Search results

Das internationale System besteht aus einer Vielzahl von Institutionen, die häufig in ihren Funktionen überlappen, aber nicht in eine hierarchische Ordnung eingebettet sind. Ob diese institutionelle Komplexität zwischenstaatliche Zusammenarbeit stärkt oder schwächt, ist eine viel diskutierte Frage. Indem Benjamin Faude zeigt, dass funktional überlappenden internationalen Institutionen die Tendenz zur Herausbildung einer Arbeitsteilung inhärent ist, widerspricht er all denen, die von einer Schwächung internationaler Institutionen sprechen. Benjamin Faude ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung »Global Governance « am Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

This paper asks how institutional complexity affects the resilience of global governance. By drawing on sociological differentiation theory, it interprets growing levels of institutional complexity as a process of institutional differentiation which allows the "political system of world society" to mirror the increasing complexity of its social environment. More precisely, the paper suggests that growing levels of institutional complexity enhance the resilience of global governance by providing states with a more diverse set of governance tools and by making backup governance tools available. Against this backdrop, it makes two interrelated contributions to the literature on global governance. First, by applying the concept of resilience to global governance, the paper provides the conceptual basis for a novel research agenda on the ability of contemporary global governance to operate under stress. So far, the analytical toolbox of global governance researchers does not contain a concept that enables a theory-driven analysis of international institutions' ability to facilitate cooperation when confronted with high levels of stress. Second, it offers a sense of how the central structural feature of contemporary global governance—institutional complexity—affects its resilience. With these two interrelated contributions, the paper seeks to start a scholarly conversation on the resilience of contemporary global governance.

This paper asks how institutional complexity affects the resilience of global governance. By drawing on sociological differentiation theory, it interprets growing levels of institutional complexity as a process of institutional differentiation which allows the "political system of world society" to mirror the increasing complexity of its social environment. More precisely, the paper suggests that growing levels of institutional complexity enhance the resilience of global governance by providing states with a more diverse set of governance tools and by making backup governance tools available. Against this backdrop, it makes two interrelated contributions to the literature on global governance. First, by applying the concept of resilience to global governance, the paper provides the conceptual basis for a novel research agenda on the ability of contemporary global governance to operate under stress. So far, the analytical toolbox of global governance researchers does not contain a concept that enables a theory-driven analysis of international institutions' ability to facilitate cooperation when confronted with high levels of stress. Second, it offers a sense of how the central structural feature of contemporary global governance—institutional complexity—affects its resilience. With these two interrelated contributions, the paper seeks to start a scholarly conversation on the resilience of contemporary global governance.

AbstractWhat are the implications of the proliferating preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for the liberal trade order? Many scholars and practitioners see large increases in PTAs as a destabilizing factor that undermines core features of the post‐war international trade system. By contrast, this paper argues that the accelerated growth of PTAs since the mid‐1990s enhances the resilience of the liberal trade order. PTAs increase the ability of the order to accommodate heterogeneous preferences and distributive conflicts. They represent a continuation of a longer path of liberalization set in motion by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This path‐dependent development created conditions for a gradual expansion of the membership and the regulatory scope of the GATT/WTO system, but also heightened levels of preference heterogeneity and distributive conflicts. By enabling groups of states with homogenous preferences to layer new rules on top of the multilateral GATT/WTO system, PTAs enable the continuation of the liberalization path. Consequently, PTAs have served as complements rather than to undermine the WTO.

In seiner "Theory of Global Governance" argumentiert Michael Zürn, Staaten seien gegenwärtig in ein globales politisches System eingebettet, das eine Vielzahl internationaler Institutionen umfasst. Dieser Forumsbeitrag unternimmt den Versuch einer Annäherung an die Gestalt des von Zürn identifizierten globalen politischen Systems. Er schlägt vor, global governance als ein polyzentrisch strukturiertes System zu konzeptualisieren, das aus vielen Entscheidungszentren besteht, die formal voneinander unabhängig sind, sich aber faktisch wechselseitig beeinflussen. Der Beitrag verdeutlicht zunächst, worin die zentralen Merkmale der polyzentrischen Struktur des von Zürn identifizierten globalen politischen Systems bestehen. Anschließend skizziert er, wie die polyzentrische Struktur staatliches Verhalten beeinflusst und das Problem politischer Ordnungsbildung jenseits des Nationalstaates akzentuiert. Abschließend wird vor dem Hintergrund gegenwärtiger Herausforderungen für zwischenstaatliche Kooperation angedeutet, worin die institutionellen Stärken einer polyzentrischen Regelungsstruktur liegen.

This paper asks how institutional complexity affects the resilience of global governance. By drawing on sociological differentiation theory, it interprets growing levels of institutional complexity as a process of institutional differentiation which allows the "political system of world society" to mirror the increasing complexity of its social environment. More precisely, the paper suggests that growing levels of institutional complexity enhance the resilience of global governance by providing states with a more diverse set of governance tools and by making backup governance tools available. Against this backdrop, it makes two interrelated contributions to the literature on global governance. First, by applying the concept of resilience to global governance, the paper provides the conceptual basis for a novel research agenda on the ability of contemporary global governance to operate under stress. So far, the analytical toolbox of global governance researchers does not contain a concept that enables a theory-driven analysis of international institutions' ability to facilitate cooperation when confronted with high levels of stress. Second, it offers a sense of how the central structural feature of contemporary global governance—institutional complexity—affects its resilience. With these two interrelated contributions, the paper seeks to start a scholarly conversation on the resilience of contemporary global governance.

Das internationale System besteht aus einer Vielzahl von Institutionen, die häufig in ihren Funktionen überlappen, aber nicht in eine hierarchische Ordnung eingebettet sind. Ob diese institutionelle Komplexität zwischenstaatliche Zusammenarbeit stärkt oder schwächt, ist eine viel diskutierte Frage. Indem Benjamin Faude zeigt, dass funktional überlappenden internationalen Institutionen die Tendenz zur Herausbildung einer Arbeitsteilung inhärent ist, widerspricht er all denen, die von einer Schwächung internationaler Institutionen sprechen.

AbstractThis paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of "contested multilateralism" (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

AbstractInstitutional overlap emerges not only as an unintended by-product of purposive state action but also as its deliberate result. In two ways, this article expands existing research on the causes and consequences of institutional overlap. First, we establish that three different types of dissatisfaction may lead states to deliberately create institutional overlap: dissatisfaction with substantive norms and rules, dissatisfaction with decision-making rules and dissatisfaction with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement for a given cooperation problem. Each type of dissatisfaction triggers a distinct motivation for the creation of institutional overlap: to induce policy change, to increase influence on collective decision-making or to enhance governance effectiveness. Second, we demonstrate that whereas the motivation to induce policy change leads to interface conflicts, the motivations to increase influence on collective decision-making and to enhance governance effectiveness give rise to inter-institutional coordination. Three empirical case studies on global energy governance, the governance of global development banking and global environmental governance probe these analytical claims.

This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of "contested multilateralism" (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.