose of comparison.

Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependence and
Policy Diffusion, Junko Kato, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003, pp. 260.This book provides a surprisingly interesting look at an understudied
problem within the field of comparative welfare state research: the
relationship between funding and welfare state regime characteristics. The
author proposes that researchers take a second look at regressive
taxation, specifically value-added taxes (VATs) such as Canada's GST.
While it is commonly assumed that a sustainable and extensive welfare
state goes hand-in-hand with a heavy reliance on progressive taxation,
Kato seeks to demonstrate through a combination of quantitative and
qualitative methods that this is not the case.

Abstract.Political-economic theory posits that in the face of a perceived decline in service quality, those who might otherwise seek alternatives will be restrained by feelings of loyalty that are a product of their emotional and physical investment in a situation (Hirschman, 1970). Amartya Sen (1977) describes support for policies that is based exclusively in values—rather than self-interest or a combination of the two—as a commitment. This article sets out to answer two questions: First, what proportion of the supporters of Canadian medicare within the province of Alberta currently expresses self-interest, and what proportion does not? We can describe this latter group as possibly expressing commitment. Second, is it possible that those who support medicare and express self-interest also share the same values as those who might be expressing commitment? If so, feelings of loyalty might help to maintain support for medicare among those who currently express self-interest, should they perceive a decline in service quality. While evidence is found to support this view, care must be taken in generalizing the results to the wider population, given the size and nature of the sample.Résumé.La théorie politique-économique pose en principe que, face à la perception d'un déclin de la qualité des services, ceux qui seraient normalement susceptibles de chercher d'autres solutions seront restreints par les sentiments de loyauté produits par l'investissement émotif et physique de l'individu dans son environnement (Hirschman, 1970). Sen (1977) décrit l'appui voué à certaines politiques pour des raisons exclusivement idéologiques, plutôt que par intérêt personnel, ou encore pour une combinaison de raisons idéologiques et d'intérêt personnel, comme un engagement. Cet article se propose de répondre à deux questions: en premier, quelle proportion de partisans du système public de santé canadien en Alberta exprime, ou n'exprime pas, des intérêts personnels? On peut probablement décrire le groupe qui n'exprime pas d'intérêts personnels comme témoignant d'un engagement. Deuxièmement, est-il possible que ceux qui soutiennent le système de santé tout en exprimant des intérêts personnels aient les mêmes valeurs que ceux qui expriment leur engagement? Si oui, ces sentiments de loyauté pourraient aider à maintenir le soutien pour le système de santé parmi ceux qui expriment actuellement des intérêts personnels, s'ils avaient l'impression d'un déclin de la qualité des services. Bien que nous ayons trouvé des preuves étayant cet avis, il faut être prudent dans la généralisation des résultats à l'ensemble de la population à cause de la taille et de la nature de l'échantillon.

The new public management (NPM) is the result of both pushes (attempts at crisis creation) and pulls (attempts to get along with less and to act more businesslike). These led to a new elite consensus on the role of the state, described by Jessop as the Schumpeterian workfare state. The NPM is seen as the management technology of this policy paradigm. To the degree that the NPM represents a broad agreement on how government should operate in light of this new consensus on the role of the state, it is a positive development. However, the NPM can also be attractive due to another, more cynical, pull. This is the desire to avoid blame for the costs that transition to this new policy paradigm imposes on society. To the degree that the NPM is used as technique for blame avoidance, its benefits to society decline.