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Based on the original unpublished documents of the Italian ambassador in Ankara, the article refers to the difficult situation in which Turkey found itself as a consequence of the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Since its entry into NATO in 1952, the Turkish government had been active in completing the Western defensive system in the Middle East. After the disappointing Middle East Command & the Medo, which had to see Egypt as a main pillar, the US Secretary of State saw in the Northern Tier line as the real base for building the Baghdad Pact. GB, of course, had to be the "glue" of the structure. Pakistan would be a new element; an Arab country; Iraq, was most welcome; & Iran joined too. Turkey tried from the beginning to get Washington into the Pact. It had to measure itself against the irresistible rise of Nasserism & the strong dissuasive action it exerted on Hussein of Jordan & Nuri Said of Iraq. When Nasser's ascendancy gained ground in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, & Iraq, Turkey tried in vain to connect the Baghdad Pact to NATO; Cairo & Damascus, the two main centers of Arab nationalism, succeeding in isolating Iraq, would strengthen those links with the USSR that would suddenly threaten Turkey both from communism in the North & Arabism from South. The bilateral treaty of 11 March 1959 with Washington, together with strong economic aid, would in the end guarantee Turkey would open its territory to the intermediate range ballistic missile base. Adapted from the source document.

Summary in English.