Search results

Few phases of history were as heavy with implications for the world at large than the turbulent years through which China moved from the overthrow of the last imperial dynasty in 1911, through anarchy, civil war and invasion, to the final triumph of the Communists in 1949 - yet few periods are as little known by the wider world, and so little understood. Professor Dreyer's impressive account of China at war is both an important contribution to this new series of studies of modern wars in their full political, social and ideological contexts, and also a valuable introduction to the birth- confu.

Zhao Chongguo (137–52 BC), who rose to the rank of general in service to the emperors of China's Former Han Dynasty (206/202 BC–9 AD) and became one of the greatest soldiers in Chinese history, is best remembered for his "strategy of military farms ( tuntian )," evolved during his famous victorious campaign of 61–60 BC against the Qianq people, presumed ancestors of the Tibetans, on the western frontier of China. Although future Chinese official historians would claim that this strategy of using infantrymen to grow crops on frontier lands was intended to solve the problem of supplying troops on distant campaigns with food and fodder, the article which follows, based on a careful reading of Zhao Chongguo's memorials to his emperor, demonstrates conclusively that the general's real reason for establishing the military farms was to deny crop and grazing land to China's frontier foes and thus "subdue the enemy without fighting," in the words of Sun Zi. A close examination of the career of this famous soldier also has much to tell us about civil-military relations in ancient China and the strategy and tactics evolved by China's soldiers in order to contain and ultimately defeat the formidable nomadic enemies on its frontiers.

Yu, P. K.: Taipei versus Beijing: a dialectical analysis of the politico-military dimension. - S.1-26. Chan, S.: Some propositions in the search of a better understanding of strategic deception and surprise. - S.27-54. Dreyer, E. L. ; Dreyer, J. T.: The Chinese People's Liberation Army's perception of an invasion of Taiwan. - S.55-103. Roy, D.: To bark of bite? The problem of deception. - S.105-131. Zeng, J.: PLA thinking about an invasion of Taiwan in the year 2000. - S.133-161. Lin W.: Will Beijing use force on Taiwan? - S.163-212. Wen D.: The United States as a peacemaker on the Taiwan strait. - S.213-227. Lasater, M. L.: A U.S. perception of a PLA invasion of Taiwan. - S.229-269. Yu, P. K.: Jiashan airforce base: Taipeis's last trump card. - S.271-272. Yu, P. K.: Thinking about Dr. Sun Yatsen's doctrine as possessing a political nuclear weapon. - S.273-290