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This article aims to answer the question, why different modern scholars undertake different positions towards who should dominate – the politicians or the bureaucrats. It depicts the transformation of the public sector in Western democracies, when elected politicians started intervening with the activities which used to be under the monopoly of professional public servants. Politicians and bureaucrats as professional groups are highly distinct. According to M. Weber, the imperative of politicians is the struggle for power, whereas bureaucrats tend to be obedient and disciplined; politicians – act in the public domain, and bureaucrats function in institutions; the working tool of politicians is their voice, whereas public servants tend to rely on the written word; politician above all things is an actor who passionately advocates for his cause, while an administrator concentrates on solving technical problems; finally, the career of a politician is uncertain, temporary and flexible, whereas bureaucrats often enjoy stability.The above defined differences led to a belief that a division of roles between politicians and bureaucrats is possible and that it can be further defined by dichotomies of end-means and values-facts. However, the article states that these dichotomies are not suitable for the analysis of a complex relationship between politicians and public servants. The goals and values of public policy are defined by both – politicians and bureaucrats, who have their own professional understanding of policy goals. In addition, during the process of implementation public servants tend to act according to their own views and their own values.Despite professional differences politicians and bureaucrats often struggle for the control over the public policy. While the first are driven by the ambition to win the upcoming elections, the latter are interested in obtaining their working position and the stability of their career. Public servants try to engage themselves in the policy-formation process, whereas politicians aim to have politically loyal or at least neutral bureaucracy. This power struggle is dominated by one side or the other because dominance is fluid and flexible, dependant on various factors. Those scholars who view public servants as more dominant emphasize the need to strengthen the political control of bureaucracy. And those who view politicians as more powerful see bureaucrats as a tool to control politicians and prevent abuse of power. ; Straipsnyje bandoma atsakyti į klausimą, kodėl šiuolaikiniai tyrinėtojai laikosi priešingų normatyvinių požiūrių į tai, kas ką turi kontroliuoti – politikai biurokratus ar biurokratai politikus. Atsakymas grindžiamas politikų ir biurokratų tarpusavio kova dėl viešosios politikos kontrolės. Šioje kovoje dominuoja tai vieni, tai kiti, nes dominavimas yra kintantis, priklauso nuo įvairių veiksnių. Tyrinėtojai, įžvelgiantys valstybės tarnybos dominavimą, pabrėžia būtinybę politiškai kontroliuoti biurokratiją, o įžvelgiantieji politikų dominavimą, biurokratijoje mato jėgą, galinčią neleisti politikams piktnaudžiauti galia.

Straipsnyje bandoma atsakyti į klausimą, kodėl šiuolaikiniai tyrinėtojai laikosi priešingų normatyvinių požiūrių į tai, kas ką turi kontroliuoti – politikai biurokratus ar biurokratai politikus. Atsakymas grindžiamas politikų ir biurokratų tarpusavio kova dėl viešosios politikos kontrolės. Šioje kovoje dominuoja tai vieni, tai kiti, nes dominavimas yra kintantis, priklauso nuo įvairių veiksnių. Tyrinėtojai, įžvelgiantys valstybės tarnybos dominavimą, pabrėžia būtinybę politiškai kontroliuoti biurokratiją, o įžvelgiantieji politikų dominavimą, biurokratijoje mato jėgą, galinčią neleisti politikams piktnaudžiauti galia.

This article aims to answer the question, why different modern scholars undertake different positions towards who should govern -- the politicians or the bureaucrats. The answer is based on the analysis of power struggle between the politicians and the bureaucrats in the field of public policy. This power struggle is dominated by one side or the other because domination is fluid and flexible, dependent on various factors. Scholars who view public servants as more dominant emphasize the need to strengthen the political control of bureaucracy. And those who view politicians as more powerful see bureaucrats as a tool to control politicians and prevent abuse of power. Adapted from the source document.

