Search results

Cover -- Dedication -- Copyright -- Introduction -- I Genetic engineering: tomorrow's reality? -- II Beneficence or precaution? -- III Hitting the "re-set" button on debates about genetic engineering -- IV What is virtue ethics? -- V The pedagogical value of virtue ethics -- VI Let's cut to the chase: what conclusions do I make? -- VII Why an introductory book on genetics and ethics? -- Notes -- 1 Eugenics: Inherently Immoral? -- I What is "eugenics"? -- II Folic acid, vaccinations and water fluoridation: eugenics? -- III The (unjust) eugenics of the past -- IV Education and exercise: eugenics? -- V From unintentional genetic modification to intentional genetic modification -- Discussion questions -- Notes -- 2 The Genetic Revolution: A Snapshot -- I Introduction -- II Historical thinkers -- III Contemporary science -- IV Behavioural genetics -- V Genetic discrimination, gene patents and gene therapy -- VI Clinical trials -- VII How virtue ethics can help us navigate the complexity and provisionality of the genetic revolution -- Discussion questions -- Notes -- 3 Disease -- I Introduction -- II Why is there disease? -- III Infectious disease -- IV The challenge of our times: chronic disease -- V Moving beyond "negative biology" -- Discussion questions -- Notes -- 4 Epigenetics -- I Introduction -- II Poverty -- III Nature and nurture: the case of addiction -- IV Future generations and the non-identity problem -- Discussion questions -- Notes -- 5 Reproductive Freedom -- I Introduction -- II Parental wellbeing -- III Replacement fertility and patriarchy -- IV Procreative beneficence: why not the best? -- V Sex selection -- Discussion questions -- Notes -- 6 Aging Research and Longevity -- I Introduction: global aging -- II Positive biology and centenarians -- III Isn't exercise alone enough? -- IV Intervening in the aging process

AbstractThe sequencing of the human genome and advances in gene therapy and genomic editing, coupled with embryo selection techniques and a potential gerontological intervention, are some examples of the rapid technological advances of the "genetic revolution." This article addresses the methodological issue of how we should theorize about justice in the genomic era. Invoking the methodology ofnon-ideal theory, I argue that theorizing about justice in the genomic era entails theorizing about (1) the new inequalities that the genetic revolution could exacerbate (e.g., genetic discrimination, disability-related injustices, and gender inequality),and(2) those inequalities that the genetic revolution could help us mitigate (e.g., the risks of disease in early and late life). By doing so, normative theorists can ensure that we develop an account of justice that takes seriously not only individual rights, equality of opportunity, the cultural and sociopolitical aspects of disability, and equality between the sexes, but also the potential health benefits (to both individuals and populations) of attending to the evolutionary causes of morbidity and disability.

AbstractThe world's aging populations face novel health challenges never experienced before in human history. The moral landscape thus needs to adapt to reflect this novel empirical reality. In this paper I take for granted one basic moral principle advanced by Peter Singer — a principle of preventing bad occurrences — and explore the implications that empirical considerations from demography, evolutionary biology, and biogerontology have for the way we conceive of fulfilling this principle at the operational level. After bringing to the fore a number of considerations that Singer ignores, such as the probability that nonintervention will result in harm and the likelihood that different kinds of extrinsic and intrinsic harms can be prevented, I argue that the aspiration to extend the human biological warranty period (by retarding the rate of aging) is a pressing moral imperative for the twenty-first century. In the final sections I briefly address some standard objections raised against life extension and conclude that, while there may be some legitimate concerns worth addressing, they are not compelling enough to provide a rational basis for forfeiting the potential health and economic benefits that could be realized by extending the biological warranty period.

In this article I explore three distinct advantages of linking virtue epistemology to an epistemic defence of democracy. First, because intellectual agents and communities are the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, virtue epistemology offers political theorists the opportunity to develop an epistemic defence of democracy that takes 'realism' seriously (e.g. the cognitive limitations and biases of humans). Second, because virtue epistemology conceives of epistemology as a normative discipline, it builds normative criteria into the exercise of assessing the 'epistemic fitness' of a political arrangement (e.g. democracy vs. epistocracy). Third, by assessing the epistemic powers of democracy from a virtue-epistemological perspective, a more robust (Deweyan) conception of democracy needs to be employed and assessed than the minimalist conception employed by the Condorcet Jury Theorem.

Why does the world have the pattern of patriarchy it currently possesses? Why have patriarchal practices and institutions evolved and changed in the ways they have tended to over time in human societies? This paper explores these general questions by integrating a feminist analysis of patriarchy with the central insights of the functionalist interpretation of historical materialism advanced by G. A. Cohen. The paper has two central aspirations: first, to help narrow the divide between analytical Marxism and feminism by redressing the former's neglect of the important role female labor has played, and continues to play, in shaping human history. Second, by developing the functionalist account of historical materialism in order to take patriarchy seriously, we can derive useful insights for diagnosing the emancipatory challenges that women face in the world today. The degree and form of patriarchy present in any particular society is determined by the productive forces it has had at its disposal. According to historical materialism, technological, material, and medical advances that ease the pressures on high fertility rates (such as the sanitation revolution, vaccinations, birth control, and so on) are the real driving forces behind the positive modulations to patriarchy witnessed in the twentieth century.

Aristotle described the study of politics as an "architectonic" science that aspires to bring together insights from different fields of scientific inquiry to ensure that citizens have the opportunities to flourish. To meet the health and economic challenges of aging populations, we must revive this Aristotelian vision of politics. Prioritizing biogerontology is a requirement of well-ordered science. But a number of cognitive limitations and biases impair our ability to perceive both the harms of the inborn aging process and the magnitude of the likely benefits of age retardation. Thus, well-ordered science also requires us to address the social and cultural, and not merely scientific, obstacles that impede the aspiration to retard human aging.

In this article I argue that theorizing about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the 'best foreseeable conditions'. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. More specifically I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost-blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties or to treat rights as 'trumps'; and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls' difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the cost-blind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of trade-offs that inevitably arises in real non-ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice.