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Inspiracją do powstania niniejszego opracowania była dla autora konferencja pt. "Inicjatywa Trójmorza – mapa drogowa dla Ukrainy", która odbyła się 27 VII 2021 r. w Kijowie, w siedzibie Ukraińskiego Kryzysowego Centrum Medialnego. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie projektów zaproponowanych przez stronę ukraińską na wspomnianej konferencji i zestawienie ich z aktualnie realizowanymi priorytetami Trójmorza (Three Seas Initiative – 3SI) z udziałem Ukrainy. Przedstawiciele ukraińskiego resortu infrastruktury zaproponowali listę sześciu projektów kluczowych dla Ukrainy: gazociąg Baltic Pipe, korytarz gazowy Północ‑Południe, Autostrada Czarnomorska, FAIRway – projekt regulacji żeglugi na Dunaju, Cyfrowa Via Carpatia oraz Platforma Cyfrowa dla Monitorowania Baz Hydrograficznych w regionie 3SI. Z kolei projekty współrealizowane przez Ukrainę to: dywersyfikacja źródeł dostaw gazu i integracja infrastruktury gazowej w regionie 3SI, giełda transportowa w regionie 3SI, budowa drugiego toru kolejowego między węzłami Koper (Słowenia) a Divača (Chorwacja), platforma cyfrowa monitorowania baz hydrograficznych w regionie 3SI oraz Via Carpatia. Porównanie wymienionych grup projektów stanowić ma próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie: Jaki jest rzeczywisty udział rządu w Kijowie w projektach 3SI? Czy zaangażowanie w projekty 3SI finansowane ze środków unijnych jest realną szansą na europeizację Ukrainy, czy jedynie sposobem na budowę własnej infrastruktury gazowej, drogowej, czy cyfrowej?

The integration of Ukraine into the European Union in the light of the selected projects of the Three Seas Initiative

This paper was inspired by the conference entitled "Three Seas Initiative‑a roadmap for Ukraine", which took place on 27 VII 2021 at the headquarters of the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center in Kyiv. This article aims to present the projects proposed by the Ukrainian side at the mentioned conference and compare them with the currently ongoing Three Seas Initiative (3SI) priorities involving Ukraine. Representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure proposed a list of six key projects for Ukraine: the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, the North‑South gas corridor, the Black Sea Motorway, FAIRway –a project to regulate navigation on the Danube river, Digital Via Carpatia and Digital Platform for Hydrographic Database Monitoring in the 3SI region. In Ukraine, the co‑implemented projects include diversification of gas supply sources and integration of gas infrastructure in the 3SI region, Transport Exchange in the 3SI region, construction of the second railway track between Koper (Slovenia) and Divača (Croatia) hubs, Digital Platform for Hydrographic Database Monitoring in the 3SI region, and Via Carpatia. The comparative analysis of the listed groups of projects presents an attempt to answer the question: What is the actual participation of the Ukrainian government in 3SI projects? Is involvement in 3SI projects financed from EU funds a real chance for the Europeanisation of Ukraine or is it just a way to build its gas, road or digital infrastructure?

China's soft-power practice in its international activity boils down to four areas: culture, education, diplomacy, and economy. The most important element of China's soft-power policy seems to be the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Announced in 2013, the BRI is a complex, long-term and large-scale strategic political and economic project by the Chinese government with an infrastructure character. In this way, China is seeking to invest its capital surpluses in resurrecting the ancient Silk Road to create railroad and maritime networks with its most important trading partner – the European Union. In these circumstances, in September 2015, the presidents of Central and Eastern EU member states announced the establishment of the separate Three Seas Initiative (TSI), a political and economic project bringing together 12 EU states, including 11 'new' members and Austria. These entities constitute an informal bloc of states between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas, though without a permanent secretariat but with rotating leadership. In addition to the lack of a formal structure, the TSI region, located mainly in the EU's eastern part, is characterized by a weaker infrastructure network than Western Europe, lower GDP (except Austria), and high dependence on gas supplies from Russia (except Croatia). To overcome these disparities, the TSI has developed a catalogue of 48 investment priorities in three economic areas: energy, transport, and digitalisation. China's soft-power policy towards the 'new' EU members may be decided by the American patronage of the TSI and the fact that one of the flagship projects is the North-South Gas Corridor, which will enable the sale of American LNG in Central Europe, which has been dependent on gas supplies from Russia, China's partner in the BRI. In the context of the US-China trade war, White House planners recognise Central Europe as both a peripheral and key area for their policy and seek to strengthen the Three Seas project, which may lead to limiting areas of cooperation under the '17+1' format, involving CEE countries and China. On the other hand, the development of better energy, transport and digital connections in the EU's east clearly intersects with China's idea of building a New Eurasian Land Bridge under the BRI to connect the most economically developed edges of Eurasia. The new US strategy towards the countries of the CEE seems to boil down to involvement in specific energy-related projects. Instead of blocking or diminishing BRI-related infrastructure projects in China, they seem in fact to complement the Chinese activity in the CEE. Increased investment by American enterprises in the region may allow the administration in Washington to maintain control of Chinese infrastructure investments, and the US involvement may even lead to the participation of American companies in projects originally started by Beijing.