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Brazil attracted relatively little innovation-intensive and export-oriented foreign investment during the liberalization period of 1990 to 2010, especially compared with competitors such as China and India. Adopting an institutionalist perspective, I argue that multinational firm investment profiles can be partly explained by the characteristics of investment promotion policies and bureaucracies charged with their implementation. Brazil's FDI policies were passive and non-discriminating in the second half of the 1990s, but became more selective under Lula. Investment promotion efforts have often been undercut by weakly coordinated and inconsistent institutions. The paper highlights the need for active, discriminating investment promotion policies if benefits from non-traditional FDI are to be realized.

Quantitative assessments of 'country risk' produced by private rating agencies have become influential among multinational firms considering investment in the developing world. This article considers whether developing countries exhibiting more labour rights violations are associated with higher risk ratings. It draws from existing literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the relationship between labour rights and FDI to illuminate the ways in which labour repression may indicate increased risk for potential investors. It implements a set of time series of cross-sections models for 95 developing countries, from 1985 to 2003. These models present predictors of a long-established risk index, plus an additional latent risk measure created through factor analysis of three separate and distinct risk ratings. Results indicate a consistent association between increased labour rights violations and increased risk ratings. The article extends the analysis to highlight the heterogeneous nature of FDI and possible sector-specific relationships between labour rights and risk ratings. The paper argues that the economic profile of a country may condition the relationship between labour rights and risk ratings. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article promotes the idea that multinational corporations have independent agency in the process of economic reform in Latin American host countries. Through a number of pooled cross-sectional time series analyses, it shows that accumulated foreign direct investment can affect policy reform in ways unanticipated by earlier theories predicated on the obsolescence of firms' influence after initial investment. The influence of firms varies across different reform areas, and competitive pressures lead firms to press alternately for liberal and illiberal reform measures. The study also considers sectoral issues, and argues that a preponderance of natural resource–oriented FDI can alter the impact of multinational investment on policy reform. Indexes of economic reform are measured against stocks of FDI and a number of political and economic control variables. Evidence shows that the dramatic increase in FDI in the region in recent years has bolstered firms' bargaining power and concomitant policy leverage.

AbstractScholars have studied the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and within‐country income inequality in cross‐national contexts, but have not empirically investigated how FDI in different sectors might affect inequality in different ways. We use error correction models to analyze sectoral FDI data compiled from UNCTAD investment reports in 60 middle‐income countries from 1989 to 2010, arguing that FDI in services is more likely to be associated with inequality than FDI in other sectors. We argue that skill biases and changes in employment patterns associated with service sector investments can help explain these findings.