Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- List of illustrations -- Acknowledgements -- List of abbreviations -- Note on translations -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Analysing climate security discourses -- 3 The United States: climate change as danger to the state -- 4 Germany: ambivalent forerunner in individual security -- 5 Mexico: a case of politicised securitisation? -- 6 Turkey: no climate for change? -- 7 Conclusion: the politics of securitising climate change -- References -- Index
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This paper contributes to the debate about the normative assessment of securitisation in light of Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It develops the distinction of progressive and regressive securitisation. In doing so, it emphasises the processual, contextual and ambiguous nature of securitisation. I suggest that progressive securitisation is closely linked to the solidarisation, whereas regressive securitisation implies the pluralisation of international society. The two cases of Covid-19 and Russia illustrate that international order has increasingly been characterised by regressive securitisation and a pluralisation of international society, despite possible alternatives, such as a transnational response to the spread of Covid-19. They have thus contributed to the further demise of the post–Cold War liberal order, which despite its problems, has involved a re-orientation of security away from state territory and national identity as the core referent objects. I end with a plea to take the ethics of security more seriously again, and in particular to scrutinise the ways in which our own behaviour reinforces regressive securitisation.
La guerre de la Russie contre l'Ukraine pose un défi à l'ordre international et remet en cause à la fois institutions et pratiques. Il convient de s'y pencher à nouveau pour réfléchir à une future architecture de sécurité pour l'Europe, même s'il est aujourd'hui impossible de savoir quel sera l'état du rapport de force.
This article discusses the relevance of discourse in the analysis of EU foreign policy. Instead of using discourse as a structure, the discursive struggles in meaning production are emphasised. The article argues that the literature trying to make a contribution to the explanation of EU foreign policy has so far overemphasised the positive function of discourses in influencing policies in their substance. In contrast, the article focuses on the delimiting function of discourses in providing the boundaries of the kinds of policies which can be legitimately pursued. From this point of view, important discursive struggles take place exactly about these limits, and it is only through the setting of these limits that identities and norms are provided with clearer meanings. The article illustrates this framework by focusing on the debate about normative power Europe. It argues that an important aspect of this debate which has been missing from the literature so far is that it is indeed engaging in a struggle over what is acceptable as a policy of a normative power and is what not, and that it is therefore engaged in setting the limits of legitimate EU foreign policy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright NISA.]
