As a consequence of international migration, religion has returned – if it had ever disappeared – as an important group boundary in contemporary society. This is evident in research on attitudes and social contacts that repeatedly shows social segregation and negative stereotyping particularly between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also between religious and non-religious individuals. The research outlined in this inaugural lecture focuses on the question under what conditions this group boundary becomes stronger, and when it takes on a more symbolic character or fades altogether. Drawing on large-scale survey research I aim to establish when people with a migration background can identify with and participate in European societies that are prevalently secular but where an anti-Islamic discourse is strong. What role do length of stay and intergroup friendship relations play in this process? I will argue that in addition to counting practice frequencies and the importance of religion, we need to better understand the different meanings that immigrants derive from their religion to get a grip on how and why religion acts as a social boundary in contemporary society.
AbstractThis contribution to the special issue on religion and migration reviews two decades of large-scale survey research on changes in immigrant religion and the relationship between immigrants' level of religiosity and their integration into European societies. The body of work reveals that Muslims in European societies stand out due to their comparatively high levels of religiosity and greater stability in religiosity over time and across immigrant generations. While the comparative picture is rather clear, findings regarding the long-term trend in Muslims' religiosity and its association with immigrant integration are instead inconclusive. A systematic review of empirical studies of the association of (various indicators of) individual religiosity with immigrant integration reveals positive, negative and non-significant results for all outcomes and domains. Thus, based on the current state of art it is hard to assess whether and why religion forms a bridge or barrier to immigrant integration in Europe. To move the field forward, the contribution ends with a twofold proposal for a research agenda that includes a broadened empirical scope, moving beyond the focus on Sunni Muslims, and a conceptual extension that focuses on differences in reasoning about religion and religious meaning-making as additional, potentially more consistent and more powerful explanation for immigrants' social relations and positions in their new societies
Abstract Both religion and ethnicity have been found to be important group boundaries for immigrants' social integration into European societies. However, since both characteristics often overlap, their unique influences remain understudied. Conceptualizing social integration as a form of boundary work, this study aims to disentangle religious and ethnic group distinctions and to examine how they matter for immigrants' contact with members of the Dutch majority group. Relying on data from four large immigrant groups in the Netherlands, that allows exploiting religious diversity within ethnic groups, we describe differences in contact with Dutch majority members between 13 ethno-religious group combinations, and we perform multiple-group SEM across the 10 largest combinations. Results indicate that while the importance of religious affiliation and ethnicity is group-specific, the strongest boundary for immigrants' contact with members of the Dutch majority group is that between the religious and non-religious. The relative importance of religion and ethnicity for social integration is explained both by immigrants' own maintenance of group boundaries and their perception of boundary permeability.
AbstractThis paper examines how integration into various sub-domains of the receiving society, including the labor market, informal contacts, attitudes and values, and identification, is associated with religious change among recent Christian and Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands—one of the least religious countries in Europe. The analysis uses data from the New Immigrants to the Netherlands Survey (NIS2NL), a four-wave panel study of recently arrived immigrants from four countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Spain and Turkey). Using latent growth models, we identify the average trajectory of religious participation (service attendance and prayer) and identity (subjective importance of religion) of recent immigrants and examine the role of time-invariant and time-varying explanations for religious change in the early years of resettlement. We find that immigrants' religious practices increase in the first years after arrival, following a substantial drop from pre-migration participation levels. However, this increase eventually levels off and even reverses with increasing length of stay. We observe a linear but modest decrease in religious identification over time that replicates across all origin groups. In line with expectations derived from assimilation theory, we find that migrants who are employed and hold more liberal attitudes regarding homosexuality, gender relations, divorce and abortion show a greater decrease in religiosity, whereas the opposite is true for those who identify more strongly with their origin country. The findings are remarkably similar for Muslim and Christian newcomers and suggest that all immigrants are susceptible to the secularizing forces of the receiving society. This indicates the potential for the "bright" boundary between Muslim immigrants and secular hosts to become more "blurred" with increasing length of stay and integration into "the mainstream".
According to liberal nationalists, sharing a national identity offers a solution to the growing concern that increasing diversity within Western societies might erode solidarity. Based on the national identity framework, a positive relation between peoples' support for redistribution and their national identification is expected. Partially confirmed among majority group members, the aim of this study is to broaden the perspective and investigate the redistributive attitudes of people with a migration background. Since the social identification of people with a migration background is more complex and tends to be based on belonging to both the nation of residence and a specific ethnic group, we additionally consider the role of ethnic identification. We perform multivariate analyses on data from the Belgian Ethnic Minorities Election Study 2014 (BEMES), a survey conducted among Belgians of Turkish and Moroccan descent. The results confirm our hypothesis about the positive role of national identification. Ethnic identification, on the contrary, is negatively related to support for redistribution and particularly the combination of a low attachment to the country of residence and strong attachment to the country of origin is associated with lower levels of support for redistribution.
Female labor force participation (FLFP) rates often vary across ethnic groups. This study examined the role of the partner's labor market resources and gender role attitudes for FLFP in different ethnic groups. Cross-sectional data of women in partnerships from the four biggest immigrant groups in the Netherlands and from a native Dutch control group were analyzed. Traditional gender role attitudes of partners were negatively related to FLFP and partly explained ethnic differences therein. Moreover, across all groups, the relation between partners' labor market resources and FLFP was more negative for traditional women and rather absent for egalitarian women.
