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Americans consistently name Republicans as the party better at handling issues like national security and crime, while they trust Democrats on issues like education and the environment - a phenomenon called 'issue ownership'. Partisan Priorities investigates the origins of issue ownership, showing that in fact the parties deliver neither superior performance nor popular policies on the issues they 'own'. Rather, Patrick J. Egan finds that Republicans and Democrats simply prioritize their owned issues with lawmaking and government spending when they are in power. Since the parties tend to be particularly ideologically rigid on the issues they own, politicians actually tend to ignore citizens' preferences when crafting policy on these issues. Thus, issue ownership distorts the relationship between citizens' preferences and public policies

AbstractPolitical science generally treats identities such as ethnicity, religion, and sexuality as "unmoved movers" in the chain of causality. I hypothesize that the growing salience of partisanship and ideology as social identities in the United States, combined with the increasing demographic distinctiveness of the nation's two political coalitions, is leading some Americans to engage in a self‐categorization and depersonalization process in which they shift their identities toward the demographic prototypes of their political groups. Analyses of a representative panel data set that tracks identities and political affiliations over a 4‐year span confirm that small but significant shares of Americans engage in identity switching regarding ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and class that is predicted by partisanship and ideology in their pasts, bringing their identities into alignment with their politics. These findings enrich and complicate our understanding of the relationship between identity and politics and suggest caution in treating identities as unchanging phenomena.

Group identities that are chosen, rather than inherited, are often associated with cohesive political attitudes and behaviours. Conventional wisdom holds that this distinctiveness is generated by mobilization through processes such as intra-group contact and acculturation. This article identifies another mechanism that can explain cohesiveness: selection. The characteristics that predict whether an individual selects a group identity may themselves determine political attitudes, and thus may account substantially for the political cohesion of those who share the identity. This mechanism is illustrated with analyses of the causes and consequences of the acquisition of lesbian, gay or bisexual identity. Seldom shared by parents and offspring, gay identity provides a rare opportunity to cleanly identify the selection process and its implications for political cohesion.

Brazil attracted relatively little innovation-intensive and export-oriented foreign investment during the liberalization period of 1990 to 2010, especially compared with competitors such as China and India. Adopting an institutionalist perspective, I argue that multinational firm investment profiles can be partly explained by the characteristics of investment promotion policies and bureaucracies charged with their implementation. Brazil's FDI policies were passive and non-discriminating in the second half of the 1990s, but became more selective under Lula. Investment promotion efforts have often been undercut by weakly coordinated and inconsistent institutions. The paper highlights the need for active, discriminating investment promotion policies if benefits from non-traditional FDI are to be realized.

Quantitative assessments of 'country risk' produced by private rating agencies have become influential among multinational firms considering investment in the developing world. This article considers whether developing countries exhibiting more labour rights violations are associated with higher risk ratings. It draws from existing literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the relationship between labour rights and FDI to illuminate the ways in which labour repression may indicate increased risk for potential investors. It implements a set of time series of cross-sections models for 95 developing countries, from 1985 to 2003. These models present predictors of a long-established risk index, plus an additional latent risk measure created through factor analysis of three separate and distinct risk ratings. Results indicate a consistent association between increased labour rights violations and increased risk ratings. The article extends the analysis to highlight the heterogeneous nature of FDI and possible sector-specific relationships between labour rights and risk ratings. The paper argues that the economic profile of a country may condition the relationship between labour rights and risk ratings. Adapted from the source document.