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Understanding political and social effects of violence in local populations through public opinion surveys has become increasingly common internationally. Yet while researchers are attuned to possible challenges induced during survey implementation, this work focuses almost uniformly on respondents. This paper considers survey enumerators as critical actors for data collection in violent research settings. We present survey results from 245 enumerators in Côte d'Ivoire to show that their personal feelings of insecurity and exposure to violence while conducting surveys may condition challenges faced and compromises made to gathering data. We shed light on how academic research in violent political settings poses unique security concerns for enumerators, with ramifications for data integrity.

When are politicians willing to liberalize abortion laws? While restricted access to legal abortion affects millions of women around the world, there is relatively little understanding of the factors shaping the views of politicians who craft or uphold such restrictive laws. This study examines the impact of a public health framing commonly employed by activists to persuade politicians to reform abortion laws. We provide evidence that politicians' preferences toward abortion reforms are shaped by the intersection of gender and wealth. Drawing on a survey experiment conducted among more than 600 politicians in Zambia, we show that only women politicians from less wealthy backgrounds are more likely to support policy liberalization after being exposed to a public health framing. These findings underscore how economic inequalities can affect the substantive representation of women's interests and provide a baseline for further research on the use of framing strategies in other developing country contexts.

Party switching among legislative candidates has important implications for accountability and representation in democratizing countries. We argue that party switching is influenced by campaign costs tied to the clientelistic politics that persist in many such countries. Candidates who are expected to personally pay for their campaigns, including handouts for voters, will seek to affiliate with parties that can lower those costs through personal inducements and organizational support. Campaign costs also drive candidate selection among party leaders, as they seek to recruit candidates who can finance their own campaigns. We corroborate these expectations with an original survey and embedded choice experiment conducted among parliamentary candidates in Zambia. The conjoint analysis shows that candidates prefer larger parties that offer particularistic benefits. The survey further reveals that parties select for business owners as candidates—the very candidates most likely to defect from one party to another.