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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Denmark: strengthened opposition, yet high levels of cooperation -- 3 Germany: heated debates but cooperative behaviour -- 4 The Netherlands: the reinvention of consensus democracy -- 5 Italy: when responsibility fails. Parliamentary opposition in times of crisis -- 6 Portugal: the unexpected path of far left parties, from permanent opposition to government support -- 7 Spain: government and opposition cooperation in a multi-level context -- 8 Czech Republic: weak governments and divided opposition in times of crisis -- 9 Hungary: the de(con)struction of parliamentary opposition -- 10 Poland: opposition in the making -- 11 Romania: an ambivalent parliamentary opposition -- 12 Switzerland: when opposition is in government -- 13 Conclusions -- Index

AbstractHow do parties that have long been confined to opposition behave once they take the decision to support government? This article analyses the case of the three Portuguese radical left parties that took such a move in the wake of the post-bailout 2015 election. Leveraging the concept of contract parliamentarism and the analysis of different data sources through different methods, we show that the three parties adopted a similar strategy after agreeing deals with the centre-left socialists. Specifically, while keeping close scrutiny on the executive action, the parties have voted consensually on most of the legislation proposed by the government. In exchange, the majority of policy pledges agreed with the socialists were implemented by the beginning of the legislature. Based on these findings, the article underlines the importance for supporting parties of conducting a thorough negotiation of policy goals and the timing of their implementation before joining the government, and of pursuing an autonomous discursive agenda.

Contributions to this study clearly support our initial hypotheses. It is observed, as expected, that the economic crisis has considerably decreased consensual behaviour in parliament. However, the nature of parties constitutes a crucial variable in order to explain the conduct of the opposition in the legislative arena better: since the outbreak of the crisis, radical parties have turned even more adversarial than before; whereas mainstream parties - who want to appear as a credible alternative to the government in office - have drifted towards more cooperative behaviour. Given the growing influence of the European Union on the legislation approved in response to the crisis, it was also expected (and demonstrated) that the traditionally pro-European parties would be more likely to cooperate on socio-economic issues than Eurosceptic parties. Finally, it has also been shown that timing also plays an important role in the opposition's decision either to support or to oppose the government: with opposition parties more inclined to contest the government's proposals when their chances of getting into power are higher, and vice versa. Adapted from the source document.

Since the onset of the economic crisis, parties in parliament (especially those in opposition) have found themselves faced with a dilemma: choosing between the need to cooperate with the government in order to overcome the crisis and the opportunity provided by a weakened government to stress their adversarial position so as to be more easily re-elected and possibly get into power. What have they decided to do? The present contribution introduces a collection of works exploring this dilemma in southern European countries, by examining the opposition behaviour in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; and in the European Parliament. Adapted from the source document.