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In recent years the level of cohesion in parliamentary parties has continued to increase. Whereas in Congress the party leadership's capabilities to solve collective action problems & to reduce transaction costs have been in doubt, in parliamentary systems little seems to warrant such doubt. Therefore, the aim of this article is to trace the party leadership's particular capabilities to secure party unity in parliamentary systems by means of (i) contract design, (ii) screening & selection, (iii) monitoring & information requirements, & (iv) institutional checks. To the extent that these capabilities affect members differently, it is possible to sketch their contours on the basis of who the rebels are. It is apparent that discipline is not readily explained in terms of rewards & punishments. Factions & tendencies provide perhaps the most valid prediction for dissent in France & the United Kingdom, whereas in Belgium the extra-parliamentary party leadership & a detailed policy agreement have a strong impact on members' discipline. 3 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Although parliamentary government is generally taken to be party government and party cohesion is acknowledged a key element thereof, it seems an accepted part of comparative parliamentary research that the effectiveness of parliaments and the level ofparty cohesion are negatively related. This is in part a remnant of the Anglo-American comparative studies that have dominated the discipline for a long time. Within reactive parliaments, this negative relation fails to materialise. Combining results from earlier research and original data, it is demonstrated that a high level ofparty cohesion does not prevent parliaments to be an effective, independent player in government formation, the recruitment of cabinet ministers or policy making. Comparing ten European parliaments, the more effective parliaments do encompass parliamentary parties with the highest level ofcohesion. A more crucial element isperhaps the characteristic of parliamentary parties as essentially oriented to the extra-parliamentary party or as a dominant element in the party-as-a-whole. Further research is however necessary.

Party cohesion is crucial in parliamentary proceedings, for the strength of parties is determined by it. However high levels of party unanimity, parliamentary party cohesion is under no circumstances to be taken for granted. It is the outcome of a persistent struggle. From a rational choice point of view, the monitoring and sanctioning of recalcitrant MPs by the parliamentary party leadership is the condition sine qua non for party cohesion. Yet, rewards and punishments do not seem the cement that holds parliamentary parties together. Preliminary findings for the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, show that ministerial appointment, committee transfers, nor party list compilation are used systematicallyto this purpose.

According to rational choice theory casework is a rational form of political participation for both voter and Member of Parliament. It increases the voter's chance to a redress of grievance and it is an important means for MPs to maximize their votes, which parliamentary activities fail to contribute to. Though rational for individual actors, casework is far from optimal for society as a whole. Disregarding isolated cases, casework does not constitute an important source of inspiration for legislative and oversight activities. A written survey among 101 Flemish MPs tends to show that a collective solution for grievances in great demand is not pursued, as casework seems electorally and personally so much more rewarding. A cure for casework cannot befound, unless it ends this structural attractiveness of constituency service. Disregarding its rationality in isolated cases, casework, because it does not result in collective measures, seems to be a meager substitute for political participation.

Based on interviews with members of over 70 parliamentary assemblies Representing the People explores how members of parliament perceive their role as representatives, and shows that the way in which they represent depends very much on the party to which they belong.