I have chosen the subject "Ideas of Economic Independence in Soviet Lithuania in 1988-1989", because it is not widely investigated in Lithuanian historiography. Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was established after Soviet Occupation of Lithuania in 1940 and existed to 1990. The Lithuanian SSR was renamed the Republic of Lithuania again on March 11, 1990, all legal ties of sovereignty were cut with the Soviet Union as Lithuania declared the restitution of its independence. But its way to independence was long and not easy. The last five years of occupation beginning in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev made significant changes in the economy were perestroika and glasnost. His policy of glasnost gave some freedom for media and hope for occupied nations. The objective of master thesis is to investigate process and development of ideas of economic independence in Soviet Lithuania (1988-1989). To obtain the objective I made three tasks: 1) to review Soviet Lithuanian economy in the end on 1980s and to show discussions about Lithuanian SSR as dependant republic of Soviet Union; 2) to introduce "Lithuania's economic independence conception" and to analyze its implementation; 3) to review ideas about its own currency and to introduce Lithuania's system of money and credit conception. In the end I came to these conclusions: 1) Soviet Lithuania's economy was integrated to Soviet Union's central economy and there was no self-sufficiency for Soviet republics; 2) in the discussions about dependency of Soviet Lithuania's economy from Soviet Union, Lithuanian economists reasoned denied Soviet government affirmations that Soviet Lithuania is dependant; 3) The ideas of Soviet Lithuania were systematized in "Lithuania's economic independence conception" (1988). This conception determined political, law and economic conditions, and only with these conditions republic economy could be independent; 4) Lithuania's economic independence conception did not threatened disintegration of Soviet Union, but it had some essential independent state features like: a) all property situated in Lithuania's territory should be Lithuanian, b) Lithuania's government institutions are not under central Soviet rule jurisdiction anymore; 5) in 1988 and 1989 the important discussion was about its own currency. In media this idea was discussed no less, than the idea of Lithuania as dependent state on the Soviet Union or not. Discussions about own currency were summarized and systematized in "Lithuania's system of money and credit conception".

I have chosen the subject "Ideas of Economic Independence in Soviet Lithuania in 1988-1989", because it is not widely investigated in Lithuanian historiography. Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was established after Soviet Occupation of Lithuania in 1940 and existed to 1990. The Lithuanian SSR was renamed the Republic of Lithuania again on March 11, 1990, all legal ties of sovereignty were cut with the Soviet Union as Lithuania declared the restitution of its independence. But its way to independence was long and not easy. The last five years of occupation beginning in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev made significant changes in the economy were perestroika and glasnost. His policy of glasnost gave some freedom for media and hope for occupied nations. The objective of master thesis is to investigate process and development of ideas of economic independence in Soviet Lithuania (1988-1989). To obtain the objective I made three tasks: 1) to review Soviet Lithuanian economy in the end on 1980s and to show discussions about Lithuanian SSR as dependant republic of Soviet Union; 2) to introduce "Lithuania's economic independence conception" and to analyze its implementation; 3) to review ideas about its own currency and to introduce Lithuania's system of money and credit conception. In the end I came to these conclusions: 1) Soviet Lithuania's economy was integrated to Soviet Union's central economy and there was no self-sufficiency for Soviet republics; 2) in the discussions about dependency of Soviet Lithuania's economy from Soviet Union, Lithuanian economists reasoned denied Soviet government affirmations that Soviet Lithuania is dependant; 3) The ideas of Soviet Lithuania were systematized in "Lithuania's economic independence conception" (1988). This conception determined political, law and economic conditions, and only with these conditions republic economy could be independent; 4) Lithuania's economic independence conception did not threatened disintegration of Soviet Union, but it had some essential independent state features like: a) all property situated in Lithuania's territory should be Lithuanian, b) Lithuania's government institutions are not under central Soviet rule jurisdiction anymore; 5) in 1988 and 1989 the important discussion was about its own currency. In media this idea was discussed no less, than the idea of Lithuania as dependent state on the Soviet Union or not. Discussions about own currency were summarized and systematized in "Lithuania's system of money and credit conception".

