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This paper studies state failure and governance in two conflict-states in the Middle East: Iraq and Somalia. Iraq is currently undergoing a social experiment under which a new form of government is being constructed after the passage of autocratic rule. The government envisaged is a consociational democratic state designed a priori as a political mechanism for the redistribution of resources, mainly oil. Somalia represents a stateless society or anarchy. The paper argues that in resource-rich countries such as Iraq, the consociational project leads to an Olson-type rent-seeking confessional behaviour that hampers economic growth and development. The rent-seeking behaviour in Iraq is fuelling the insurgency that perceives the consociational system as a grabbing.

AbstractThe postwar business cycle in Lebanon was dominated by the exchange rate based stabilization (ERBS) program implemented by the successive postwar governments. In the early period 1993–2002, a boom‐bust dynamics was generated during which the economy exhibited the well‐documented stylised facts of ERBS programs. The paper develops a cyclical index (ci) for Lebanon during this period and a VAR model shows that real interest rates (rr) had a significant impact on the dynamics of the business cycle during the early ERBS period. The second period 2002–2005 was marked by a recovery generated by foreign aid given to Lebanon in the Paris II international donors' conference held in November 2002. The period ended in a recession in 2005 brought about by the assassination of Lebanon's ex‐prime minister Rafic Hariri. The third phase of the business cycle was caused by the Israel–Lebanon war in the summer of 2006 which led to widespread civilian and infrastructure damage and ended a brief recovery in early 2006. Throughout the period 2002–2006, foreign aid was instrumental in the resilience of the ERBS program. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper shows that foreign aid in postwar Lebanon passed through two phases with distinct features that have had far reaching implications for postwar development. In the first phase lasting from 1992-97, foreign aid was mainly channelled towards providing resources for postwar reconstruction projects. The second phase from 1997 to the present witnessed a qualitative shift in foreign aid utilization from reconstruction needs towards financial stability and balance-of-payments equilibrium needs. This shift allowed the government to intervene in the foreign exchange market, maintained balance of payments surpluses during this period, reduced interest rates on public debt instruments and finally provided the necessary liquidity and 'confidence' for the government to continue borrowing funds from local commercial banks and foreign investors. More importantly this shift in foreign aid allowed the government to avoid financial and currency crises in 2002. However, the cost of such a qualitative shift was large in terms of fiscal management, diversion of funds from reconstruction, and the increased dependency of the Lebanese economy on foreign aid for stabilization purposes.

This paper studies the postwar economic and political reconstruction in Lebanon. The paper shows that the 'reconstruction boom' was short-lived. The economy experienced a growth trap early in the reconstruction period, and entered a cyclical crisis in 1998 which resulted from an ill-designed fiscal-monetary policy mix. The expansionary fiscal policy resulting from the high resource demands – due to economic and political reconstruction and from the needs of addressing horizontal inequality codified in the peace agreement known as the Taef Accords – led to a fiscal crisis of the state. The monetary and central bank policy was finance-biased with emphasis on financial and exchange rate stability and foreign capital inflows. Such a mix led to a real interest rate shock in the postwar period that played a role in the onset of the cyclical downturn. The finance-biased policy led to the rise of a rentier economy leading to deindustrialization during this period. The rise of a growth-impeding political economic structure resulting from the Taef Accords also played a role in intensifying the economic crisis through exerting pressures on public resources and through the engendering of a political crisis that brought to an end the era of postwar reconstruction. – conflict ; civil war ; post-conflict ; institutions ; social contract

War Libanon vor dem Bürgerkrieg von 1975-1990 ein Vorbild für stabile Währung und niedrige Inflation, so wurde er während des Bürgerkrieges zum schlechten Beispiel für Währungskrise und Inflation. Wie der Autor darlegt, sei dafür nicht allein der Bürgerkrieg verantwortlich. Vielmehr habe das Finanzwesen gemeinsam mit Industrie, Staat und Zentralbank die Währungskrise und Inflation gezielt hervorgerufen. Nach einem kurzen Rückblick auf die Rolle der Zentralbank im Libanon seit ihrer Gründung 1964, konzentriert sich die Analyse des Autors auf den Zeitraum von 1984-1992, als die Zentralbank ihre vorherige Politik der Inflationsbekämpfung zugunsten der Interessen von Finanzwesen, Industrie und Staat aufgab. (DÜI-Mjr)

This book examines monetary policy, central banking and exchange rate regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. Part I covers central banking and monetary policy, while Part II covers monetary policy and exchange rate regimes. Some chapters focus on the monetary frameworks of particular countries, including Lebanon, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey, outlining the different systems operated in each case, considering their successes and failures, and discussing important issues such as government policy, macroeconomic performance, inflation and inflation targeting, central bank

Building on the editors' earlier book, Monetary Policy and Central Banking in the Middle East and North Africa, this book emphasises monetary policy strategies and frameworks. It fills an important gap providing multi-country and single-country studies on monetary policy in post-civil war Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Territory and Turkey

Monetary policy in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries remains an understudied area; this book fills an important gap by examining monetary policy frameworks and monetary policy strategies in the region. Building on the editors' earlier book, Monetary Policy and Central Banking in the Middle East and North Africa, which focused on central bank independence issues and on exchange rate regimes, this book emphasises monetary policy strategies. Part I contains an overview of the financial markets and institutions which condition the choice of monetary policy strategy in.

This book examines monetary policy and central banking in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Individual chapters focus on the monetary frameworks of particular countries. Other chapters adopt a thematic approach, addressing important subjects such as exchange rate regimes, price stability and central banking.

AbstractThis article studies the determinants of youth emigration decisions, which is considered one of the main causes of 'Brain Drain' in Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs). We focus on the case of Lebanon using a unique dataset covering young people aged 15 to 29 from the year 2016. The aim of the article is to identify the profile of youth's propensity to emigrate from Lebanon. The empirical results indicate that youth from non‐wealthy backgrounds living in smaller dwellings have a higher propensity to emigrate. It is also found that being male and unemployed has a positive effect on migration. Moreover, university education promotes the willingness to emigrate; while residents of poor regions are more likely to express such willingness. Finally, the article provides some insights for policymakers.