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This paper presents a very simple characterization of the technological choices underlying M‐form and U‐form organizations. We first show that the externalities within a function favour the M‐form, which gives higher profit, higher output level and lower prices than the U‐form. The major innovation of the paper consists in the analysis of communication flows that constitute a positive externality on demand schedules. When these information flows are introduced, we find conditions under which the U‐form gives output and communication flows higher than the M‐form.

The aim of this article is to provide a mid-term evaluation of liberalization of electricity retailing in Europe, taking into account four limitations to policy analysis: different and often conflicting theoretical points of view, shortage of routinely collected data, problems in disentangling the effect of retail liberalization from those of other related reforms and pervasive regulatory interventions. Lacking a common analytical framework to assess the costs and benefits of electricity retail competition, we firstly built a comprehensive theory on retail liberalization and we then use European Union data on market structure and its dynamics to test the consistency of theory and practice. The analysis highlights the presence of an oligopolistic supply structure, as well as a limited level of customer engagement in the market, which in the case of small consumers is partially justified by the presence of switching costs and informational complexities. Asymmetries in the rate and speed of cost-pass through make the market opaque, challenging the sole reliance on "light-hand" regulation to guarantee a sound market functioning. We identify the situations in which some form of "hard" regulation appear to be necessary to secure the continuity of supply even after the introduction of competition and we propose several implementation solutions according to the weight attributed to the objectives of supply continuity and customer protection. In the light of evidences about European markets, we suggest that the attribution of the Default/Last Resort service through an auction mechanism may favor both the development of upstream and downstream competition, without deterring customer switching.

International audience This paper studies merger incentives for polluting Cournot firms under a competitive tradable emission permits market. We find that when firms are symmetric and marginal costs are constant, an horizontal merger is welfare enhancing if efficiency gains are high enough for the merger to take place. The presence of a competitive (or monopolistic) outside market that also trades in the permits market makes profitable a merger that would not happen otherwise. When firms are vertically related in an input-output chain, an horizontal merger in one of the markets increases profits in the other market due to the permits price decrease. Finally we consider an oligopoly-fringe model in which firms differ in their marginal production costs. A merger between the dominant oligopolistic firms decreases the permits price and is always profitable. Such setting is relevant to assess the observed mergers between power generators in several market for permits, like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), allowing us to derive some policy recommendations.

AbstractShocks related to weather variations have strong effects on developing countries' economies. Climate change is expected to increase the occurrence and magnitude of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods or hurricanes that strongly affect agriculture and other activities. This special issue gathers literature reviews and case studies that aim to better understand heterogeneous impacts and their transmission channels, as well as to evaluate the impact of such weather shocks on developing economies, including Sub-Saharan African countries, India and Brazil.

Dans les années à venir, les concessions hydroélectriques françaises seront soumises à un processus de mise en concurrence, avec une offre qui prévoit deux volets, économique et environnemental. Cette procédure pourrait générer un arbitrage entre transferts monétaires et engagements environnementaux. En particulier, nous anticipons que des compensations monétaires élevées vis-à-vis des autorités locales seront couplées avec des mesures de mitigation moins satisfaisantes et vice-versa . Cet article analyse les raisons à l'origine des choix des autorités locales auxquelles ces compensations s'adressent. À travers une expérience dans le cadre des modèles de choix discret (DCE) conduite dans la vallée de l'Aspe, où est installée une capacité hydroélectrique de 100 MW, nous considérons que les offres monétaires sont converties en rabais de la facture d'électricité pour les résidents. Nous testons dans ce contexte si la population locale préfère des économies sur la facture plus importantes ou une plus ample amélioration environnementale. Du point de vue méthodologique, nous calculons nos résultats suivant l'approche standard de l'espace des préférences et celle de la propension à payer ( willingness to pay , WTP). Nous montrons que la population locale révèle une préférence forte pour les améliorations environnementales. Cela nous emmène à conclure que les acteurs intéressés aux concessions hydroélectriques devraient donner une priorité forte aux mesures de mitigation. JEL Codes: H23, Q2, Q4, Q5.