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This article investigates the relationship between director networks and earnings quality in Malaysia. Using data on 4,416 individual directors who served on the boards of 745 firms listed on Bursa, Malaysia during 2011, we map the entire network of directors and generate measures to reflect the size and quality of information within the network. We find a negative and significant relationship between the overall connectedness of a director's network and the firm's earnings quality. In addition, we find a negative and significant relationship between the political connectedness of the director's network and earnings quality. Our results are robust for different measures of earnings quality.

ABSTRACTBased on a sample of 2,034 Malaysian listed firm-year observations for the period 2007–2014, this study shows a negative relationship between dimensions of political patronage (i.e., politically connected firms and the percentage of Bumiputera directors) and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. Furthermore, the study documents a positive relationship between Bumiputera directors and earnings forecast dispersion. These results suggest that the political patronage of firms is associated with low-quality earnings. We also find that measures of high audit quality are associated with high financial reporting quality and that this is evident in firms with high audit quality showing a weaker negative (positive) relationship between forecast accuracy (dispersion) and political connections and high levels of Bumiputera directors. Overall, the findings suggest that high audit quality plays an important role in mitigating agency costs of information asymmetry by improving the financial information environment.JEL Classifications: G24; G34; G38.