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The Building as Screen: A History, Theory, and Practice of Massive Media describes, historicizes, theorizes, and creatively deploys massive media - a set of techno-social assemblages and practices that include large outdoor projections, programmable architectural façades, and urban screens -- in order to better understand their critical and creative potential. Massive media is named as such not only because of the size and subsequent visibility of this phenomenon but also for its characteristic networks and interactive screen and cinema-like qualities. Examples include the programmable lighting of the Empire State Building and the interactive projections of Montreal's Quartier des spectacles, as well as a number of works created by the author himself. This book argues that massive media enables and necessitates the development of new practices of expanded cinema, public data visualization, and installation art and curation that blend the logics of urban space, monumentality, and the public sphere with the aesthetics and affordances of digital information and the moving image.

Fairness is not foreign to competition law and fairness considerations are not new to it. However, the endemic uncertainty on its notion has traditionally made fairness unsuitable to act as a stand-alone applicable legal standard. Indeed, antitrust enforcers have usually been reluctant to engage with the unfairness of terms and conditions. Nonetheless, against the perceived undue corporate power and market concentration in the digital economy, fairness has recently gained center stage in the policy debate, especially in Europe where recent regulatory interventions have been declared to be aimed at promoting fairness in digital markets. Against this background, the article attempts to demonstrate that the vagueness and ambiguity associated with its meaning may make fairness particularly attractive to policy makers and that, accordingly, the revival of fairness risks being simply functional to grant them more discretion and room for intervention. JEL codes: K20, K21, L40, L50

Abstract
Self-preferencing is the symbol of the competition policy Zeitgeist in digital markets. Large online platforms acting as gatekeepers to their ecosystems and engaging in a dual mode intermediation are accused of taking advantage of their hybrid business model by granting preferential treatment to their own products and services. Alongside the recent legislative initiatives undertaken around the world to impose a neutrality regime over digital gatekeepers by targeting different forms of self-preferencing, this practice is also emerging in Europe as a new antitrust theory of harm advanced by courts and competition authorities. In the aftermath of the General Court's decision in Google Shopping and against the risk that the new label may merely provide antitrust enforcers with the opportunity to skip the legal standards and evidentiary burdens required to prove traditional anticompetitive behavior, this paper investigates whether and to what extent self-preferencing could be considered a new standalone offence in EU competition law.