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Artykuł podejmuje próbę reinterpretacji rabacji galicyjskiej z 1846 r. Główna teza zakłada, że była to gwałtowna kulminacja konfliktu społecznego, którego rezultatem było zdarzenie o charakterze ludobójczym. Wyjaśnienie tej złożonej sytuacji jest dokonane w pierwszej części tekstu poprzez przybliżenie długotrwałych procesów ekonomicznych, politycznych oraz paramilitarnych i ideologicznych. W drugiej części wyjaśniam charakter zamieszek korzystając z typologii i pojęć zaczerpniętych z mikrosocjologicznej teorii przemocy zbiorowej. Podsumowanie artykułu zawiera wnioski i dyskusję dotyczącą alternatywnych ścieżek budowania tożsamości narodowej i obywatelskiej.

Abstract
The present paper takes on the question of whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment is compatible with libertarianism. Despite Walter Block's recent arguments to the contrary, the paper argues that unless a gain is received in accordance with the libertarian principles of justice, it is without a basis and thus unjust. This fact alone proves that the concept of unjust enrichment is compatible with libertarianism. Besides, even though it is true — as Block claims — that forcing the recipient of an unjust gain to return it or pay for it involves positive duties and is therefore incompatible with libertarianism, the present paper argues that the practical consequences of this fact would be negligible, for compensatory schemes would develop on the free market anyway in justice-preserving steps.

Libertarianism and the Theory of Personal Identity. Robert Nozick's Closest Continuer Theory as a Background Theory of the Principle of Self‑Ownership The research problem of the present paper is the following question: May the closest continuer theory serve as a background theory for the principle of self‑ownership? This issue is a peculiar instance of the more general problem of the anthropological presuppositions of the libertarian political philosophy that can be phrased in a Kantian manner: How is self‑ownership possible?; or in a more detailed way: What sort of entity a human being has to be, if it is possible for him to be a self‑owner? The research thesis that is argued for in the paper says that: 1) the closest continuer theory may not serve as a background theory for a wide principle of self‑ownership since as an example of reductionist theory of personal identity it excludes the possibility of possessing this set of psychological facts which the personal identity is reducible to and possession of which is presupposed by the wide principle of self‑ownership; 2) the closest continuer theory may though serve as a background theory for a narrow principle of self‑ownership since this principle assumes that one can own only scarce resources and psychological facts are not instances thereof.

The present text is a rejoinder to Igor Wysocki's rejoinder published in Political Dialogues 20 to Dominiak & Szczęsny's paper Brain Death in Japan: A Critical Approach.

The present text is a rejoinder to Igor Wysocki's rejoinder published in Political Dialogues 20 to Dominiak & Szczęsny's paper Brain Death in Japan: A Critical Approach.

This paper examines the problem of migration from the point of view of libertarian political philosophy. The author presents a theory of natural rights to private property and uses it to infer that the right to migration does not exist in the libertarian order. He points out that according to the the libertarian theory of justice, the decision-making process concerned with the reception of immigrants in a given location is governed by a communitarian-syndicalist rule, which recognises the local community's right to make such decisions.

The present text is a rejoinder to Igor Wysocki's rejoinder published in Political Dialogues 20 to Dominiak & Szczęsny's paper Brain Death in Japan: A Critical Approach.

In this paper I shall inquire into the metaphysical underpinnings of the prohibition of prenatal femicide within the Indian cultural and legal milieu. Even though I choose Th e Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act and Th e Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Act (amended in 2004 as Th e Pre-Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Act) as the commencing points of my study, I will develop neither legal nor anthropological analysis of the sex-selective abortion in India. My purpose is to present politico-philosophical implications of the legal solutions in question. Th e main thesis of my paper is the contention that metaphysical background theories that the prohibition of prenatal femicide is based on undermine the anti-discriminatory objectives of this prohibition; what follows, this anti-discriminatory legislation is then a contradiction in terms and for that reason ought to be abandoned.

This text contains initial reflections on the subject of the academic biography of Norbert Elias from the perspective of the theory of ritual interactions. The author outlines the spatial-temporal conditions that produced the emotional energy in Elias's works and to a large degree determined his great popularity in the second half of the 20th century and now.

In the present paper we investigate, from the politico-philosophical point of view, the inconsistencies of legal solutions concerning reproductive freedom that are present in various jurisdictions in the civilised world. We hypothesise that an attempt to introduce into legal systems such institutions as preconception harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life without taking into consideration metaphysical questions of identity and ontological status of the foetus is doomed to failure. To boot, we pay attention to the relationship between these new legal inventions and the question of procreative liberty and women's rights.

In the present paper we investigate, from the politico-philosophical point of view, the inconsistencies of legal solutions concerning reproductive freedom that are present in various jurisdictions in the civilised world. We hypothesisethat an attempt to introduce into legal systems such institutions as preconception harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life without taking into consideration metaphysical questions of identity and ontological status of the foetus is doomed tofailure. To boot, we pay attention to the relationship between these new legal inventions and the question of procreativeliberty and women's rights. ; In the present paper we investigate, from the politico-philosophical point of view, the inconsistencies of legal solutions concerning reproductive freedom that are present in various jurisdictions in the civilised world. We hypothesisethat an attempt to introduce into legal systems such institutions as preconception harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life without taking into consideration metaphysical questions of identity and ontological status of the foetus is doomed tofailure. To boot, we pay attention to the relationship between these new legal inventions and the question of procreativeliberty and women's rights.

In the present paper we investigate, from the politico-philosophical point of view, the inconsistencies of legal solutions concerning reproductive freedom that are present in various jurisdictions in the civilised world. We hypothesisethat an attempt to introduce into legal systems such institutions as preconception harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life without taking into consideration metaphysical questions of identity and ontological status of the foetus is doomed tofailure. To boot, we pay attention to the relationship between these new legal inventions and the question of procreativeliberty and women's rights. ; In the present paper we investigate, from the politico-philosophical point of view, the inconsistencies of legal solutions concerning reproductive freedom that are present in various jurisdictions in the civilised world. We hypothesisethat an attempt to introduce into legal systems such institutions as preconception harm, prenatal harm or wrongful life without taking into consideration metaphysical questions of identity and ontological status of the foetus is doomed tofailure. To boot, we pay attention to the relationship between these new legal inventions and the question of procreativeliberty and women's rights.

In this paper, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium to analyse background conditions of our considered judgements about distributive justice generated by a thought experiment called "Three Children and a Flute", proposed and interestingly commented upon by Amartya Sen in his book The Idea of Justice. I claim that, contrary to Sen's conclusions drawn from the thought experiment, for the utilitarian and egalitarian visions of distributive justice to hold other things about distribution of resources and social life that we are not willing to accept must be true and that it is not the case then that it is a 'difficult decision' to make what pattern of distribution should prevail in the thought experiment. To boot, I hold that libertarian or natural pattern of distribution does not presuppose these background conditions that we are not willing to accept and which are presupposed by egalitarian and utilitarian distributive patterns. I conclude that taking into consideration the fact that there is a plethora of inconsistencies, counter-intuitive consequences and anti-scientific implications of the utilitarian and egalitarian solutions to the thought experiment, it is a natural pattern of distribution that prevails in the 'flute dilemma'.