A. Farazmand identifies three approaches towards relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in contemporary academic discussion. The first approach holds the idea of total control of bureaucracy by elected politicians. The second approach rejects dichotomy of politics-administration, and speaks for the twofold role of bureaucracy, both political and administrative. The third approach treats the high level bureaucrats as possessing certain autonomy vis-à-vis politicians. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that already the early researchers of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats provided different explanation of their roles. In order to ensure effectiveness of public administration, W. Wilson separated administration and politics. M. Weber showed the dark side of administrative effectiveness – bureaucratization of public life, which can be controlled only by charismatic political leadership. J. Schumpeter pointed to the negative side of competition among such charismatic leaders, that is, decrease of administrative effectiveness. Therefore, he claimed that democratic government has to rely upon professional bureaucracy, which is sufficiently strong and independent. The article proposes a twofold explanation of these divergent approaches. First, it can be explained by variety of parliamentary systems, which is determined by differing executive-legislative linkage. On of the extreme cases of such linkage is premiership of cabinet system, where the executive power dominates vis-à-vis parliament. Such case could explain the approach (by M. Weber), according to which charismatic political leaders, who proved their capabilities during the party competition, could and should rule the systems of bureaucratic administration. Another extreme case – the French type assembly government – could explain the approach (by J. Schumpeter) that bureaucracy should be strong and independent, which could advice or even prescribe politicians, engaged into competition, which forces to care not about the effectiveness of state administration but the political value of administrative decisions. Second, the explanation of different approaches concerning the role of politicians and bureaucrats may by related to the fact that societies seek to have both politically responsive and professionally responsible bureaucracy. The aim of politically responsive bureaucracy rests on the understanding of the importance of political leadership in liberal democracies and its relationship with the state bureaucracy. This aim is expressed by M. Weber. Another aim comes from the understanding that implementation of public policy, formulated by politicians, depends on the professionalism of bureaucracy and its responsibility. This aim is articulated by J. Schumpeter.

A. Farazmand identifies three approaches towards relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in contemporary academic discussion. The first approach holds the idea of total control of bureaucracy by elected politicians. The second approach rejects dichotomy of politics-administration, and speaks for the twofold role of bureaucracy, both political and administrative. The third approach treats the high level bureaucrats as possessing certain autonomy vis-à-vis politicians. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that already the early researchers of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats provided different explanation of their roles. In order to ensure effectiveness of public administration, W. Wilson separated administration and politics. M. Weber showed the dark side of administrative effectiveness – bureaucratization of public life, which can be controlled only by charismatic political leadership. J. Schumpeter pointed to the negative side of competition among such charismatic leaders, that is, decrease of administrative effectiveness. Therefore, he claimed that democratic government has to rely upon professional bureaucracy, which is sufficiently strong and independent. The article proposes a twofold explanation of these divergent approaches. First, it can be explained by variety of parliamentary systems, which is determined by differing executive-legislative linkage. On of the extreme cases of such linkage is premiership of cabinet system, where the executive power dominates vis-à-vis parliament. Such case could explain the approach (by M. Weber), according to which charismatic political leaders, who proved their capabilities during the party competition, could and should rule the systems of bureaucratic administration. Another extreme case – the French type assembly government – could explain the approach (by J. Schumpeter) that bureaucracy should be strong and independent, which could advice or even prescribe politicians, engaged into competition, which forces to care not about the effectiveness of state administration but the political value of administrative decisions. Second, the explanation of different approaches concerning the role of politicians and bureaucrats may by related to the fact that societies seek to have both politically responsive and professionally responsible bureaucracy. The aim of politically responsive bureaucracy rests on the understanding of the importance of political leadership in liberal democracies and its relationship with the state bureaucracy. This aim is expressed by M. Weber. Another aim comes from the understanding that implementation of public policy, formulated by politicians, depends on the professionalism of bureaucracy and its responsibility. This aim is articulated by J. Schumpeter.

