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Outlining a framework -- Understanding political incentives and behavior -- Understanding bureaucratic incentives and behavior -- Understanding the dynamism of context and incentives -- Applied political economy of decentralization diagnostics

Cover -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Part One: Introduction -- 1. Explaining Decentralization and Re-centralization -- 2. Definitions, Cases, and Patterns -- Part Two: Nineteenth-Century Origins, Twentieth-Century Trajectories -- 3. Decentralization from Below: Argentina before 1966, Brazil before 1964 -- 4. Decentralization from Above: Chile and Uruguay before 1973 -- Part Three: Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Beyond the Capital -- 5. Subnational Reforms by Military Governments -- Part Four: Subnational Institutions in the Third Wave of Democracy -- 6. The Reemergence of the Governors in Argentina and Brazil -- 7. National Engineering of Subnational Institutions in Chile and Uruguay -- Part Five: Conclusion -- 8. Comparing Waves and Approaches -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Colombia's 2016 peace accord emphasises the concept of "territorial peace" but denies meaningful roles for territorial governments—a design decision that is especially puzzling given the recent prominence of local governments in peacebuilding initiatives around the world. This article argues that the pursuit of territorial peace without territorial governments can only be understood by broadening the temporal frame in ways that problematise the evolution of these governments over time. Decentralising reforms were at the heart of an earlier failed effort to end Colombia's armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, leading both sides in the 2016 accord to draw different, but similarly negative, lessons about decentralisation. Guerrilla and government negotiators alike eschewed local governments but not for the reasons emphasised in the peacebuilding literature. Furthermore, Colombia's earlier experience with decentralisation also exposed serious capacity deficits at the local level, raising questions about territorial governments as viable partners in building peace.

ABSTRACTDecentralization has triggered widespread use of the subnational comparative method in the study of Latin American politics. Simultaneously, it has created challenges for this method that deserve careful attention. While subnational governments after decentralization can often be treated as potentially autonomous policy jurisdictions, their autonomy is also subject to new constraints and incursions, which may limit scholars' ability to treat them as relatively independent units. By taking stock of the vibrant literature that has emerged in recent years, this article explores three major challenges that complicate the use of the subnational comparative method. Two are vertical in nature: how to theorize national causes of subnational variation, and how the varied linkages between subnational governments and transnational actors can be conceptualized in work that compares subnational units. The third challenge is horizontal, referring to interactions between governments at the same subnational level that can either enhance or subvert autonomy.

AbstractFor the political left, decentralization has increased both the appeal and the importance of governing the city, and yet sharp constraints limit the left's transformative potential when it controls that level of government alone. Bogotá is an important case in point under the recent mayoral administration of Gustavo Petro (2012–15), a demobilized guerrilla leader who sought to implement a series of urban policy reforms that together represent one of the most substantively radical and intellectually coherent attempts to challenge neoliberalism in all of Latin America. Focusing on the four policy arenas through which Petro hoped to transform the city (environment, housing, transport, and trash collection), the article documents the veto power of the firms whose privileges he threatened, as well as the tools through which they derailed reform. In contrast to the failure of his political economy agenda, Petro was indeed able to enact a number of progressive social policy reforms precisely because they did not threaten the profitability of the city's entrenched growth machine.

This essay reviews the following works:Illiberal Practices: Territorial Variance within Large Federal Democracies. Edited by Jacqueline Behrend and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016. Pp. x + 330. $49.95 paperback. ISBN: 9781421419589. Avoiding Governors: Federalism, Democracy, and Poverty Alleviation in Brazil and Argentina. By Tracy Beck Fenwick. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016. Pp. xviii + 277. $29.00 paperback. ISBN: 9780268028961. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. By Edward L. Gibson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 192. $31.99 paperback. ISBN: 9780521127332. Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries. By Agustina Giraudy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. xx + 214. $86.00 hardcover. ISBN: 9780198706861. Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil. By Natasha Borges Sugiyama. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012. Pp. xx + 265. $35.00 paperback. ISBN: 9780268041427.