How inclusive are European national identities of Muslim minorities and how can we explain cross-cultural variation in inclusiveness? To address these questions, we draw on large-scale school-based surveys of Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority and other minority youth in five European countries (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey [CILS]; Belgium, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Our double comparison of national identification across groups and countries reveals that national identities are less strongly endorsed by all minorities compared with majority youth, but national identification is lowest among Muslims. This descriptive evidence resonates with public concerns about the insufficient inclusion of immigrant minorities in general, and Muslims in particular, in European national identities. In addition, significant country variation in group differences in identification suggest that some national identities are more inclusive of Muslims than others. Taking an intergroup relations approach to the inclusiveness of national identities for Muslims, we establish that beyond religious commitment, positive intergroup contact (majority friendship) plays a major role in explaining differences in national identification in multigroup multilevel mediation models, whereas experiences of discrimination in school do not contribute to this explanation. Our comparative findings thus establish contextual variation in the inclusiveness of intergroup relations and European national identities for Muslim minorities.
Drawing on large‐scale comparative surveys across nine sociopolitical contexts, we address the question when and why ethno‐religious and city or national identities of European‐born Muslims are in conflict. We argue that the sociopolitical context makes the difference between identity compatibility or conflict and that conflict arises from perceived discrimination and related negative feelings towards the national majority. Using multigroup structural equation modelling, we examine how Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in five European cities combine their civic membership of the city and country of residence—as common identities shared with the national majority—with distinct ethnic and religious identities. In all sociopolitical contexts, participants combined significant city and national identities with strong ethnic and religious identifications. Yet, identification patterns varied between contexts from conflict (negatively correlated minority and civic identities) over compartmentalization (zero correlations) to compatibility (positive correlations). Muslims who perceived more personal discrimination were more committed to their ethnic and religious identities while simultaneously dis‐identifying from their country and city. Across cities, discrimination experiences and negative majority‐group evaluations explained away identity conflict.
What happens to the religious identity, belief, and practice of Muslims who settle in Western countries? Do they, or their children and subsequent generations, gradually become more secular? Or do they react against the dominant ethos and perceived prejudice by becoming more religious? We review recent research that touches on these questions. Most Muslim immigrants outside the United States come from rural areas of less developed countries where religiosity is higher than in the receiving societies. Residence in areas of high coethnic concentration, support from religious communities, and religious endogamy help to maintain religious commitment. The situation is more complicated for the second generation. Western culture has an influence, but structural integration does not necessarily reduce religiosity. Some children of immigrants try to follow a "real" Islam that has been purified of culturally specific practices. Hostility toward Muslims may lead some to react by increasing their own religious involvement.
Drawing on recent cross-nationally comparative survey data of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in five European cities, this study examines the patterns of identification with ethnic, religious, national and city identities. We take a comparative perspective and analyse data from five cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Brussels and Stockholm) that differ markedly in their policy approach to the integration of immigrants, the socio-economic position of the second generation and the political climate confronting ethnic and religious minorities. The analysis focuses on the question of how the Turkish and Moroccan second generation combines their ethnic and religious minority identities with identification with the country and city of residence. As European national identities are - to a greater extent than is the case for US American national identity - implicitly tied to and appropriated by the national majority group, we hypothesise that national identities will be non-inclusive of ethnic and religious identification, thus resulting in a negative correlation between Dutch/Belgian/Swedish identity on the one hand and Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim identities on the other. In contrast, we expect a positive correlation with identification with the city of residence, as Europe's cities are more diverse in terms of their population composition, have a more cosmopolitan outlook and are to a lesser extent dominated by one group of the population than the nationstates in which they are located. Secondly, we hypothesise that distinct identification patterns will be related to the modes of incorporation of the second generation, such that identity compatibility (i.e., positive associations between ethnic and religious identities on the one hand and national and city identities on the other) instead of identity conflict (i.e., negative associations) will be more often found in more favourable contexts of reception. ; Das Paper analysiert die Identifikationsmuster der türkischen und marokkanischen zweiten Einwanderergeneration in vergleichender Perspektive auf Basis von neuen ländervergleichenden Umfragedaten in fünf europäischen Städten in drei Ländern (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerpen, Brüssel und Stockholm). Diese unterscheiden sich deutlich in ihrer Einwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik, aber auch in der sozioökonomischen Position der zweiten Generation und in dem Maß der politischen Polarisierung rundum die Themen Immigration und Integration. Daraus ergeben sich länder- und städtespezifische modes of incorporation, die hier in Bezug zu den Identifikationsmustern der zweiten Generation gesetzt werden. Dabei richten wir uns vor allem auf die Zusammenhänge zwischen ethnischer und religiöser Identifikation auf der einen Seite - als Identitäten die die türkische und marokkanische zweite Generation von der Mehrheitsgesellschaft unterscheiden - und nationaler (d.h., niederländischer, belgischer und schwedischer) und Städte- Identifikation (z.B. Amsterdamer) - als Identitäten die mit der Mehrheitsgesellschaft geteilt werden. Da europäische nationale Identitäten stärker als dies in den USA der Fall ist von den ethnischen und religiösen Merkmalen der Mehrheitsgesellschaft bestimmt werden und daher ethnische und religiöse Minderheiten eher ausschließen, erwarten wir einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen nationaler Identifikation auf der einen, und ethnischer und religiöser Identifikation auf der anderen Seite. Im Gegensatz dazu erwarten wir positive Zusammenhänge mit der Identifikation mit der Stadt, da europäische Städte im Vergleich zu den sie umringenden Ländern Zentren ethnischer und kultureller Vielfalt sind und ihre Identität daher weniger von einer einzelnen Gruppe dominiert wird. Aus vergleichender Perspektive erwarten wir, dass die Identifikationsmuster der zweiten Generation die modes of incorporation in den jeweiligen Kontexten widerspiegeln, so dass in für Einwanderer der zweiten Generation günstigeren Kontexten Identitäten eher kompatibel sind (d.h., positiv korrelieren) und sich seltener in Konflikt miteinander befinden (d.h. negativ korrelieren).