A. Farazmand identifies three approaches towards relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in contemporary academic discussion. The first approach holds the idea of total control of bureaucracy by elected politicians. The second approach rejects dichotomy of politics-administration, and speaks for the twofold role of bureaucracy, both political and administrative. The third approach treats the high level bureaucrats as possessing certain autonomy vis-à-vis politicians. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that already the early researchers of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats provided different explanation of their roles. In order to ensure effectiveness of public administration, W. Wilson separated administration and politics. M. Weber showed the dark side of administrative effectiveness – bureaucratization of public life, which can be controlled only by charismatic political leadership. J. Schumpeter pointed to the negative side of competition among such charismatic leaders, that is, decrease of administrative effectiveness. Therefore, he claimed that democratic government has to rely upon professional bureaucracy, which is sufficiently strong and independent. The article proposes a twofold explanation of these divergent approaches. First, it can be explained by variety of parliamentary systems, which is determined by differing executive-legislative linkage. On of the extreme cases of such linkage is premiership of cabinet system, where the executive power dominates vis-à-vis parliament. Such case could explain the approach (by M. Weber), according to which charismatic political leaders, who proved their capabilities during the party competition, could and should rule the systems of bureaucratic administration. Another extreme case – the French type assembly government – could explain the approach (by J. Schumpeter) that bureaucracy should be strong and independent, which could advice or even prescribe politicians, engaged into competition, which forces to care not about the effectiveness of state administration but the political value of administrative decisions. Second, the explanation of different approaches concerning the role of politicians and bureaucrats may by related to the fact that societies seek to have both politically responsive and professionally responsible bureaucracy. The aim of politically responsive bureaucracy rests on the understanding of the importance of political leadership in liberal democracies and its relationship with the state bureaucracy. This aim is expressed by M. Weber. Another aim comes from the understanding that implementation of public policy, formulated by politicians, depends on the professionalism of bureaucracy and its responsibility. This aim is articulated by J. Schumpeter.

A. Farazmand identifies three approaches towards relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in contemporary academic discussion. The first approach holds the idea of total control of bureaucracy by elected politicians. The second approach rejects dichotomy of politics-administration, and speaks for the twofold role of bureaucracy, both political and administrative. The third approach treats the high level bureaucrats as possessing certain autonomy vis-à-vis politicians. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that already the early researchers of relationship between politicians and bureaucrats provided different explanation of their roles. In order to ensure effectiveness of public administration, W. Wilson separated administration and politics. M. Weber showed the dark side of administrative effectiveness – bureaucratization of public life, which can be controlled only by charismatic political leadership. J. Schumpeter pointed to the negative side of competition among such charismatic leaders, that is, decrease of administrative effectiveness. Therefore, he claimed that democratic government has to rely upon professional bureaucracy, which is sufficiently strong and independent. The article proposes a twofold explanation of these divergent approaches. First, it can be explained by variety of parliamentary systems, which is determined by differing executive-legislative linkage. On of the extreme cases of such linkage is premiership of cabinet system, where the executive power dominates vis-à-vis parliament. Such case could explain the approach (by M. Weber), according to which charismatic political leaders, who proved their capabilities during the party competition, could and should rule the systems of bureaucratic administration. Another extreme case – the French type assembly government – could explain the approach (by J. Schumpeter) that bureaucracy should be strong and independent, which could advice or even prescribe politicians, engaged into competition, which forces to care not about the effectiveness of state administration but the political value of administrative decisions. Second, the explanation of different approaches concerning the role of politicians and bureaucrats may by related to the fact that societies seek to have both politically responsive and professionally responsible bureaucracy. The aim of politically responsive bureaucracy rests on the understanding of the importance of political leadership in liberal democracies and its relationship with the state bureaucracy. This aim is expressed by M. Weber. Another aim comes from the understanding that implementation of public policy, formulated by politicians, depends on the professionalism of bureaucracy and its responsibility. This aim is articulated by J. Schumpeter.

