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The neo-Brandeis school of antitrust has suddenly emerged as a viable challenger to the reigning consumer welfare establishment. Assuming the mantle of Brandeis gives the neo-Brandeisians a historically grounded brand but also comes with some baggage. Among other things, the neo-Brandeisians need to be prepared to answer the following questions: (1) Will they follow Brandeis in seeing bigness as a curse not only in business but also in government? (2) Will they break cleanly with welfarism and adhere to a moral, social, and political theory of anti-bigness, even at the cost of efficiency? and (3) Will they commit themselves genuinely to Brandeis's empiricism—that facts on the ground trump theories, wherever the facts may lead?

Antitrust systems that permit private enforcement must choose between prioritizing compensation or deterrence as primary goals given the inevitable trade-offs. Although a number of systems that have been transitioning towards private enforcement—the EU in particular—have recently sided with compensation as the primary goal, it is doubtful that antitrust generally can achieve effective compensation to consumers as compensation is traditionally understood in remedial systems. This article considers the possibility of reaching for a different definition of compensation than conventionally understood and casts doubt on the advisability of such a move.