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In the two decades after independence, Georgia's open economy and lax immigration policies have engendered, for the first time, immigration from far outside of the region. On the streets of Tbilisi, the most conspicuous of these migrants are from India, China, and the countries of Africa. Of those from India, a substantial number are students of medicine, or enrolled in other professional courses. Africans in Georgia are mostly driven by work opportunity with a few students in higher education institutions. Chinese immigrants, on the other hand, are almost entirely driven by economic opportunities. A modern Chinese presence in Georgia began in the 1990s with the beginning of Chinese state-owned investment ventures in the region, as well as a burgeoning restaurant scene. In 2000s, this expanded to encompass a trickle and then an influx of Chinese migrant shop owners and market vendors. The third wave of migration occurred in 2010 as a result of contract construction workers. As of today, there are around 1,000 Chinese now divided into five groups: specialists, businessmen, shopkeepers, contract workers, and those in the restaurant and catering sector. This paper will focus on the history of Chinese migrants in Georgia, driving causes, their level of integration (or lack thereof), vulnerabilities, and their status in Georgian society. It will also cover increasingly large-scale economic ventures in the country, the status of Chinese as a foreign language in Georgia, and the role of the PRC Embassy in the Chinese community.

This paper addresses the phenomenon of public fora which are designed to represent certain ethnic groups and are set up through a popular vote. The academic and popular interest in such "congresses" results from the fact that over time it has been shown that these endeavors have: (1) proven to be viable and durable organization structures for about two decades; (2) secured flexibility in their establishment and functioning; (3) provided for mass participation in public discussions and voting; (4) avoided "identity trap" and most complexities related to setting qualifications and the selection of eligibility criteria for the participants; (5) been a bridge between minority activists and public authorities. At the same time, the real practical outcomes, the ability to act independently and visibility of the "congresses" on the political landscape are far from being obvious, and this raises questions about the reasons for such doubtful achievements and the very meaning of "representation" in such a context. (ECMI)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to the fore claims of linguistic minorities which had been ignored far too long. In almost all of the former Soviet republics language became an impetus to national revival and an important instrument in consolidating the newly independent states. At times excessively accentuated and overly politicized, the language issue demanded immediate reaction. It was not, therefore, surprising, that almost all of the former Soviet republics rejected to various degrees the legal dogmas which had been created in the Soviet Union and moved towards the weakening of the bonds within the former USSR, the lowering of the status of the Russian language as a symbol of long-term oppression and, as a consequence, the strengthening of the position of the titular language. Belarus has somewhat stood aloof in the process. With Russian being the de facto main language, and Belarusian playing largely a symbolic function, the position of other languages spoken by minority groups residing within the territory of Belarus seems indeed precarious. The present paper seeks to identify the main tendencies in the development of language legislation in the area of education, which has traditionally been considered as determinant for the survival of the language, in Belarus. It investigates the place of the Belarusian legislation in the field of education reserved for the language rights of the titular nation and those of national minorities. (ECMI)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to the fore claims of linguistic minorities which had been ignored far too long. In almost all of the former Soviet republics language became an impetus to national revival and an important instrument in consolidating the newly independent states. At times excessively accentuated and overly politicized, the language issue demanded immediate reaction. It was not, therefore, surprising, that almost all of the former Soviet republics rejected to various degrees the legal dogmas which had been created in the Soviet Union and moved towards the weakening of the bonds within the former USSR, the lowering of the status of the Russian language as a symbol of long-term oppression and, as a consequence, the strengthening of the position of the titular language. Belarus has somewhat stood aloof in the process. With Russian being the de facto main language, and Belarusian playing largely a symbolic function, the position of other languages spoken by minority groups residing within the territory of Belarus seems indeed precarious. The present paper seeks to identify the main tendencies in the development of language legislation in the area of education, which has traditionally been considered as determinant for the survival of the language, in Belarus. It investigates the place of the Belarusian legislation in the field of education reserved for the language rights of the titular nation and those of national minorities. (ECMI)

This paper addresses the phenomenon of public fora which are designed to represent certain ethnic groups and are set up through a popular vote. The academic and popular interest in such "congresses" results from the fact that over time it has been shown that these endeavors have: (1) proven to be viable and durable organization structures for about two decades; (2) secured flexibility in their establishment and functioning; (3) provided for mass participation in public discussions and voting; (4) avoided "identity trap" and most complexities related to setting qualifications and the selection of eligibility criteria for the participants; (5) been a bridge between minority activists and public authorities. At the same time, the real practical outcomes, the ability to act independently and visibility of the "congresses" on the political landscape are far from being obvious, and this raises questions about the reasons for such doubtful achievements and the very meaning of "representation" in such a context. (ECMI)

The FCNM was received fairly well among the member states. Within the first two years after adoption 33 countries had signed the instrument. In the next two years another three countries signed, and since 1999 seven countries have signed. Some countries have decided not to sign. Among experts the reception of the FCNM was slightly different. Critics pointed out that an international instrument without a petition process and a strong power to sanction states would not have effect on the protection of beneficiaries. The ultimate power of the FCNM rests in the CM which issues country-specific resolutions on the basis of a monitoring process trusted to a group of experts, the Advisory Committee and a preliminary drafting trusted to one of the subsidiary groups of the CM, the Rapporteur Group on Human Rights (GR-H). The FCNM has developed a near consensus approach to the protection of persons belonging to national minorities. This consensus became pronounced also through the monitoring process and the CM was able to adopt resolutions within a reasonable length of time from the start of the monitoring. However, the second decade of the FCNM appears to show a different reality. There seems to be an increasing activity at the political level during the process of drafting the CM resolutions. This has slowed the monitoring process and given rise to concern that the FCNM is not enjoying the initial support that it did. The political process is the focus of this paper. This paper seeks to investigate the process in the GR-H, as well as examining which countries are experiencing a slower process and the issues raised.

This paper is the result of 'The Union Ministry for Human and Minority Rights Support Initiative', a collaborative project of ECMI and the Danish Institute for Human Rights with the aim to enhance the capacities of the State Union Ministry of Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro. The project is structured to assist the Ministry in enhancing its effectiveness in accomplishing the tasks assigned to it by the Constitutional Charter and legal framework of the State Union. The project focuses on three components: (1) Law reform; (2) Reporting and Monitoring; and (3) Strategic Planning. (ECMI)