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This brief paper summarizes results from an analysis of the World Development Report (WDR) homicide dataset (February 24, 2010), which is based primarily on estimates from the United Nations Office against Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with some changes or additions from national sources and the World Health organization (WHO). Although homicide rates appear to be the most reliable cross-national measure of crime, the best estimates have are still probably much less reliable than parallel measures have for presence and scale of civil conflict involving organized armed groups. This is so for two main reasons. First, the data are collected and reported by country agencies (police, usually), and procedures, definitions, and competence can vary greatly across countries and over time within them. Looking at the time series for particular countries suggests in many cases that large changes must be due to changed procedures or data collection policies, rather than changes in actual homicide rates. Second, there is a great deal of missing data.

When Things Fell Apart manages to be wonderfully concise but still compelling. The thing Robert Bates seeks to explain is the secular trend in sub-Saharan Africa toward civil war, although he often characterizes this in broader terms, as a trend toward "political conflict" or "political disorder." He explains the trend as follows: Public revenues fell in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of commodity price declines, effects of the second oil shock, and bad economic policy choices that overtaxed farmers so that politicians could dispense patronage to smaller, politically more important urban constituencies. The decline in public revenues led elites to become more predatory, which caused an increase in political conflict by mobilizing opposition. Popular demands for political reform, along with increased international pressure for the same at the end of the Cold War, heightened elite insecurity and led to more predation. This had the effect of "provoking their citizens to take up arms" (p. 109). Further, state decline and national-level conflicts exacerbated simmering subnational conflicts, typically in the form of land disputes between locals and migrants from other tribes.

Collier and Hoeffler reported that countries with a higher percentage of national income from primary commodity exports have been more prone to civil war, an interesting finding that has received much attention from policy makers and the media. The author shows that this result is quite fragile, even using Collier and Hoeffler's data. Minor changes in the sample framing and the recovery of missing data undermine it. To the extent that there is an association, it is likely because oil is a major component of primary commodity exports and substantial oil production does associate with civil war risk. The author argues that oil predicts civil war risk not because it provides an easy source of rebel start-up finance but probably because oil producers have relatively low state capabilities given their level of per capita income and because oil makes state or regional control a tempting "prize." An analysis of data on government observance of contracts and investor-perceived expropriation risk is consistent with this hypothesis.