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"NATO has many European and global partner countries. The political and military utility of all these partnerships is clear; they 'provide' more security than they 'consume.' But the utility for NATO of partners also changes over time. This book scrutinizes these partnerships, both from a NATO perspective and from that of its partners"--

Is there a common notion amongst the political and military leadership in Sweden on how to defend the country? Several events in the arena of international politics during the 20th century argue for the importance of coherence between political and military thinking. Different focus during peacetime has subsequently caused fatal consequences in times of war. This thesis studies a less obvious case: Sweden, a small-state, during the 1990's in the aftermath of the Cold War. In the effort of identifying inconsistency between the political and military level the study deals with a more comprehensive issue for any democratic society: How shall the elected political leadership exercise control over an authority (subordinated the government and) with deeply rooted professional values and with authority vested in it of crucial importance for national survival? Although several of government authorities play key roles in this respect the Armed Forces stands out to be the single most important entity. The thesis approaches the problem by studying one measure of control: the defence doctrine. The doctrine is analysed by studying various documents provided by the political decisionsprocess and with interviews involving a significant number of actors in the politico-military leaderships. The purpose has been to identify whether there is any inconsistency prevailing in the perception of values to be protected by the Armed Forces in case or war, what poses threat to these values and finally how to counter the threats. Hence, the political and military views on defence doctrine are examined. The last element of the doctrine, how to deal with the perceived threats, is embodied in the strategy for countering threats. Comparative studies involving Norway and Finland have been made to provide relevant references for the findings and provide a framework for elaboration on the differences between political and military priorities encapsulated in the research hypothesis. In addition, the research hypothesis involved the assumption that technical, tactical and operational decisions would serve as explanations for any inconsistency between military and political priorities. Piecemealed low-level decisions were assumed to unintentionally diverge bottom- up perceptions and create tensions if the politico-military interaction is not fully functional or if the politicians do not fully comprehend the implications of their decisions. The empirical findings suggest differences in the consistency of the politico-military leadership when comparing Sweden with Norway and Finland. For Sweden, the findings suggest a relative good politico-military adherence regarding values and threat perceptions. However there is a disparity in the views on what strategy to adopt and the military leadership has a more offensive mindset than the political leadership. The empirical data has primarily been collected from processes. To provide a better explanation for the findings the structure of security policymaking has been adopted in a new conceptual model based on Edward Luttwak's 'vertical dimension'.

This book analyses how and to what extent ex-communist states have adjusted their defence strategies since joining the EU and NATO, and how differences and similarities between their strategies can be explained. Between 1999 and 2013, four phases of enlargement took place when the European Union (EU) and NATO allowed 11 new former communist states to enter both organisations. These states share some common attributes and experiences related to strategic culture and common experiences during the Cold War era that can potentially explain similarities in behaviour and preferences among them. However, the strategic adjustments among these states are far from uniform. In an effort to explain these differences, the book introduces three intervening variables: (1) differences in relative power and position in the international system, (2) national geographical characteristics; and (3) historical experiences related to formative periods of state-building processes as well as wars and armed conflicts. Empirically, the book strives to present and analyse the defence strategies of each of the new allies by conducting a structured focused comparison of official strategic documents from the twenty-first century for each of the 11 cases. Theoretically and methodologically, it introduces an analytical framework enabling us to explain both similarities and differences in the formulation of the strategies of the 11 states, and to shed light on their external and internal efforts to promote their strategic interest by operationalising the dependent variable - defence strategy. The analytical framework combines elements of structural realism with classical realism, and constructivist research on unit-level characteristics related to relative power and perceptions of strategic exposure.

This book explores the military strategies of the five system-determining great powers during the twenty-first century. The book's point of departure is that analyses of countries' defence strategies should acknowledge that states come in various shapes and sizes and that their strategic choices are affected by their perceptions of their position in the international system and by power asymmetries between more and less resourceful states. This creates a diversity in strategies that is often overlooked in theoretically oriented analyses. The book examines how five major powers – the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia – have adjusted their strategies to improve or maintain their relative position and to manage power asymmetries during the twenty-first century. It also develops and applies an analytical framework for exploring and categorising the strategies pursued by the five major powers which combines elements of structural realism with research on power transition theory and status competition. The concluding chapter addresses questions related to stability and change in the present international system.

This book analyses how and to what extent ex-communist states have adjusted their defence strategies since joining the EU and NATO, and how differences and similarities between their strategies can be explained. Between 1999 and 2013, four phases of enlargement took place when the European Union (EU) and NATO allowed 11 new former communist states to enter both organisations. These states share some common attributes and experiences related to strategic culture and common experiences during the Cold War era that can potentially explain similarities in behaviour and preferences among them. However, the strategic adjustments among these states are far from uniform. In an effort to explain these differences, the book introduces three intervening variables: (1) differences in relative power and position in the international system, (2) national geographical characteristics; and (3) historical experiences related to formative periods of state-building processes as well as wars and armed conflicts. Empirically, the book strives to present and analyse the defence strategies of each of the new allies by conducting a structured focused comparison of official strategic documents from the twenty-first century for each of the 11 cases. Theoretically and methodologically, it introduces an analytical framework enabling us to explain both similarities and differences in the formulation of the strategies of the 11 states, and to shed light on their external and internal efforts to promote their strategic interest by operationalising the dependent variable - defence strategy. The analytical framework combines elements of structural realism with classical realism, and constructivist research on unit-level characteristics related to relative power and perceptions of strategic exposure. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, European Union policy, NATO and International Relations in general.

This book comprises of a range of case studies of military strategy, based on UN documents, observing and concluding the effectiveness of each individual case. Edstrom and Gyllensporre analyse the UN's military strategy, its consequences and its potential to fulfil political ambitions.

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.