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Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. A Second American Century -- 2. Science and the Hegemon: Speaking Truth to Power -- 3. Power, Polarity, and Hegemony in the Twenty-first Century -- 4. Science and the American State: Mobilizing Democracy -- 5. Science and Diplomacy: U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Rest -- 6. Science and Global Governance at the Final Frontier -- 7. Science, Grand Strategy, and Prospects for American Influence -- Notes -- Index

Venezuela, one of few Latin American countries that did not have to democratize during the Third Wave, veered hardest to the left at the turn of the century. Now, this country, despite its democratic tradition, apparently has most to fear with respect to continued civilian control of the military. This article shows how Venezuela's democracia pactada (democracy-by-pact) and its Bolivarian Revolution both permitted fusing of military with political power across policy areas. However, the emergence of a coordinate system for civilian control of the military protects Hugo Chávez even as it places certain constraints on the anti-American president. Moreover, this form of civilian control matches elements of the U.S. example. Accurate description, or coding, of Venezuela opens an avenue for improved military-to-military relations, which could, in turn, lay the foundation for constructive U.S.-Venezuelan engagement in the Western Hemisphere.

In defense of the argument made in "Courage in the Service of Virtue," in effect that courageous military advice better serves the republic when it accounts for political competition facing civilian principals, the author answers the complaint that his analysis accorded too much deference to the executive and ignored Congress and the people the real principals of American civil–military relations. The principal–agent model has more than one useful application, and executive authority over the U.S. military is both more fragile and more important for democratic control than the critics imply.