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AbstractThis paper defends strong emissions sufficientarianism as an approach to assigning moral rights to generate greenhouse gas emissions. Strong emissions sufficientarianism holds that only subsistence emitting is morally permissible. This paper argues that, since it is uncertain how many subsistence emissions there will be, the present generation owes it to future generations to refrain from generating non-subsistence emissions, not to risk imposing on them a tragic choice between sacrificing themselves and contributing to very dangerous climate change. The paper also addresses the charge that emissions sufficientarianism, in general, is too permissive since it entails a right to contribute to very dangerous climate change. The overall message is that, given the moral urgency posed by climate change, there is little room for distributive principles besides emissions sufficientarianism. This casts doubt on the appropriateness of relying on carbon budgets in assigning rights to emit.

Luck egalitarian theories of justice are frequently criticised for being unduly harsh on people who experience disadvantage as a result of their responsible choices. According to the "abandonment objection", luck egalitarians are committed to abandoning even very severely disadvantaged persons as long as responsibility figures in the right way in the genesis of their disadvantage. This article makes a distinction between two views that are insufficiently distinguished in the literature. Weak luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires us to cater to the claims of victims of bad brute luck before there is an obligation to assist responsible victims. Strong luck egalitarianism is the view that responsibility robustly determines the requirements of justice. The abandonment objection presumably targets the less plausible strong view. It does not seem to touch the more plausible weak view. The article consequently argues that the abandonment objection is either trivial or wrong. Adapted from the source document.

By affecting conceptualizations of crime, media depictions of crime play a crucial part in the way criminal policy is shaped. An analysis of Swedish newspaper articles suggest that crime today is depicted in a more exclusionary way than a few decades ago. This is particularly true for the culprit, whose actions are accounted for in an individualized way. Crime victims are described in a manner that invites identification. During the 1980s, media depictions change from structural accounts of the crime to individualized accounts of the culprit and the criminal deed, often in terms of the psychology of the culprit However, it is not until around 1990 that the media depiction of the crime victim change, with fairly neutral descriptions being replaced by more detailed and personal images. In contemporary media stories, crime and criminality are seen as external threats to society. The culprit is depicted as an intruder, and often also as disordered or irrational. The victim, on the other hand, is depicted as a human being just as you and I, with a particular personality. The consumer of these media stories is primarily encouraged to identify with the victim and those close to him or her. Adapted from the source document.