The article compares W. Wilson's, M. Weber's & J. Schumpeter's approaches towards the role of politicians & bureaucrats. W. Wilson proposed to separate politics & administration, while M. Weber considered that bureaucracy should be subordinated to the will of political leaders & J. Schumpeter argued that professional bureaucracy should be sufficiently strong to advice & even to direct politicians. The twofold explanation is provided to explain this divergence of approaches. First, it could be explained by the variety of parliamentary systems, related to the different executive-legislative linkage, ranging from the British-type of premiership of cabinet system to the French type of assembly government. Second, it could be explained by the aims of democratic societies to have both political responsive & professionally responsible bureaucracy. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje parodoma santuokos ir šeimos tarpusavio sąveika, jų bendrumas ir skirtumai. Šios sąvokos dažnai visiškai sutapatinamos. Teigiama, kad santuokos sąvoka suponuoja šeimos sąvoką. Analogiškai ir šeimos sąvoka suponuoja santuokos sąvoką, nes šeimos turinį įprasta detalizuoti tėvų ir vaikų sąvokomis, sutuoktinių pora yra pilnos šeimos branduolys. Santuoka atsirado daug anksčiau už šeimą. Pirmoji santuokos forma buvo grupinė santuoka, kuri uždraudė santykius giminės viduje ir reiškė vienos giminės vyrų santuoką su kitos giminės moterimis. Šeima atsiranda tik iš grupinės santuokos išsivysčius porinei santuokai. Porinė šeima susikūrė porinės santuokos pagrindu ir jų egzistavimas viena be kitos buvo neįmanomas. Aptariamos ištuokos, bevaikės sutuoktinių poros, vienišos mamos sąvokos. Daroma išvada, kad absoliutaus ryšio tarp santuokos ir šeimos nėra, šios socialinės institucijos gali egzistuoti ir kartu, ir atskirai viena nuo kitos. Šiuo metu santuoka ima netekti turėtos reikšmės dėl savo nepatvarumo ir dėl to, kad lyčių santykiai išėjo už jos ribų. Visuomeniškai reikšmingesnė lieka šeima, bet santuokos vaidmens pasikeitimas atsiliepė ir šeimos vidaus santykiams.

The formulation of scenarios for developing the urban transport infrastructure requires decisions mainly based on the intuition of experts in transport and highly influenced by public interest groups, business entities and political opinions. However, the reached decisions sometimes fail to be the most efficient. Therefore, to avoid errors and ensure the development of a sustainable transport system, the economical appraisal of infrastructure development scenarios is necessary. The economic evaluation of the developed scenarios can be carried out through macro-simulation and cost-benefit analysis. This paper deals with the Kaunas City Master Plan providing solutions to transport infrastructure development. According to the Master Plan, solutions can be classified considering 3 cathegories (priorities), although the detailed sequence of implementation is not given. With the help of macro-simulation, this study arranged Master Plan solutions into scenarios, checked all 20 scenarious and established an implementation order based on the theory of cost benefit analysis. The identified order substantially differs from the priorities set in the Master Plan.

The formulation of scenarios for developing the urban transport infrastructure requires decisions mainly based on the intuition of experts in transport and highly influenced by public interest groups, business entities and political opinions. However, the reached decisions sometimes fail to be the most efficient. Therefore, to avoid errors and ensure the development of a sustainable transport system, the economical appraisal of infrastructure development scenarios is necessary. The economic evaluation of the developed scenarios can be carried out through macro-simulation and cost-benefit analysis. This paper deals with the Kaunas City Master Plan providing solutions to transport infrastructure development. According to the Master Plan, solutions can be classified considering 3 cathegories (priorities), although the detailed sequence of implementation is not given. With the help of macro-simulation, this study arranged Master Plan solutions into scenarios, checked all 20 scenarious and established an implementation order based on the theory of cost benefit analysis. The identified order substantially differs from the priorities set in the Master Plan.