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Group members value informed decisions and hold ideological preferences. A leader takes a decision on their behalf. Good leadership depends on characteristics of moderation and judgment. The latter emerges (endogenously) via advice communicated by "trustworthy associates." Trustworthy advice requires ideological proximity to the leader. A group may choose a relatively extreme leader with a large number of such associates. Paradoxically, this can happen though it is in the group's collective interest to choose a moderate leader. To assess whether these insights persist when political groups compete, we embed our analysis in a model of elections. Each of two parties chooses a leader who implements her preferred policy if elected. We find that a party may choose an extreme leader who defeats a moderate candidate chosen by the opposing party. Our results highlight the importance of party cohesion and the relations between a leader and her party. These can be more important to electoral success than proximity of a leader's position to the median voter.

AbstractWe model faction formation in a world where party politicians' objective is the development of an informed program of governance. Politicians' preferences reflect their own views and their information that, when aggregated via intraparty deliberations, influences the party manifesto. By joining a faction, a politician increases the influence of its leader on the manifesto, but foregoes his individual bargaining power. For broad model specifications, we find that a faction formation process allows power to be transferred to moderate politicians. This facilitates information sharing, increasing the capacity of the party to attain its objective. These positive welfare effects may hold even when factionalism restricts intraparty dialogue, and hold a fortiori when information is freely exchanged across factions. We conclude that the existence of ideological factions may benefit a party: It provides a means to tie uninformed or extremist politicians to more moderate and informed faction leaders.

Using data from the United Kingdom, we estimate the effects of ministerial resignation on government popularity. We test a counterfactual argument that resignations should have a corrective effect, that is, there is an increase in popularity following a resignation when taking into account the negative effect on popularity of the resignation issue. We get empirical estimates by using the age of ministers involved in resignation issues as an instrument. Our IV estimates provide empirical support for the corrective effect.

Using data from the United Kingdom, we estimate the effects of ministerial resignation on government popularity. We test a counterfactual argument that resignations should have a corrective effect, that is, there is an increase in popularity following a resignation when taking into account the negative effect on popularity of the resignation issue. We get empirical estimates by using the age of ministers involved in resignation issues as an instrument. Our IV estimates provide empirical support for the corrective effect.

We review a large formal literature on economic models of voting and electoral politics. We discuss two broad classes of model: those focusing on preference aggregation and those that look at elections as mechanisms of information aggregation. We also explore the role of elections in situations of asymmetric information, where politicians take hidden actions or are otherwise better informed about policy than voters are, and examine the role of elections in selection and as incentive mechanisms. In the section on models of preference aggregation, we focus on the themes of exogenous candidacy, policy commitment, and the role of valence attributes. For information aggregation, we analyze how different aspects of the institutional environment affect aggregation, focusing on the structure of elections—whether simultaneous or sequential—and the number of choices, as well as the motivations of voters. Finally, in considering models of asymmetric information, we describe how these models shed new light on incumbency effects, campaign spending, and the policy choices of politicians.

We review a large formal literature on economic models of voting and electoral politics. We discuss two broad classes of model: those focusing on preference aggregation and those that look at elections as mechanisms of information aggregation. We also explore the role of elections in situations of asymmetric information, where politicians take hidden actions or are otherwise better informed about policy than voters are, and examine the role of elections in selection and as incentive mechanism. In the section on models of preference aggregation, we focus on the themes of exogenous candidacy, policy commitment, and the role of valence attributes. For information aggregation, we analyze how different aspects of the institutional environment affect aggregation, focusing on the structure of elections -- whether simultaneous or sequential -- and the number of choices, as well as the motivations of voters. Finally, in considering models of asymmetric information, we describe how these models shed new light on incumbency effects, campaign spending, and the policy choice of politicians. Adapted from the source document.

Cohesive government-versus-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish Parliament, we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood, and use roll call records to show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension. Using a simple variant of the agenda-setting model—in which members of parliament can commit to their voting strategies—we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in Westminster systems can explain this phenomenon: in the equilibrium, on some bills, members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal. Such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes. We introduce new data from the House of Lords, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly to distinguish our claims from competing accounts of the data.