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Abstract
Taking an approach to international law that embraced key features of the New Haven School, Rosalyn Higgins has made several important contributions to the law of international organizations. In 1963, at a time when no theory had addressed the work of the United Nations' (UN) political organs, Higgins showed how General Assembly resolutions and other decisions contribute to the development of customary international law. She also demonstrated that, separate and apart from UN member states, the UN Secretariat was contributing to the development of customary international law regarding treaties. Later, as counsel for the International Tin Council and later rapporteur for the Institut de Droit International, Higgins put on the global agenda the issue of the accountability of international organizations for harm to third parties, highlighting gaps in existing law and competing policy concerns that precluded easy solutions. Higgins made two contributions in marking the path forward for theorizing about international organizations, one substantive and the other methodological. She highlighted the importance of considering international organizations in relation to the full range of actors with whom they interact, including private parties. As a methodological matter, Higgins demonstrated the value of an inductive approach where legal claims are grounded in close, detailed and careful observations of how international organizations actually operate.

Abstract
This article argues that international organizations 'as such' can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations' direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations' role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.

AbstractAs a disciplinarian of international organizations, reputation has serious shortcomings. Even though international organizations have strong incentives to maintain a good reputation, reputational concerns will sometimes fail to spur preventive or corrective action. Organizations have multiple audiences, so efforts to preserve a "good" reputation may pull organizations in many different directions, and steps taken to preserve a good reputation will not always be salutary. Recent incidents of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic illustrate these points.

International organizations undermine democracy, or so their critics charge: not only do international organizations themselves operate undemocratically, but they undercut democratic governance within their member states. In particular, when states participate in international organizations, they lose control over policy outcomes because each state must share decision-making authority with other member states. And within member states, national legislatures—the bodies specifically designed to be responsive to popular control—are marginalized. Legislatures lack direct influence over international organizations and also have little influence over the executive branch's interactions with such organizations.